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Abstract 
 
Focusing on the everyday lives of middle-class English families in a medium size town 
situated in the Midlands, this doctoral thesis contributes to anthropological debates on the 
topics of human agency, time, domesticity, mothering, and kinship. Organized upon the 
idea that cultural models of time are inextricably linked to understandings of agency 
(Greenhouse 1996), the thesis links Moore’s (2011) post-vitalist theoretical framework and 
the work of Foucault (1990, 2000) on ethical practices, with Gershon’s (2011) critique of 
‘neoliberal agency’. The concept of ‘ordinary agency’ is proposed for situating everyday 
actions as significant actions that contribute to social transformation. Three cultural models 
of time are identified – spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family time’ – and the types of 
‘ordinary agencies’ that they engage are described in three dedicated chapters. 
The first chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis. The second chapter 
addresses methodological issues, and discusses the methods that the author developed 
during her ethnographic fieldwork for looking at people’s relationships with time. The third 
chapter addresses the time mode of spontaneity, presenting ethnographic examples of 
digital media use at home, and introducing theoretical tools for situating the forms of 
agency engendered by spontaneity. The fourth chapter looks at the time mode of 
anticipation in relation to mothering, motherhood and care. This chapter is accompanied by 
a video component, titled Mum’s Cup and situated in the appendix of the thesis. Based on 
material that the participants filmed in solitude, for a self-interviewing with video task, 
Mum’s Cup is a visual point of departure for theorising the Mother-Multiple ontological 
position that is described in chapter IV. Alongside providing a visual ethnographic lever for 
endorsing a theoretical concept, the video project also reflects on the relationship between 
the researcher and the participants, a relationship that, for various reasons (some related 
to length limitations), is not fully described in the textual corpus of the thesis. Discussing 
two types of domestic sociality, the fifth chapter looks at ‘family time’ and at the forms of 
agency engendered by the idea and by the experience of having a ‘family-style lifestyle’ 
(Strathern 1992), and it draws on, and contributes to, bodies of literature on English kinship. 
The last chapter addresses the context of the research – which is an interdisciplinary 
project looking at domestic energy consumption –; it situates the position of the author in 
relation to the domestic sustainability agenda and to debates on interdisciplinarity, and it 
formulates ideas about possible applications that the anthropological knowledge gained by 
the author through her research could have in relation to the context that originally framed 
and facilitated the research. 
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Introduction 
 
This ethnography draws upon fifteen months of fieldwork in Middleborough1, a 
medium-sized town situated in the area of East Midlands, England. The central 
topic is an exploration of everyday domestic life of middle-class families, focusing 
on the articulation and enactment of specific time-modes, the corresponding types 
of ‘ordinary agency’ that they engender, and their employment in everyday 
practices of creating relatedness (Carsten 2000a). I examine everyday actions 
performed at home, in solitude, or in the company of members of one’s nuclear 
family, as significant actions that express human agency and that can contribute to 
social transformation in two ways: by extending people’s ‘ethical imaginations’ in 
self-other relations (Moore 2011), which can refer to the relationships between 
participants and researcher, or to kin relationships, with regard to enacting care 
towards one’s ‘domestic others’ – family members, pets, and the house itself as an 
entity; and by supporting the development of new forms of sociality that can inspire 
further models of social organisation, such as the sociality of instant gifting and the 
sociality of physical togetherness and digital independence. Specifically, I focus 
upon examples of actions that involve the use of digital media, such as finding the 
answer to a question of momentary concern by using a smartphone or a tablet 
connected to the internet, coordinating activities with other family members by 
sending text messages, and engaging in activities of media multi-tasking in the 
evening in relation to ‘doing’ family (Morgan 1996) and to making ‘family time’. 
My approach responds to two different calls towards a new recognition of the 
potentialities, ubiquity, and the embedded nature of human agency in activities of 
self-reflection, imagination and hope. Both grounded in Foucault’s (1990, 2000) 
work on ethical practices, one call is made by Moore (2011), in proposing the 
analytical lever of ‘ethical imagination’ for developing a post-vitalist perspective, and 
one is made by Hobson (2011), in her critique of existing approaches to the 
domestic sustainability research agenda. My dissertation advances the work of 
Moore (2011) and Hobson (2011), adding one more analytical tool to the ideas and 
vision expressed in their calls, by introducing the working concept of ‘ordinary 
agency’. Situated  and employed within the domain of the everyday, of the ‘non-
                                            
1 A pseudonym whose choice I explain in the methodological chapter. 
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eventful’ (Ehn & Löfgren 2010), ordinary agencies are related to ‘non-conscious’ – 
unconscious, tacit, and non-intentional – acts of creating meaning, such as 
imagination and taking action on impulse. This concept can also be approached as 
in contradistinction to the concept of ‘neoliberal agency’ (Gershon 2011) that 
defines acts of calculation and rational decision making. Gershon (2011) developed 
this concept in order to criticise the unquestioned influence that neoliberal contexts 
have upon the analytical tools and approaches used for looking at human agency 
by contemporary scholars coming from such contexts. By universalizing a specific 
definition of agency, neoliberal perspectives, Gershon (2011) argues, endorse a 
singular worldview. ‘Neoliberal agency’ does not account for people’s capacity to 
produce radical social transformation, but only for their ability to rationally operate 
means-ends calculations within a given (neoliberal) context. Gershon (2011) 
suggests that, in order for one to arrive at seeing other forms, understandings, and 
enactments of agency beyond the dominant neoliberal worldview, one should pay 
attention to epistemological difference, (alternative forms of) social organisation, 
and their interconnections.  
The working concept of ‘ordinary agency’ has, therefore, two functions. First, it 
responds to Moore’s (2011) and Hobson’s (2011) calls towards an approach of 
ordinary actions as meaningful for social transformation. Second, it responds to 
Gershon’s (2011) call for moving beyond ‘neoliberal agency’ through attention to 
epistemological difference and social organisation. I suggest that the domain of the 
ordinary, even in neoliberal economic and political contexts, can be regarded to 
manifest different epistemologies – related to tacit knowledge, imagination and the 
unconscious – and to bring out new understandings of the mutual shaping between 
epistemologies and relationships. This argument is developed in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, which introduces the theoretical framework of my work.  
The second chapter introduces the methodological framework of my research, 
presenting the ways in which I experienced the relationships between ‘applied’ and 
‘academic’ anthropology, discussing ‘sensory ethnography’ (Pink 2009) as the 
approach to ethnographic practice that I follow, and describing the methods that I 
developed together with my participants in order to access different forms of tacit 
knowledge. 
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The empirical chapters of my thesis (chapters 3 – 5) focus upon specific types of 
‘ordinary agencies’, in relation to approaches to, understandings, and enactments 
of time inside domestic settings. The third chapter looks at spontaneity, developing 
a theoretical framework, based upon the work of the British philosopher Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1981, 2000 [1957]), for understanding spontaneous action as a form of 
action where means and ends coincide, and that represents ‘doing’ in the 
Aristotelian distinction between ‘doing’ and ‘making’. In the fourth chapter, I discuss 
the time-mode of anticipation, and I develop the concept of Mother-Multiple 
ontology in order to look at experiences of caregiving in kinship contexts; I describe 
forms of anticipation that are enacted when one steps into the Mother-Multiple 
position. In the fifth chapter, I discuss ‘family time’ as a concept used to ‘measure’ 
the quality of home life in ‘family-style lifestyle’ (Strathern 1992) settings, focusing 
upon two types of domestic sociality: elusive togetherness, and physical 
togetherness and digital independence; I look at the forms of agency engendered in 
making ‘family time’, and at the ways in which the normativity associated with the 
concept of ‘family’ in English middle-class contexts was both incorporated, and 
contested by my participants in their everyday practices of ‘creating relatedness’ 
(Carsten 2000a). Besides developing conceptualizations for regarding three specific 
time-modes and the types of ‘ordinary agencies’ that they engender, the empirical 
chapters also focus upon three different scales of analysis: the third chapter looks 
at individuals; the fourth chapter looks at relationships between two parts: the 
Mother-Multiple and the ‘domestic others’; and the fifth chapter looks at 
commonality and at specific forms of sociality of togetherness that are articulated in 
family settings.    
In the sixth chapter I define my position in relation to the interdisciplinary applied 
context that framed my doctoral research, in order to show how my ethnographic 
findings, which were influenced by this context, could be applied in order to change 
the type of questions that projects focused on energy reduction address. The 
applications that I describe are related to tackling the powerful constellations of 
normativity and morality attributed to having a family-style lifestyle in English 
middle-class contexts; and to mediating between the temporality expressed by the 
Climate Change Act and the temporalities that laypeople enact in their everyday 
domestic lives. 
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In this introduction, after I succinctly describe the context of my research, I will 
focus upon two topics that are of specific importance in situating the empirical and 
the theoretical work that is discussed in my dissertation: family and time. My 
research participants were families which I visited, during my fieldwork, in their 
domestic settings; the multi-sensory and affective experiences, the forms of 
sociality, as well as the expectations and the normativity associated with the 
concept of ‘family’ in the UK were, therefore essential influences in the articulation 
of my ethnographic findings, as well as in the analytic development of my 
dissertation. Time, as I will show, was a general topic of concern that I encountered 
in these settings. The focus on family and time in this introduction is, therefore, 
meant to set the context for the work that is developed in the main corpus of my 
thesis. 
 
The context of the research 
 
My doctoral research was carried out as part of an interdisciplinary research project, 
the Low Effort Energy Demand Reduction (LEEDR) project. Based at 
Loughborough University, and funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) of the UK, LEEDR brought together fifteen researchers 
from five departments: building engineering, systems engineering, computer 
science, design and social sciences. The project investigated domestic energy 
consumption with English families, with the aim of proposing digital interventions 
that would help lower domestic energy demand. From the start, the focus of the 
project was twofold: reducing energy demand and understanding the ways in which 
digital technologies are used inside the home, so that interventions based upon 
these technologies could be developed. Both these aims, together with the general 
domestic sustainability research agenda related to existent concerns in national 
environmental policy, framed my research from the start and they influenced the 
way in which I developed my research design.   
One of the current research areas that the EPSRC allocates funding for is the area 
of ‘Energy’, which is related to the efforts for meeting the environmental targets and 
the policy goals set by the Climate Change Act. Adopted in 2008, the Climate 
Change Act legally bounds the UK’s Parliament to reduce the country’s carbon 
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emissions with 80% by the year 2050, in relation to the 1990 baseline. In order to 
achieve the 80% reduction in carbon emissions, it is estimated that a reduction of 
26-43% in energy consumption will be required, as a set of energy consumption 
scenarios produced by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
show. While accounting for approximately 30% of UK’s greenhouse gas emissions, 
at the moment, domestic energy consumption is estimated to be higher than in 
1990. The predictions of the Energy Saving Trust for electricity consumption show 
that ‘domestic electricity demand in 2020 is forecast at 80TWh, a reduction in real 
terms of about 6% from 2009 levels, but 14% higher than 1990’ (EST 2011: 29). 
This context explains the interest with funding research in the area of energy 
efficiency, which the LEEDR project addresses as well. 
Working as part of an interdisciplinary project meant, for me, taking part in 
fortnightly meetings and thematic one-day workshops with the entire LEEDR team 
in order to develop interdisciplinary dialogues. I had the opportunity to engage with 
the types of questions addressed by other disciplines and to conduct research as 
part of the social sciences branch of the LEEDR project. At the same time, I was 
able to develop and to carry out my doctoral research independently. For my 
doctoral project I chose to momentarily suspend any direct concerns with domestic 
energy consumption and to focus, instead, upon gaining a deeper understanding of 
domesticity, looking at what was specific about the types of actions performed at 
home, about the forms of relationships developed in kinship contexts, and about the 
forms of sociality enacted in domestic settings. While keeping the interest with 
digital media usages expressed initially by the LEEDR project, I approached these 
questions in relation to the temporal dimension of domesticity. My doctoral research 
focused, therefore, on domestic time and digital media use: the ways in which 
people understand, measure, organise, approach, and engage with time in 
domestic settings defined by particular sets of relationships and by specific forms of 
sociality, and how digital media are employed in these processes. However, after 
finalising my ethnographic fieldwork, and after analysing my findings within a social 
anthropological framework, I went back to the concern with reducing domestic 
energy consumption embedded in the LEEDR project, and I made an exercise of 
formulating possible applications that the knowledge produced through my fieldwork 
could have in relation to energy demand reduction. In the second chapter of this 
thesis, which is the methodological chapter, I discuss in more detail my experiences 
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of working as part of an applied interdisciplinary project, as well as the ways in 
which this context influenced my fieldwork and the relationships that I developed 
with my participants. In the sixth chapter, I situate my position within the domestic 
sustainability research agenda, which is expressed by the LEEDR project, and I 
discuss some ways in which my ethnographic findings could be applied in order to 
change the types of questions that projects following this agenda address.  
 
Family 
 
The LEEDR group conducted research with twenty self-selected family-participants 
who volunteered to take part in the project for two and a half years. Their 
participation was not incentivised and their reasons for volunteering were individual 
and diverse, such as an interest in living more sustainable, or in lowering down 
one’s energy bills. The participants agreed to have their energy consumption 
monitored for the whole duration of their participation, and to take part in 
ethnographic research, and in research conducted by colleagues from the discipline 
of design. The participant families were all home-owners; two of them defined 
themselves, during interviews, as ‘working-class’ while the other eighteen could be 
described, in terms of income and education, as ‘middle-class’. With the exception 
of one single-parent family and of one extended family where the maternal 
grandmother was living in, all the family-participants were two-parent nuclear 
families. Moreover, all adult couples were heterosexual and married. Each family 
had between one and four children, with ages between one and 22.  
While the LEEDR recruitment materials did not contain any descriptive cues 
regarding the types of families wanted, except for the essential criteria of being 
home-owners in order for the process of monitoring equipment installation to run 
smoothly, it turned out that all the families who volunteered reflected what can be 
called a traditional family ideology, namely a heterosexual married couple with 
children. James (1998) argues that the rhetoric of the traditional family in the UK 
continues to be conferred with ideological solidity by social policy and political 
practice ‘despite its considerable inappropriateness for accounting for the 
contemporary forms of family life’ (James 1998: 143). The dominance of this 
rhetoric might be one of the reasons why other, alternative forms of families were 
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not represented in this research, as the apparently neutral descriptive cue of ‘home-
owner family’ might have automatically triggered the image of a ‘cereal box’ middle-
class family, which many potential participants might not have identified themselves 
with.  
The fact that all the families had children relates with existent cultural 
understandings of kinship as well. In her study of childhood identity in Britain, 
James (1998) discusses the assumption that ‘[p]arenting is what transforms the 
couple into a family – a shift that is also popularly held to make a house into a home’ 
(1998: 144). In other words, in order to be regarded as having ‘a family’, or a family-
style lifestyle (Strathern 1992), UK adults need to have children. This social 
requirement is associated with a set of moral values that, in a secular context, has 
the potential to produce a dominant and self-sufficient model of morality. As 
Strathern (1992) argues, in post-Thatcherite Britain, by ‘doing’ convention, which, 
here, is opting for a family-style lifestyle, the individual ‘shows his or her capacity for 
morality, and thus makes explicit the fact that moral behaviour is contingent on the 
capacity for choice’ (1992: 162). In the fifth chapter, I discuss the complex 
relationships that my participants had with the ideologically solid rhetoric of ‘the 
family’ and that they expressed in ‘family practices’ (Morgan 1996) of making ‘family 
time’ that both showed their ‘doing’ of convention, and their creativity in challenging 
the rigidity of social norms regarding family life and the dominant definition of the 
notion of ‘family’. In the sixth chapter, I draw attention to a potential conflict between 
the morality associated with having a family-style lifestyle, and the morality of 
sustainable and low-carbon living practices, which, I suggest, can only be resolved 
by melting down the ideologically solid rhetoric of the traditional family and its 
default association with moral capacities.  
 
Time 
 
A focus on time emerged from the early stages of my research, before officially 
starting my fieldwork, by looking at early findings from research with a LEEDR pilot 
family-participant, as well as from my everyday experiences and observations as a 
Romanian anthropologist moving to a small English town. While I initially framed 
this focus by developing the working concept of ‘domestic moments’ as a lens for 
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looking at everyday family life and domestic activities that will acknowledge the 
temporal, rather than the spatial, dimension of home, my understandings of my 
participants’ relationships with time at home developed considerably during my 
fieldwork, moving beyond the analytical capacities of this initial working concept.  
In my fieldwork with English middle-class families, time appeared as one of the 
main constraints in people’s lives; one of the main agents that stood in their way to 
achieving a sense of having the life they always wanted. The state, political power, 
the economic system, financial constraints, gender inequalities, specific sets of 
social norms and expectations, were not, apparently, sources of conflict. Time, 
instead, was. Lack of time was all that stopped my participants to be what they 
aspired to be, to pursue all the hobbies that they would have liked to, to make their 
house into their imagined ideal home, to model their children in a way that would 
fully represent their values and beliefs. This sense of lack of time emerged most 
strongly when I asked my research participants if there were ever moments when 
they wanted to make time go faster, or when they were feeling bored. The 
unanimous response to this question was a strong no, accompanied by surprised 
laughter and various explanations, such as Vic’s, below.2 
Normally, time is something that we don’t have enough anyway. So, to make it 
pass quicker, it’s not something we would, generally, want to do. I can’t remember 
the last time I was bored. I can remember the last time I was thinking ‘why am I 
watching this?’, but not actually bored, no. We’re always busy: if we’re waiting 
twenty minutes for something to be ready in the oven, then we would use that 
twenty minutes for something else. (interview Vic and Gail) 
For my participants, time was running fast, which was visible in the changes in 
one’s children growing up; time was finite, an observation which usually emerged 
on Sunday evenings and at the end of holidays. Time was not what it used to be. 
When I asked Elaine and Chris if they had a routine of using music, radio, or the TV 
as a background to set the atmosphere for specific collective family activities, they 
said that they do not follow a routine, as their parents might have done by listening 
to the same radio show, or by watching the same TV soap opera every evening. 
They were not trying to create a sense of continuity and repetition in the ways they 
                                            
2 When referring to the research participants in the corpus of this thesis I use pseudonyms.  
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articulated domesticity, but just to get done all the evening tasks that they needed 
to complete for themselves and for their children.  
Chris: I guess the modern world and family processes, they don’t really lend 
themselves to the kind of relaxed context repetition of previous generations. I 
mean, we’re just doing whatever we need to do to get everything done at the 
moment, aren’t we? (interview Chris and Elaine) 
For the majority of my participants, everyday domestic life was far from routinized, 
but it was rather made of a series of spontaneous decisions. These decisions 
generally followed the scenario: ‘what’s the situation?’; ‘what’s the time?’; ‘what 
needs to be finished, what can be paused and what can be left for tomorrow?’ The 
increased busyness of life, the blurring of the boundaries between work and home 
facilitated by the new capacities of digital technologies, such as that of providing 
access to one’s work emails on one’s mobile phone, placed the realm of 
domesticity and the realm of the public space in a relation of mutual saturation, 
rather than in opposition. In her study of temporal organization at home and at work 
with American families where both adults were working full-time, Hochschild (1997) 
argues that people’s attempts to efficiently organize ‘family time’ represented a 
characteristic of work that was increasingly spreading inside the home. What she 
found out that her participants wished for was ‘not simply more time, but a less 
alienating sense of time’ (Hochschild 1997: 52); they wanted to be ‘time-architects’, 
who would be able to take their time in deciding how to structure their ‘home time’, 
in order to improve and develop their relationships, and not ‘time-capitalists’ that 
would treat time as capital that needs to be well managed. However, my research 
participants were not longing for an alternative sense of time, as they did have 
various strategies for manipulating time at home; but their time conflicts emerged 
from feeling limited by the amount of time available, which would not allow them to 
fully develop all their interests, and to fully reach and express their individual 
complexity. Multi-tasking, and switching between activities while waiting, were two 
techniques for gaining time. Below, Chris describes his strategies for not wasting 
precious time. 
Chris: You can never wait for anything; you start something off and then you think: 
‘Right, I’ll go and do this’. And, then, you start something else off, and, then, you 
go and do something else and start that off, and then, all of a sudden, you’re 
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going ‘Oh, there was something else I needed to do and that’s going to be ready 
in a minute and I’ve got to get the...’ I mean, I’ve even got to the point of trying to 
write down what comes into my head that I should be doing, so that when I come 
back I won’t forget what it was I thought of five items ago that I can do. I mean, the 
bizarre thing is: it’s like putting your cup of tea in the microwave for 30 seconds, or 
something – even that you can’t stand to stand there and watch. You cannot 
watch for 30 seconds, you have to go and do something else (…) I mean, 
watching seconds count down on the microwave is like watching your life 
disappear, or something. They should put a skull on the front, or something. 
(interview Chris and Elaine) 
While this sense of passing through everyday life against the constant ticking of a 
timer was clearly related to the sheer busyness of life in modern times, I argue that 
one important element in generating and sustaining this feeling was an essential 
change in the visual representation of time measurement. My participants’ preferred 
method for telling the time during the day was by checking their mobile phones or 
computers. These devices display time as a series of four numbers (e.g. 15:52), the 
last of which changes every minute. Analogue clocks represent time as cyclical: the 
speed of the moving hands is constant and their movement visible, which makes it 
possible for one to see the choreography of one minute’s passing, to anticipate a 
future event that will start after a specific number of set segments of time have 
passed, and to visually ‘calculate’ the amount of time that is left before one would 
need to leave for work. In a digital numeric representation, time appears as linear 
and as moving forward like a chronometer, rather than in circles and clockwise; this 
representation appears as a given and unquestionable set of numbers that do not 
permit a creative interpretation, anticipation, or waiting, as Chris mentions. Digital 
clocks show time in the same way that a time bomb in an action movie would show 
it. No wonder that one cannot stop the chain of activities in order to just wait for 
something to be ready. 
Digital representations of time are increasingly replacing analogue ones. Besides 
mobile phones and computers, digital clocks are embedded in various other 
domestic appliances and they can be found in each room of the house, as it was 
the case for the domestic settings of my participants: on the microwave, or on the 
oven screen, in the kitchen; in the living room, on the TV box; and as alarm clocks, 
in the bedrooms. From the moment they wake up and until they go to bed, people 
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situate themselves in relation to time by using a digital numerical framework of 
linearity, or progression. While very few of my participants still wore watches, and 
some of them had an analogue wall clock in the kitchen or in the living room, the 
presence of time as numerical and linear, expressed by all the digital technologies 
increasingly used at home, was the dominant temporal framework of the everyday. 
When asked about the differences between using a digital and an analogue clock, 
some participants said that for them it did not make any difference as they were 
using both devices with an informative purpose, while others said they preferred to 
read time on an analogue clock face; however, because of the plurality and 
pervasiveness of digital devices around them, people said that they did not use an 
analogue clock as often as they would have liked to. Digital clocks were associated 
with precision, and they were often checked because people knew that the time on 
mobile phones and computers was synchronized through satellites, and it 
represented the ‘right’ time that was used globally. Analogue clocks, on the other 
hand, are not connected with satellites and, thus, they are prone to error. Their 
invention is related to a previous scientific era when the time on mechanical clocks 
was calibrated to the cycles of cesium atoms, and not to the rotation of the Earth, 
as discussed by Birth (2012).   
Steve told me that he prefers to read time on an analogue clock face, rather than by 
using a digital clock: 
Because, at a glance, you know what you’re looking at (…) When I see the hand, 
for me, it equates to an amount of time. Certainly, in the morning, if I need to take 
Alan at eight o’clock to school, and I’m sitting here, and I’ve got fifteen minutes left 
to get dressed and get out. I do see that more relevant as a sequence of time, 
than if I’ve looked and it said ‘45’. Sometimes I get caught out a little bit, if I’ve 
used the clock on my car for instance: what time you’ve got left to get somewhere. 
Sometimes I’ve got caught out, ‘cause somehow it doesn’t… I don’t know, it goes 
faster; for me, anyway. (interview Steve and Iris) 
Because he is not able to see the time passing on the digital clock in his car, as he 
is able to do when using an analogue clock, Steve feels that time goes faster. His 
driving is not attuned to a visible movement of cyclical time, but it is parallel, and in 
competition, to a progressive linear invisible time, which is expressed through a set 
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of numbers that are to be trusted as representing ‘the reality’ and that appear as an 
unquestionable verdict. 
The cognitive anthropologist Kevin Birth (2012) argues that the time-reckoning tools 
developed by humans can be regarded as cognitive artefacts: objects that people 
use to think about the world. Clocks and calendars, which provide a set of dominant 
representations of time, are tools that humans have placed knowledge in, and that 
they have come to rely on, instead of continuing to develop and to use their 
cognitive skills for telling the time: ‘These skills can be cultivated, but normally are 
not, because their cultivation creates a sense of multiple temporalities of which 
clocks and calendars represent only two. To place these alternate temporalities in 
counterpoint with the dominant modes of reckoning time challenges these dominant 
modes’ (Birth 2012: 11).    
Following Birth’s (2012) approach, one can argue that digital clocks are cognitive 
artefacts that people use in order to think about the world, and that can have 
specific influences upon the ways in which people think about, and position 
themselves in relation to time. Digital clocks are not accountable for what is 
regarded as the increased pace of everyday life in modern times (Eriksen 2001), 
but their pervasiveness can be regarded as contributing to maintaining one’s 
perception of competing against the counting down of a timer, as a way of living. 
While analogue clocks, prone to error and requiring resetting from time to time, 
leave room for the imagination that time could pass at different speeds and, 
sometimes, even stop, digital clocks, synchronized to the satellites, are never 
wrong, and they privilege a specific type of engagement: one that is based on linear 
progression, and not on imagination, or daydreaming.  
However, I argue that the existence and constant use of a set of dominant time-
reckoning tools, such as digital clocks, does not completely erase alternative sets of 
human skills for telling the time, for imaging time, and for engaging with time; rather 
than being absent, these skills are exercised tentatively and informally in the 
domain of everyday domestic life, between others. Greenhouse (1996) argues that 
there is a connection between the forms of time used by social groups and their 
understandings of agency: ‘time’s many forms are cultural propositions about the 
nature and distribution of agency across social space – cultural propositions cast as 
normative ideals’ (Greenhouse 1996: 82). Following this idea, in this dissertation I 
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will discuss spontaneity, anticipation, and ‘family time’ as time-modes that express 
counterdiscourses to the dominance of linear time – articulated and maintained 
through digital clocks, between other techniques – and that make a statement about 
the ingrained presence of ‘ordinary agency’ in everyday domestic life. Moreover, in 
my discussion I will focus upon examples in which these alternative time-modes are 
being articulated through the use of digital media, showing that people have the 
capacity and the creativity to employ the very tools that embody a linear 
representation of time, in order to create counterdiscourses to this form of 
temporality. These counterdiscourses, however, should not be regarded as forms of 
resistance to, but as co-existing together with, linear time, and that people appeal to 
in order to momentarily ignore the requests and the limitations associated with a 
linear temporality, and to express, instead, alternative ways of engagement with the 
world, articulated through ‘ethical imagination’ (Moore 2011), and through the 
development of new forms of sociality. In the theoretical chapter, I discuss in more 
detail the argument developed by Greenhouse (1996), together with other 
anthropological approaches to time. In the empirical chapters (chapters 3 – 5), I 
describe the time-modes of spontaneity, anticipation and, respectively, ‘family time’, 
and the forms of ‘ordinary agency’ that their enactments engender. In the last 
chapter I address the topic of time when discussing potential applications of the 
knowledge developed through my doctoral research, by looking at ways of 
mediating between the temporalities of domesticity that I arrived to learn about, and 
the temporal framework expressed by the Climate Change Act in the UK. 
 
Methods 
 
This ethnography is the result of fifteen months of fieldwork (October 2011 – 
December 2012) that I carried out with eighteen families, all part of the twenty 
LEEDR households. During the first three months of fieldwork (October – 
December 2011), I conducted research with six of these families as part of the 
social sciences branch of the LEEDR project. For the following twelve months, I 
developed my doctoral fieldwork, in two directions that unfolded simultaneously. 
First, I conducted a semi-structured interview on the topic of domestic time and 
digital media usages, accompanied by participant observation, with eighteen family-
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participants. Second, I asked five families, out of the larger group, to take part in an 
in-depth long-term research for one year (January – December 2012). With these 
families, who became my key-participants, I developed a long-term relationship, 
and I carried out long-term ethnographic fieldwork. 
In order to find multiple entry points into the topic of domestic time, I developed 
together with my key-participants a set of arts-based ‘inventive’ methods, and 
participatory methods: the Tactile Time collage, the Evening Times self-video 
recording activity and the Five Cups of Tea self-interviewing with video activity. 
Besides these methods, towards the end of my fieldwork I conducted another 
interview with the adults in the five key family-participants, on childhood and 
teenage memories of media and ICT use at home. I discuss in more detail the 
stages of my research, and the methods that were developed, in the second 
chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Myself 
 
I see myself as an optimist, and I regard the opportunity of engaging in long-term 
ethnographic research as providing immense personal gain, by bringing out new 
ways of carrying out ‘ethical work’ (Foucault 1990, 2000) in relation to the 
experiences, ontologies and epistemologies of the research participants that the 
ethnographer learns from. These two features clearly influenced the knowledge 
produced through my fieldwork and, specifically, the topic and focus of my 
dissertation. However, if in my writing I seem to privilege the positive aspects of the 
lives of my participants, and their ways of finding empowerment in a variety of 
situations, this should not be regarded as either being solely due to my own 
optimism, or as reflecting the unlikely condition that the people I met during my 
fieldwork had been spared from going through difficult life experiences. Rather, this 
is because the full half of the glass was what they emphasized in their relationships 
with me. From my participants, I learnt to be even more optimistic, maybe a bit 
more laidback, to treat my domestic others with kindness, and to enjoy the nice 
weather while it’s here. 
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Besides being an optimistic, I am also an avid reader – and amateur writer – of 
fiction. As an aid towards imagining how other people live and understand their 
lives, fiction has always been for me a cherished resource. During my time in 
England, I serendipitously came across books – novels and autobiographical 
memoirs – that will always stay with me, and whose company I cannot disentangle 
from the experiences of doing my fieldwork, and from the process of writing my 
dissertation. I mention the names of their writers with gratitude: William Cooper, 
Janice Galloway, Blake Morrison, Nina Stibbe, Jonathan Taylor, Sue Townsend, 
Jeanette Winterson.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework and it introduces the working 
concepts of ‘ordinary agency’, spontaneity, anticipation, and ‘family time’ that form 
the analytical basis of this dissertation.  
The next section is an exploration of the continuous back and forth journey between 
ethnographic fieldwork and theoretical constructs that is an essential characteristic 
of anthropological research (Strathern 1999). My aim in this part is to show the 
ways in which I arrived at the theoretical perspective that grounds my thesis, which 
is Moore’s (2011) post-vitalist approach. I will start with my reflections regarding a 
particular ethnographic encounter and I will bring selected ethnographic material – 
interview extracts, field notes and photography – in dialogue with theoretical 
perspectives in order to express the iterative-inductive (O’Reilly 2012) nature of 
ethnography and to outline that this process of knowledge-making is profoundly 
personal. In Edwards’s words, ‘it is the process by which the fieldworker comes to 
know which provides grist for the anthropological mill, rather than that which is 
eventually known which is always contingent and available for all to know’ (Edwards 
2000: 14).   
In the third part I introduce Foucault’s work on ethical practices (1990, 2000) 
through the readings of the anthropologists Paul Rabinow (2000) and James 
Faubion (2001). I discuss the ways in which Foucault inspired Moore’s (2011) 
approach and the way in which his ideas on ethical work have been employed by 
the geographer Kersty Hobson (2011) in order to formulate a critical response to 
the domestic sustainability agenda by calling towards an approach that 
acknowledges ordinariness as a site for personal environmental politics and 
everyday actions as ‘moments of interruption’ (Dikeç 2005). 
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In the fourth part I discuss the similarities in spirit between Moore’s (2011) and 
Hobson’s (2011) publications and I show the ways in which the mundane can be 
regarded as a site for ethical work and how everyday actions, such as those related 
to the care of the self, could be seen as contributing to social transformation.  
In the fifth section I discuss Gershon’s (2011) critique of ‘neoliberal agency’ in 
relation to which I subsequently introduce and describe the working concept of 
‘ordinary agency’ 
In the sixth part I discuss the last element that completes my theoretical framework 
– the element of time, as it is approached by the anthropologist Carol Greenhouse 
(1996). I introduce the concepts of spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family time’ and I 
situate them, as time modes, in relation to Strathern’s (1992) ideas on the English 
sense of time in kinship. 
I conclude in the seventh part. 
 
2. Prologue: How the light gets in 
 
We did it in stages. Because we first moved in and, before any planning, we 
knocked these double doors through. That was the first thing we did. And we 
immediately saw light coming in into that room that had no light. If you imagine, in 
the hall it was a room: there was a ceiling and no windows, no daylight. And the 
only daylight in that room came from the front door. So then we knocked this and 
that just flooded it with light. And then we knocked another door through and that 
flooded it with light. And then, the more we did it gradually, we thought: ‘oh, yeah, 
this is great; yeah, this is lovely; this will be good’. So yeah, we kind of built up. 
We didn’t really know. It sort of evolved. (interview Iris and Steve)  
While telling the story of their house extension, Iris has arisen from her chair. She is 
pointing towards the hall with large gestures that help her explain the complicated 
transformations their house went through after they had bought it. We are all 
gathered around the kitchen table: Iris, her husband, Steve, me, and a colleague 
researcher. We are discussing Iris’s and my previous encounter, when we took a 
18 
 
house video tour (Pink 2004), exploring their home and the ways in which Iris 
engaged with it.  
After Iris, Steve and their two children, May and Alan, who were 11 and 13 at that 
time, had the chance to watch the nearly two-hour long video recording, I am now 
visiting them again, this time shadowed by a colleague, for a follow-up interview. 
Iris’s reflection on the process of transforming the ground floor comes as a 
response to my insistent wish to find out how it felt to completely change the whole 
layout of the house by moving the staircase, knocking down several walls, moving 
the main entrance door to a different side of the house, extending the kitchen and, 
practically, changing all the ground floor rooms together with two bedrooms. Most of 
the families that I met during my 15 months of fieldwork had their stories of house 
transformations that followed the moment of acquisition and they enjoyed recalling 
‘tearing down the wallpaper’ and redecorating, as in an attempt to get rid of any 
traces of the previous owners and make the house ‘their own’.3 Strathern (1992) 
interprets the belief that the interior of the house can be the object of personal 
careful design as being in close connection to the modern English middle-class idea 
that the interior of the individual person is ‘an explicit object of improvement’ 
(Strathern 1992: 102). The relation between the interior of the person and the 
interior of the home has been inverted as an interest with the good organisation of 
the latter arrived to show, for the new middle-class of the nineteenth century, the 
virtues of the former and, so, ‘[t]he internal (what is within persons) has been 
literalised as an interior (residential) space’ (Strathern 1992: 103).  
In the case of Iris and Steve the house transformation was substantial and I wanted 
to know whether they could envisage it in advance. My questions made Iris bring 
the house plans. They had someone who made the technical drawings but they 
assigned no architect. It was all based on their imagination and hope that the house 
could be transformed into their ideal home: a place where they could gather their 
extended family, which counts 35 people, for large parties and celebrations. They 
followed Iris’s brother advice to move the staircase, a transformation which he 
previously undertook for his own house and whose results pleased him. Thinking, 
discussing, planning, drawing and imaging the house was a process that took them 
around six months from the moment they moved in and it was followed by six more 
months for the building work. While showing me the floor plans and recalling this 
                                            
3 See also (Miller 2001b). 
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experience that happened five years before, both Iris and Steve admit that at the 
moment of planning they could not really envisage, by only looking at the drawings, 
how the house would look like after the structural transformation. They just went for 
it, took the risk, and started knocking down walls one by one, letting the light in. 
Printed in large font on an A4 sheet, Iris’s words that opened this section have been 
standing for over two years on the screen by my desk, between photos of my 
friends and postcards. Leaving her place after the follow-up interview, I thought 
about the way Iris talked when she described the process of knocking down walls in 
order to let the light come in: she spontaneously stood up so as to let the memory 
embody her better. I transcribed that fragment the next morning. Her words felt 
powerful and inspiring, even if, at that time, I did not know how they were inspiring, 
or whether and how I would later use them in writing about my fieldwork. These 
words are about an action of building work that one might imagine as dusty, noisy, 
and generally not very attractive to watch from a close distance. What makes this 
event memorable – what makes the reminiscence of the light flooding the dark 
room memorable and shareable with an anthropologist?  
In her recent publication on hopes, desires, satisfactions and ‘the aspirational 
character of our relations to others, to knowledge and the world’ (Moore 2011: 10), 
Henrietta Moore provides a critical review of the new wave of ‘vitalist’ theories: 
theories of affect (Massumi 2002), actor-network theory (Latour 2005) and non-
representational theory (Thrift 2008). Moore acknowledges the ontological break 
that ‘vitalist’ theories have marked in relation to, and as a critical response to social 
constructivist approaches by proposing ‘a decentring of the human subject, a 
recognition that the subject is formed through a series of encounters which it does 
not author or control’ (2011: 180). These approaches move away from the human 
subject and outline the vitality of a world made up of indeterminate relations that are 
autonomous of their subjects (Massumi 2002; Thrift 2008). If one would follow the 
principles proposed by this new theoretical corpus, then, in Iris’s account it would 
be the element of light that would be emphasized as an agentic substance that 
autonomously floods the dark room; the intrinsic quality of immateriality that light 
possesses makes it simple for this substance to circulate, to sneak in. But, is it the 
special qualities of light that make the moment of flooding the dark room 
exceptional and memorable? Or might it be the empowering freedom of knocking 
down walls and of transforming them into doors that Iris wants to share with me?  
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During the follow-up interview, Iris and Steve recounted the way they 
spontaneously transformed the big open-space kitchen – their favourite room – into 
a ‘Christmas hub’ during the last festive season. They connected the TV screen, 
through the Wii, to the Internet and they played a YouTube video of ‘a real crackling 
fire’, while broadcasting a Christmas jukebox radio station by attaching speakers to 
their iPad. They laughed while recalling the episode, feeling also content with their 
creative invention. They could have gone into the living room and lit the ‘real’ fire 
place – which they often use in winter evenings – but they created something 
different instead. The thorough details of their remembrance of this event suggest 
that the temporary technological assemblage was a product of their own making – 
that embodied and expressed their subjectivities and their agencies – as knocking 
down the walls, too, was.  
In concluding her book, Moore outlines that ‘perhaps it is too early yet to abandon a 
notion of the human subject marked by what is specifically human, most especially 
our desires, hopes and satisfactions’ (Moore 2011: 204). What she finds to be some 
important limitations of ‘vitalist’ theories are: an insistence on the autonomy of affect 
that dismisses the human creativity in making relationships and meanings; and a 
disregard of the historical and cultural specificities of the contexts in which life takes 
place. Moore suggests that a new acknowledgment of human agency would be a 
possible way to surpass the dichotomous tensions between a social constructivist 
tradition and the new ‘vitalist’ approaches. This shift would allow us to ‘think again’ 
in a manner that recognises human creativity and ‘ethical imagination’. Moore’s 
(2011) post-vitalist approach to human agency suggests that acts of ‘ethical 
imagination’ of self-other relations, or the question of ‘how we deal with each other’ 
(ibid p.15), are generative of social transformation. The concept of ‘ethical 
imagination’, which illustrates the forms and means ‘through which individuals 
imagine relationships to themselves and to others’ (ibid p.16), is proposed by Moore 
as an analytical tool to look not only at how actual relations are experienced, but 
also at the new forms and ‘potentialities of the relationalities’ (ibid p. 22) that 
emerge. Moore is interested as well in the ways in which new technologies can 
enhance the capacities for relationality and ‘augment our potential for connection 
and sharing’ (idem). 
We can now arrive to see Iris and Steve as agents who let the light come in by 
knocking walls down. Similarly, every morning, people in Middleborough, people in 
21 
 
the UK, people in the world, open their curtains and let the light come in. It is this 
form of everyday human action that brings daylight into homes. People choose 
when to open and when to close curtains and blinds; their actions do not ‘produce’ 
the light, but, most importantly, make manifest an engagement with the world that 
recognises, accepts, and lets the light in. These everyday actions make ‘morning’ 
and ‘evening’ happen inside people’s houses. Subjective ‘mornings’ and ‘evenings’ 
can take place any time before or after their ‘natural’ counterparts – but always in 
relation to them – the time of their occurrences often varying with the day of the 
week. For example, on Saturdays my participants used to close the curtains earlier 
than on midweek evenings, even if the sun obviously does not set sooner on the 
weekends. Similarly, sometimes whole Sundays would be spent by keeping the 
curtains closed, in a 24 hours ‘non-day’: a suspended and ‘stolen’ time pulled away 
from the everyday logic of clock and calendar time. This suggests that, even if they 
might be analytically approached as ‘routines’, opening and closing curtains are not 
performed automatically, without too much thought, at exactly the same times every 
morning and evening, but they are actions that involve taking decisions. These 
decisions are enacted by agents when they feel that it is the right time. The ways in 
which they arrive to these decisions are by bringing together what is happening 
outside (getting brighter or darker) with what is happening inside (e.g. people still 
wearing their pyjamas in the morning or planning to ‘start the evening’ sooner). 
Sometimes the actions of opening and closing curtains can be directed towards 
changing what is happening indoors or outdoors: for example, one can open the 
curtains in order to convince one’s children that they need to get dressed, or in 
order to make the daylight last longer at winter.  
In setting her home in the mood for embracing the new day that has just started, for 
Joyce it is important to open the curtains on every single window in the house. 
However, one of the windows in the landing is particularly hard to reach as it is 
situated on the other side of the staircase. Joyce needs to lean over the baluster in 
order to reach the handle and to open the blinds. Still, she performs this risky 
leaning every day, twice: once for making morning and once for making evening. 
This action can be regarded as a brief form of worship that Joyce feels necessary to 
perform in order to assess – through her body – that a new day has, respectively, 
come, or is ending. Veena Das observes that ‘our theoretical impulse is often to 
think of agency in terms of escaping the ordinary rather than as a descent into it’ 
(2007: 7). In Joyce’s case, opening and closing down curtains are ordinary actions 
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through which she takes and expresses control over her life by choosing (when) to 
make ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ happen. 
 
  
Figure 1 Joyce leaning over the baluster in order to open the blinds and to make ‘morning’ in her house. 
 
My own answer, therefore, to the question of how the light gets in is that people let 
it in. Whether through opening curtains or through knocking walls down, people 
welcome and acknowledge the light when, and if, they wish to do so.  
 
3. Foucault’s ethical practices  
 
In her conceptualization of ‘ethical imagination’ as an analytic tool, Moore (2011) 
draws upon Foucault’s ideas about the relationships between ethical practices and 
the constitution of the knowing subject. She argues that by using the analytic lever 
of ‘ethical imagination’ one can arrive to ‘novel ways of approaching social 
transformation’ (Moore 2011: 15). The ways in which we ‘deal with each other’ – or, 
in Foucault’s original wording, ‘the strategies that individuals in their freedom can 
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use in dealing with each other’ (2000: 300) – are generative of social change 
because the question of self-other relations stands at the very basis of what 
constitutes ‘the social’. Moore’s approach surpasses, thence, a perspective on 
agency as in opposition to structure, because the question of how we deal with 
each other can be seen as constitutive and as influencing both the direction and 
focus of individual actions and the ways in which we create social institutions, 
systems, and structures. She suggests that ‘ethical imagination’ can be regarded as 
‘one of the primary sites of cultural invention’ (Moore 2011: 16) that is ‘brought into 
play by the advent of new information and new ideas, new ways of being and acting, 
new forms of representation and their mediation’ (Moore 2011: 16) that, however, 
are not just linguistic and are not just conscious.  
Foucault’s work on ethics follows the idea that ethical analysis is a mode of self-
formation and a practice of freedom: ‘the freedom of the subject and its 
relationships to others (…) constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics’ (Foucault 
2000: 300). The relation between ethics and freedom involves practices of reflection: 
‘Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form 
that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection’ (Foucault 2000: 284). As a 
practice of freedom, ethics is directed towards limiting and controlling relations of 
power that, Foucault argues, are widespread in all the forms of human relationships, 
when one tries to control the actions and the behaviour of the other(s). Practices of 
freedom are essential in preventing an abuse of power. This abuse would lead to 
the dissolution of power relations and to a serious transformation of the social and 
political regime, because, for Foucault, when the possibility of resistance does not 
exist, such as in slavery, one cannot talk about power relations: ‘in order for power 
relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on 
both sides’ (Foucault 2000: 292).  
However, what Foucault calls practices of freedom should not be seen as merely 
synonymous with what can be called ‘resistance’. In the case of the ethical as the 
domain in which one can exercise a free relationship to the self (or rapport à soi), 
the scope of ethical practice is to develop one’s relationship to the self and to others. 
The anthropologist James Faubion (2001) outlines that this practice is also ‘always 
analytically distinct from the moral principles and codes to which it has reference’ 
(2001: 85), codes that are, nevertheless, cultural and social (Foucault 2000: 291).  
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It is in the idea of ethical practices where, Faubion (2001) argues, the potential of 
Foucault’s work to inspire anthropological theoretical and empirical advancements 
stands. This is because in his conceptualization of ethical analysis as consisting in 
a series of practices, Foucault continues Aristotle’s focus on the practical that, 
Faubion argues, invites us ‘to attend to all that distinguishes the ethical field beyond 
mere obedience (or mere transgression)’ (Faubion 2001: 85) – in other words, an 
analytic focus on ethical practices can surpass a view on agency as being solely 
expressed in relation to ‘structure’, as Moore (2011) has also argued.  
In his introduction to a collected volume of Foucault’s published texts on the topics 
of ethics that were not included in his books (such as lectures, interviews, and 
articles), the anthropologist Paul Rabinow (2000) discusses the ethical fourfold of 
Foucault, or the four categories through which ethical practices could be examined: 
ethical substance, mode of subjectivation, ethical work, and telos.  
Ethical substance represents ‘the prime material of moral conduct, (…) the “will to 
truth”’ (Rabinow 2000: xxix) and it can be described through the impulse of curiosity. 
The type of curiosity advocated by Foucault is ‘not the curiosity that seeks to 
assimilate what is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of 
oneself’ (Foucault 1990: 8). In this perspective, curiosity evokes care: ‘it evokes the 
care one takes of what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, 
but one that is never immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us 
strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to 
look at the same things in a different way’ (Foucault 2000: 325).  
The mode of subjectivation can be seen as self-stylization in relation to social 
norms: ‘the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and 
recognizes himself as obligated to put it into practice’ (Foucault 1990: 27). The 
process of choosing the mode of subjectivation that would accompany one’s ethical 
project is not merely an act of conformity in which one needs to pick, from a variety 
of socially accepted and available modes, the one that would suit one better, but it 
is an active and creative process. Drawing from Baudelaire’s view on ‘modernity’ as 
an attitude, Foucault sees self-stylization as ‘an exercise in which extreme attention 
to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously 
respects this reality and violates it’ (Foucault 2000: 311). As Faubion remarks, the 
ethical field is a normative field, but there is more to it than that: ‘It is a domain of 
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obedience. Yet it is also a domain of more elective aspirations, of the “quest for 
excellence”, as we moderns like to put it, of saintly and heroic excess’ (Faubion 
2001: 90). 
Ethical work, or critical activity, is the work that one performs ‘to attempt to 
transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour’ (Foucault 1990: 27). 
This is a work of reflection in which all forms of experience can be objects of self-
reflection, or thought, where thought is seen as ‘freedom in relation to what one 
does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, 
and reflects on it as a problem’ (Foucault 2000: 117). Ethical work is essentially 
practical and, in Faubion’s reading, it can be seen as an ‘autodidactic’ endeavour 
(2001: 94). In his reading, this is an essential point in Foucault’s work where the 
French philosopher draws upon and extends the Aristotelian distinction between 
‘making’ and ‘doing’. The way in which Aristotle draws this distinction is by 
suggesting that: ‘doing and making are generically different, since making aims at 
an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other 
than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end’ (NE VIv3-4). For Aristotle, making is 
concerned with the creation of a new, finite, object; while doing contains its scope in 
itself. 
Finally, telos, or ‘disassembling the self’ (Rabinow 2000: xxxviii), represents the 
mode of being that would be the actualization of the ethical project: ‘A moral action 
tends toward its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the 
establishing of a moral conduct that commits an individual, not only to other actions 
always in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode 
of being characteristic of the ethical subject’ (Foucault 1990: 28). Rabinow (2000) 
suggests that the mode of being that Foucault was committed to was one of 
disassembling the self, or releasing oneself from oneself (se déprendre de soi-
même), which could also be translated as unlearning of, or de-familiarizing with, 
oneself (as, I would say, in the process of de-familiarization required by 
ethnographic work). Foucault regards the ethical category of mode of being as 
historically constrained but also as having the capacity to surpass the present 
through a critical engagement with it and through de-familiarization. Moore 
expresses this idea suggesting that: ‘How we are placed in time and space links to 
modes of being – specific ways of thinking, feeling and acting, of relating to things, 
to others and to ourselves. Political and economic changes alter these ways of 
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being, and new ways of seeing and understanding drive forward further possibilities 
for change’ (2011: 1-2). These new ways of seeing and understanding emerge, in 
Foucault’s opinion, through ethical practices – through the process of ethical 
analysis as a practice of freedom. 
Ethical work, or critical activity, can also be regarded as a practice of 
‘problematization’ (Foucault 1990: 10). For Faubion, problematization is ‘that 
reflexive process through which one presents to oneself a certain way of acting or 
reacting, asks questions of it, examines its meanings and goals’ (2001: 97). He 
argues that Foucault’s work on the genealogy of systems of thought demonstrates 
that each parameter of the ethical fourfold (ethical substance, mode of 
subjectivation, ethical work, and telos) ‘can itself be (and in fact has been) the focus 
of problematization’ (2001: 98). In other words, the four categories of ethical 
analysis have also been the subjects of ethical analysis – and, therefore, it is a 
never-ending process of self-reflection that drives social transformation. Faubion 
concludes that ‘the ethical field, in which power is fluid and problematization 
capable of being the catalyst of revisionary resolution, is the primary site of the 
active transformation at once of the parameters of subjectivation and of given views 
of the world’ (2001: 99). 
This conclusion takes us back to Moore’s conceptualization of ‘ethical imagination’ 
as one of the main sites of cultural invention (2001: 16). However, Moore 
considerably advances Foucault’s ideas, by insisting that ethical work, or the 
process of problematization, should be regarded as being more than a work of 
conscious self-reflection and thought. For her, problematization also involves ‘affect, 
emotion, the placement of the body, fantasy, and relations with objects, 
technologies and the material world’ (Moore 2011: 21). Thence, Moore’s focus on 
hopes, desires and satisfactions aims to (re)introduce a regard on the value of 
imagination and of what I call the ‘non’-conscious – an experiential area that 
involves unintentional actions and the tacit knowledge of the body and of the 
unconscious – in processes of self-development or subject-formation. She argues 
that ‘we cannot unproblematically base our theories of subjectivity on the 
experience of the conscious subject or on their conscious meanings and intentions’ 
(Moore 2011: 75). 
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 As I have shown, Foucault’s ideas on ethical practices provided an important 
inspiration and influence on Moore’s (2011) post-vitalist approach that grounds my 
theoretical framework. I will now show how Foucault’s work on ethics, mediated by 
a publication of the geographer Kersty Hobson, inspired the way in which I 
formulate my position in relation to the domestic sustainability agenda that 
represents the context of my research.  
In a recent publication, Hobson (2011) addresses the question of whether everyday 
acts of sustainability have the potential to make people more environmentally-
aware and active in the future, or, on the contrary, this approach to sustainable 
consumption can limit the scope and the scale of the possible environmental 
engagements. Questioning the assumptions of several theoretical approaches to 
policy interventions related to the domestic sustainability agenda, Hobson suggests 
that researchers should not abandon the idea that a form of personal environmental 
politics might exist, and, in doing so, they should contribute to making the first part 
of the question possible. She proposes an approach inspired by Foucault’s work on 
ethical analysis as practice of freedom and, more specifically, on the question of 
‘What do I aspire to be?’, or the telos. The geographer suggests that this question 
proved to be an important trigger in her participants’ actions to ‘reclaim the street’, 
as she discussed in a previous publication (Hobson 2008). 
Drawing from Dikeç (2005), Hobson advocates for a more inclusive definition of the 
political, as appearing in ‘moments of interruption’ when ‘a wrong can be addressed 
and equality can be demonstrated’ (Dikeç 2005 cited in Hobson 2011: 203). In her 
own research on everyday domestic practices in relation to the sustainability 
agenda in the UK and in Australia, Hobson (2003) identifies such ‘moments of 
interruption’ as ‘ah ha’ moments that her participants reported to have experienced 
when they made connections between their everyday actions that they have not 
previously reflected upon and their environmental outcomes. After such ‘ah ha’ 
moments her participants believed that they could consciously work towards 
changing some of their domestic actions, reporting a feeling of ‘I can do that, it’s not 
so hard’ (Hobson 2011: 204). These ‘ah ha’ moments, I suggest, can be regarded 
as instants of ethical work, in Foucault’s terminology. Hobson acknowledges that 
‘moments of interruption’ appear and are experienced as part of a wider existing 
‘grammar’ of discourses of accepted and positively valued practices and attitudes. 
However, she suggests that existing grammars can be mobilized ‘in ways that move 
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towards a constructive and positive slippage, such as fostering a creative grammar 
of household sustainable consumption that constitutes it as a thoroughly political 
act; that is, where there is a moment, or ongoing moments, of interruption that can 
take the needs and presence of other people and non-human entities into account 
and can, in turn, be acknowledged by others’ (Hobson 2011: 205). Some of these 
‘others’ who can, if they choose to, acknowledge such moments of interruption as 
political acts, are the researchers who, one can argue, are often positioned 
between public discourses and policy interventions related to the domestic 
sustainability agenda and the everyday actions of laypeople. 
 
4. Mundane actions and the ethical field 
 
In the previous two sections I have discussed Moore’s (2011) post-vitalist approach 
that grounds the theoretical framework of my dissertation and I have introduced the 
work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault on ethical work and the knowing 
subject, which inspired Moore’s concept of ‘ethical imagination’ and her call towards 
a new acknowledgment of human agency and creativity. Foucault’s 
conceptualization of ethical practices and of the telos also inspired the geographer 
Kersty Hobson (2011) to suggest that scholars researching domestic sustainability 
should be able to create a conceptual space in which the idea of a personal 
environmental politics could be recognized and developed.  
While coming from different backgrounds, and having different aims, I believe that 
Moore’s and Hobson’s calls are similar in spirit, in at least two ways. First, they both 
urge social scientists not to abandon the belief in ‘the radical potentialities of human 
agency and human subjectivity’ (Moore 2011: 22) in the ways they create theory 
and in the ways they regard, frame, and interpret the actions of their research 
participants. Second, they both try to open up the category of human actions that 
are to be considered ‘worthwhile’ of attention and of research to include ordinary 
and ‘non’-conscious actions – actions that have no conscious meanings and 
intentions attributed to.  
Their definition of worthiness is not related to the immediate possible effects on 
society that these actions could have, but, I believe, to the effects that they have on 
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the agent. Regarded through the lens provided by Foucault’s conceptualization of 
ethical analysis as a practice of freedom of the knowing subject, these everyday 
actions can be acknowledged as ‘ah ha’ moments in doing ethical work, which is a 
practical endeavour, in the Aristotelian sense (Faubion 2001: 93), that contains its 
scope in itself. Ethical work, or critical activity, is a practice of subject-formation that 
is ongoing and that can be regarded, following Moore (2011) and Faubion (2001), 
as one of the main vehicles of social transformation. ‘Ah ha’ moments provide the 
opportunity to critically re-examine the ‘reality’ and one’s relationships with oneself 
and with the others. As this re-examination leads to a change in oneself, it would 
also lead to a change in one’s relationships with the others and, ultimately, to social 
change.  
Looking at the conceptualization of the ethical in the Greek antiquity, Foucault 
identifies the twin principles of ‘Take care of yourself’ and ‘Know thyself’. He argues 
that ‘our philosophical tradition has overemphasized the latter and forgotten the 
former’ (Foucault 2000: 226) for two reasons. The  first reason is that the tradition of 
Christian morality ‘insists that the self is that which one can reject’ (ibid p. 228), the 
scope of knowing oneself being to provide a means of self-renunciation as the 
condition for salvation. The second reason is that in theoretical philosophy 
knowledge of the self ‘takes on an ever-increasing importance as the first step in 
the theory of knowledge’ (idem). The philosopher argues that the hierarchy of the 
two principles has been inverted: while in Greco-Roman antiquity ‘knowledge of 
oneself appeared as the consequence of the care of the self’ (idem), in the modern 
world ‘knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle’ (idem). Foucault 
explains that a preoccupation with the care of the self was seen as having not only 
individual outcomes, but also important social outcomes: ‘the postulate of this whole 
morality was that a person who took proper care of himself would, by the same 
token, be able to conduct himself properly in relation to others and for others’ (ibid p. 
287).  
In a study of grocery shopping in London, Miller (2001b) argues that very often the 
decisions of buying organic products are related to concerns for the health of the 
shopper and of her family, rather than to concerns for the world at large. This form 
of interpretation that aims to find the core ‘reasons’ behind people’s actions can be 
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found in other publications on ethical consumption as well.4 The assumptions upon 
which scholars might compare two different sets of reasons, such as in Miller’s 
(2001b) case, could be seen, by following Foucault’s (2000) argument, as grounded 
in the tradition of Christian morality and in a body/ mind dualism. By acknowledging 
acts of taking care of oneself as essentially ethical and not as opposed, but as the 
very basis, to acts of taking care of the others, one can surpass a set of analytical 
limits when situating everyday actions in relation to ideas about sustainability. This 
perspective would make it possible to re-examine a whole series of banal actions 
that social sciences scholars used to explain by placing them in specific categories, 
such as the performance of social roles – for example, in interpreting mothers’ 
expressions of care towards their children as performances of the role of mother – 
as ethical practices that are vehicles for social transformation. 
Thus, for Moore (2011) and Hobson (2011), following Foucault, ordinary actions 
need to be acknowledged in themselves – and not only in relation to societal ideals 
and norms – because they have an effect on the agent. They do not affect directly 
the society, but, by triggering critical activity and problematization, they are at the 
very basis of future social transformation. 
Opening the domain of the ordinary to a fresh regard would bring, ultimately, the 
possibility to start moving towards a new vision of social change, a vision that, in 
Moore’s opinion, would also contribute to social change: ‘We all clearly recognize 
that the way we think about things has an impact on the way we live in the world. 
Thought is a form of agency. Worlds and their futures are created by the actions of 
human beings in specific contexts, and representation is an indissoluble and crucial 
aspect of those actions’ (2011: 143). Moore points here to the responsibility that 
scholars have when they choose how to interpret their data, when they choose 
what story to tell to the others. If one could claim that people’s everyday choices 
have an impact on carbon emissions and climate change, then, I argue, 
researcher’s choices of theory to interpret one’s findings might be regarded as 
having carbon footprints at their turn. Theoretical choices, like any other choices, 
have consequences.  
 
5. ‘Neoliberal agency’ and ‘ordinary agencies’ 
                                            
4 See (Morosanu 2013) for a review. 
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At this point in my argument I introduce Ilana Gershon’s (2011) critique of 
‘neoliberal agency’. In a recent essay, followed by comments and a reply and 
published in a special debate section of the journal Current Anthropology, Gershon 
addresses the challenges that neoliberal perspectives on agency pose to 
anthropological interpretations of human action.  
Gershon identifies two shifts that affect the concept of agency with the move from 
economic liberalism to neoliberalism. The first shift is that, under neoliberalism, 
markets, economic rationality and, also, subjects, are recognized as made, 
achieved, or socially constructed. Gershon is inspired by the work of Wendy Brown 
(2003, 2006) and by Lemke’s (2001) reading of Foucault’s lectures on neoliberal 
governmentality, who identify a major distinction between neoliberalism and 
liberalism to be ‘the neoliberal emphasis on market rationality as an achieved state’ 
(Gershon 2011: 538). The fact that neoliberal perspectives have incorporated the 
belief in social construction as an underlying principle that organizes the social 
would make an uncritical continuation of the analytical path of social constructivism 
in anthropology problematic, in Gershon’s opinion. This is also because, by 
dropping the concept of culture out of their analytical toolkit, social constructivist 
anthropological approaches do not have the capacity to oppose resistance, 
anymore, to the fact that ‘a neoliberal perspective is additionally prescriptive by 
working toward universalizing forms of neoliberal agency’ (ibid p.539).  
While Brown and Lemke address the implications of the belief in construction for 
political practices, in her article Gershon looks at the ethical implications of doing 
ethnography in neoliberal contexts (ibid p.538). She points out to the challenges 
that neoliberal perspectives on agency pose to anthropologists when trying to 
situate human actions in a post-culture theoretical context: ‘Spreading neoliberalism 
entails convincing others that everyone should enact corporate form of agency, 
produced by consciously using a means-ends calculus that balances alliances, 
responsibility and risk. Other forms of agency are getting pushed aside’ (ibid p.539). 
Gershon argues that anthropologists have unintentionally contributed to spreading 
the neoliberal conception of agency by discarding, in the last two decades, the 
concept of culture. This concept could have provided a viable analytical apparatus 
(Wagner 1981) for revealing practical alternatives to neoliberal agency, and, while 
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rejecting it, scholars did not find a different analytical tool to do this work with either. 
However, Gershon (2011) is clear in showing that the scope of her article is not to 
bring the concept of culture back, but to draw attention to alternative tools that could 
support the analytical work once accomplished through the use of the concept of 
culture. 
The second shift identified by Gershon to affect conceptions of agency is ‘a move 
from the liberal vision of people owning themselves as though they were property to 
a neoliberal vision of people owning themselves as though they were a business’ 
(Gershon 2011: 539). She looks at the implications of this shift for a neoliberal 
conception of agency by discussing neoliberal perspectives on selves, relations, 
and social organisation. Following this shift of vision towards the idea that people 
owe themselves as though they were a business, selves come to be regarded as 
autonomous collections of ‘skills or traits that can enter into alliances with other 
such collections’ (idem), as Martin (2000) and Leve (2011) have also suggested. 
Alliances represent what neoliberal relations are, while social organisation emerges 
‘as market strategies that determine the consequences of alliances between 
different sizes of corporate entities and different skill sets’ (Gershon 2011: 542). No 
longer part of the analytical toolkit of the researcher, culture is now regarded as a 
possession or a trait that can support specific sets of alliances.    
In this neoliberal context, scholars have arrived to regard agency as, simply and 
universally, ‘conscious choices that balance alliances, responsibility, and risk using 
a means-ends calculus’ (ibid p. 540). Agents are, thus, assumed to be rational 
calculators who follow the principles of market rationality in the process of 
assessing the best suited strategies to create and to interpret relationships and 
forms of social organisation. Departing from Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2001) 
critique of neoliberalism for framing freedom only in terms of choice, Gershon 
argues that ‘it might be more apt to say that neoliberalism equates freedom with the 
ability to act on one’s own calculations’ (2011: 540).  
The neoliberal assumption that people are agentive in the same way as business 
and corporate entities are, disregards, in Gershon’s opinion, the nuances of scale 
between different social units: ‘Under neoliberalism, all entities, regardless of size 
and internal social organisation, become the same type of corporate entity. Yet 
people confronting neoliberal policies rarely experience differences in scale as 
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differences in size instead of differences in kind’ (ibid p.544). The misrecognition of 
scale is, in her view, one of the two weaknesses of neoliberalism that could be 
addressed by anthropologists. The second one is the inadequacy of neoliberalism 
‘as a set of moral guidelines’ (ibid p.546). Gershon cites ethnographic examples 
that reveal both these weaknesses.  
In this situation, Gershon asks what the analytical techniques are that 
anthropologists could use to critique, rather than to contribute to spreading, 
neoliberal views of agency. In order to outline what makes anthropological 
approaches different from other social sciences disciplinary approaches, Gershon 
discusses what an anthropological imagination entails in comparison to a 
sociological imagination. Drawing on Mills’ (1959) definition of sociological 
imagination, she outlines that a sociological imagination ‘crosses levels of scale to 
produce insight, interrogating how practices at different levels of scale affect each 
other’ (Gershon 2011: 543). This definition reflects the sociological endeavour of 
explaining how the individual is connected to the society, how the personal is 
connected to the political. For an anthropological imagination, however, ‘the 
challenge is to understand how the ways that people engage with knowledge and 
engage with each other are always already interwoven’ (idem). In other words, the 
anthropological endeavour is to understand how epistemologies and relationships 
shape each other. This process of mutual shaping, I would add, is not universal, but 
it follows different paradigms and patterns for different groups of people, in different 
places and in different moments of time. In Gershon’s view, a focus on the mutual 
shaping between knowledge and relationships can be translated into an endeavour 
of employing the analytical tools of epistemological difference and of social 
organisation together. Even if these analytical tools might be seen as too closely 
tied to the concept of culture, Gershon argues that they could provide a fruitful 
critique of ‘neoliberal agency’ by making possible a description of other ways of 
living and of other, contrasting and opposing, conceptions of agency. Moreover, 
through sophisticated attention, anthropologists would be able to attend to ‘the 
moral force of different epistemologies and social organisations’ (ibid p. 547), which 
means more than mere description but a recognition of the fact that by 
understanding alternative ways of engagement with the world, one comes to see 
paths to social transformation that go beyond neoliberalism.   
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From Gershon’s essay I retain two important points that I will link with the literature 
that I discussed in the previous sections. First, in this publication the responsibility 
of scholars in choosing their analytical tools and their theoretical frameworks for 
interpreting data is brought to the fore in a strong and bold manner; as one of the 
essay’s commentators outlines: ‘[a]nalytical tools have political power’ (idem). The 
recognition of this fact, which appears as well in the works of Moore (2011) and 
Hobson (2011), is a central concern in Gershon’s. The second point is the focus on 
agency as a domain that is particularly vulnerable in face of political interpretations; 
more specifically, by universalizing a specific definition of agency, neoliberal 
perspectives, Gershon argues, endorse a singular worldview. ‘Neoliberal agency’ 
does not account for people’s capacity to produce radical social transformation, but 
only for their ability to rationally operate means-ends calculations within a given 
(neoliberal) context. 
While Gershon (2011) calls towards a renewed focus on social organisation and 
epistemological difference in order to arrive to alternative descriptions of agency, 
Moore (2011) draws attention to epistemologies of the unconscious and imagination. 
I will now bring together Gershon’s and Moore’s ideas by proposing the working 
concept of ‘ordinary agencies’. Ordinary agencies are forms of agency employed in 
everyday life and that are related to ‘non-conscious’ (unconscious, tacit, and non-
intentional) acts of creating meaning. I place this working concept in 
contradistinction to the concept of ‘neoliberal agency’ – as consisting in acts of self-
conscious rational decision making – developed by Gershon, whose critique 
inspired me to investigate the agency that people express as part of the mundane. 
This working concept has two functions. First, it responds to Moore’s (2011) and 
Hobson’s (2011) calls towards an approach of ordinary actions as meaningful for 
social transformation. Second, it responds to Gershon’s (2011) call for moving 
beyond ‘neoliberal agency’ through attention to epistemological difference and 
social organisation. I suggest that the domain of the ordinary, even in neoliberal 
economic and political contexts, can be regarded to manifest different 
epistemologies (related to tacit knowledge, imagination and the unconscious) and 
to bring out new understandings of the mutual shaping between epistemologies and 
relationships.   
To link this discussion back to the introduction of Foucault’s writings on ethical work, 
I bring to the fore the focus on the practical. In Faubion’s (2001) reading, the 
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potential of Foucault’s work to inspire epistemological advancements in 
anthropology stands in his continuation of Aristotle’s focus on the practical, which 
could be seen as a way of surpassing a regard on human action as having either an 
obedient, or a transgressive direction – or, in other words, a view on agency as 
existing only in relation to structure. In his definition of ethical work, or critical 
activity, Foucault draws upon and extends the Aristotelian distinction between 
‘making’ and ‘doing’, Faubion (2001) argues. This distinction suggests that while the 
end of making is different from it, doing contains its end in itself: ‘doing and making 
are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of 
making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in 
itself the end’ (NE VIv3-4).  
Applying the lens provided by this distinction, one could suggest that ‘neoliberal 
agency’ is concerned with ‘making’: making selves as collections of skills that are 
always extendable; making alliances; making means-ends calculations. ‘Neoliberal 
agency’ refers to action that always has a scope, or a reason, that can be easily 
identified and verbalized. Ordinary agency, instead, is concerned with doing. It 
would not be right to affirm that it refers to action that has no scope, but, rather, I 
suggest that the scope of this type of action – such as the wish to let the light come 
inside one’s home every morning – is circumscribed within a domain of tacit 
knowledge, and, so, it is not verbalized or even regarded as a scope every time the 
action is performed. Therefore, I propose to regard ordinary agency as concerned 
with doing, where doing is an end in itself.  
 
6. Agency and time 
 
I will now introduce and discuss the last element that completes my theoretical 
framework – the element of time, as it is approached by the anthropologist Carol 
Greenhouse. 
Drawing from an interest in the relationships between law and time, related to her 
work in the field of anthropology of law, Greenhouse (1996) makes a thorough 
analysis of time politics across cultures. One of the main arguments that she makes 
in her analysis and that is of great significance for the development of my 
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theoretical framework is the idea that cultural models of time are inextricably linked 
to cultural understandings of agency as ‘time articulates people’s understandings of 
agency: literally, what makes things happen and what makes acts relevant in 
relation to social experience, however conceived’ (Greenhouse 1996: 1). 
Greenhouse argues that agency is a cultural concept because ‘“[a]gency” names 
cultural propositions about how the universe works’ (1996: 4), allowing researchers 
to see what social relevance means in various social contexts. Further I will 
summarize Greenhouse’s argumentation of the main premise of her book, which is 
the idea that time, like agency, is also cultural, and not universal.  
Greenhouse suggests that the most part of anthropological studies of social time 
have proceeded from the double assumption that linear time is the time of the 
Western world and that, as physical scientists argue, time is, indeed, linear, or, in 
her formulation, ‘that linear time – “our” time – really is our time and really is real’ 
(1996: 2, original italics). She argues that the second assumption is reinforced in 
the temporal discourses of state nationalism. Starting with a critical reading of the 
ways in which Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Fortes (1949) have approached the 
relationships between social structure and temporal organisation, and continuing by 
looking at the perspectives on time employed by Leach (1961), Lévi-Strauss (1969), 
Geertz (1973) and Bloch (1977), Greenhouse finds out that, besides the theoretical 
differences in their approaches, all authors share the idea that time is dual, which 
they present in universalistic terms. The duality of time concerns two geometrical 
forms: linear time, which is regarded as representing social time and is employed to 
understand progress and sequence; and cyclical time, which is presumed to be 
related to the periodicities of nature and to be enacted in performances of rituals. 
Out of these two geometric forms of time, the linear time, Greenhouse argues, ‘is 
generally taken to be the more mundane, profane, practical, or objectively “true” 
construction of time’ (1996: 34). This idea, she shows, is related to the assumption 
that each cited authors hold that ‘the real meaning of time, against which a culture 
might construe, mistake, or mystify some alternative formulation, comes from what 
they take to be the universal significance of mortality’ (idem). Thus, the idea that 
linear time is real, ‘true’, and universal comes from the fact that linearity is 
constructed in relation to mortality and the biological lifespan of human beings. 
Greenhouse outlines that the assumption that ‘mortality is the ultimate 
nonreversible experience’ (ibid p.35) has two elements: the idea that ‘death is 
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universally an object of individual preoccupation’ (idem) and the claim that ‘death is 
universally perceived as natural’ (idem). Drawing upon her readings of European 
medieval theology, she argues that the idea that individual lifetime has a linear 
shape going from birth to death emerged as a parallel to the idea that the history of 
the world was linear, occupying the interval between the creation and the end of the 
world. Thus, Greenhouse concludes, ‘the institutionalization of linear time as the 
time of public life was modelled not on the personal mortality of the individual but on 
the mortality of human society itself’ (idem). 
Further, Greenhouse addresses the assumption that death is universally an object 
of individual preoccupation whose anticipation creates a linear temporality. She 
starts by drawing upon Humphreys’ (1981) study of the meanings of death in 
ancient Greece, whose conclusions trigger the argument that the link between 
linear time and the inevitability of personal death is built upon ‘a particular 
construction of the person in relation to the group’ (Greenhouse 1996: 36), namely 
the fact that the person, as a unit of social action and of analysis, ‘is assumed to be 
wholly integrated’ (idem). In other words, ‘the “problem” with death, correspondingly, 
is absence, nonbeing, and destruction of the physical body’ (idem). However, there 
are cultural contexts in which persons are not believed to be wholly integrated with 
their physical bodies, but are revealed ‘to be layered or refracted or ambiguously 
multiple at death’ (idem). To demonstrate this point Greenhouse uses ethnographic 
examples from the work of Meggitt (1962) with the Walbiri of Australia, from 
Woodburn’s (1982) work with African hunters and gatherers, and from Bloch’s 
(1982) writings on the Merina of Madagascar. For the Merina, ‘the problem is not a 
disjunction between birth and death seen as two moments, to be connected by a 
line or not, but rather their union as equal, though different, challenges to the 
solidarity of the group’ (Greenhouse 1996: 38). In this cultural context, as in others, 
death represents primarily a social crisis, an intrusive rupture of social solidarity, 
rather than an individual preoccupation: ‘death is not about the closure of an 
interval but the disruption of the group and a corresponding crisis in social health’ 
(idem). Thus, the assumption that mortality universally reinforces a logic of linear 
time, Greenhouse argues, is false. 
She further shows that the alternative to the duality of linear and cyclical time in 
ethnographic writing is a depiction of ‘timelessness’, such as in Rosaldo’s (1980) 
study on how space is the element that organizes the narrative of events, or what 
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we call ‘history’, for the Ilongot, and in Bell’s (1993) study of aboriginal Australian 
‘dreamtime’ as an example of indifference to time where the idea of a fixed universe 
whose categories of time and space cannot be distinguished between each other, is 
performed. Greenhouse argues that these examples, between others, show that 
‘what makes time temporal is not necessarily an arrangement of past and future but 
any number of other criteria. These same criteria, whatever they may be, make 
agency recognizable as both a subject and a principle of narrative’ (1996: 46). 
Recognition of the fact that time is not universally constructed in relation to human 
mortality and to the periodicities of nature, but, rather, ‘to formulations of social 
experience such as agency, narrative, and space’ (ibid p.47) is needed. 
Greenhouse regards her analysis, thus, as a call towards a reconceptualization of 
‘an anthropology of time that does not presuppose what time is’ (ibid p.75). In her 
conclusion to the chapter where she critically examined a series of ethnographic 
texts concerned with the topic of time, Greenhouse looks at what cultural models of 
time could say about various understandings of agency: ‘European “linear time” 
depicts agency as having been created all at once and then partially distributed 
among individuals (yet without being depleted by this distributuion). “Indifference to 
time” appears to mean at least two things: untotalized formulations of agency and 
totalizations of agency in terms other than duration’ (ibid p.47).  
After looking at anthropological perspectives on time, Greenhouse addresses the 
question of agency that, she suggests has very often been restricted ‘to 
consideration of the means whereby individual effort can be seen to be lodged as 
(or against) “social structure”’ (ibid p.77). She focuses particularly on Giddens’ 
(1979) ideas on the connections between agency and social structure, where 
agency is seen as ‘a form of inscription, whose effects are caught and accumulated 
as “structure”’ (Greenhouse 1996: 80), or, in other words, structure is seen as ‘the 
“sedimentation” of agency’ (ibid p.81). The association of agency with inscription, 
Greenhouse argues, is linked to the fact that linear time is the ‘official’ temporality of 
the Western nation-state. She outlines that this perspective suggests that agency 
involves, universally, issues of intention and will. But this view of agency, she 
suggests, ‘would seem to imply that cultural differences with respect to the meaning 
of agency are limited to actors’ different means or instrumentalities in relation to 
different goals, as well as their different understandings of what intention and 
causality are’ (idem). However, as she stated at the beginning of her book, agency 
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is a productive area of ethnographic inquiry because it can bring an entry point into 
the exploration of the ways in which the question of what social relevance means 
emerges in different social and cultural contexts. Agency is about how people 
believe that the universe works, and not just about intention and causality. For 
Greenhouse, agency ‘is not necessarily at the level of conscious choice or 
ideological commitment’ (1996: 82) and it should not be depicted by exclusively 
analysing its effects: ‘Can we consider agency as an ethnographic question without 
assuming in advance that what “matter” about agency are individual effects on 
society or that what matter about time are “moments”?’ (ibid p. 81). With her work, 
Greenhouse proposes a positive response to this question.  
From this last paragraph it is evident that in this publication, Greenhouse (1996) 
introduces an idea that is shared by the works of Moore (2011) and of Gershon 
(2011), which I discussed in the previous sections, namely the endeavour of 
decoupling agency and structure and of moving beyond the assumption that agency 
only relates to a level of conscious choice. As I have shown, ‘neoliberal agency’ 
(Gershon 2011) is one of the definitions of agency that assume it to universally 
involve issues of intention and will. In her approach that moves beyond the 
structure / agency dialectic, Moore (2011) calls, for her part, towards an 
acknowledgement of unconscious forms of agency that are not directly concerned 
with effects on society. In the previous section I brought together Moore’s (2011) 
and Gershon’s (2011) ideas to formulate the working concept of ‘ordinary agency’ 
that describes forms of agency employed in everyday life that are related to ‘non-
conscious’ (unconscious, tacit, and non-intentional) acts of creating meaning. 
However, what is specific to Greenhouse’s (1996) approach is the focus on the 
relationship between time and agency. Her thesis is that ‘time’s many forms are 
cultural propositions about the nature and distribution of agency across social 
space – cultural propositions cast as normative ideals’ (Greenhouse 1996: 82). 
Looking at the temporalities of law in the United States, she argues that ‘linear time 
does the state’s (or any institution’s) work by providing an idiom with which 
individual agency can be represented as flowing into the nation’s’ (ibid p. 180). 
Greenhouse advocates a plural perspective that recognizes that individuals are 
able to simultaneously engage with multiple types of temporalities – ‘there appears 
to be no limit to people’s ability to incorporate multiple temporalities into their daily 
lives’ (ibid p. 87) – and to imagine and enact multiple forms of agency. However, 
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she remarks that the multiplicity of cultural formulations of agency ‘are only 
selectively acknowledged and accommodated by any particular institutional form’ 
(ibid p. 233). An important role of the ethnographic endeavour would be, here, to 
describe and to conceptualize some of the multiple formulations of agency that are 
not necessarily recognized as agencies by dominant institutional forms. Some 
examples of alternative formulations of agency in the United States mentioned by 
Greenhouse are ‘creationism, laziness, superstition, witchcraft’ (ibid p. 7), none of 
which is generally taken seriously in public discourse. She argues that these 
alternative formulations ‘should not be left as caricatures but read as critical, if 
partial, counterdiscourses of time’ (idem).   
Temporalities of domesticity, I believe, could also be regarded as 
counterdiscourses of time that make a consistent – even if quiet, or ‘non-conscious’ 
– statement about the ingrained presence of agency in everyday life. In the 
empirical chapters of my thesis I describe and conceptualize three time modes of 
domesticity – spontaneity, anticipation, and ‘family time’ – and the forms of ‘ordinary 
agency’ that they engender and make visible. 
For Greenhouse (1996), as we have seen, a cultural dimension, that she 
acknowledges in order to argue against claims on the universality of linear time, is 
an essential tool for undertaking the investigation that she advocates for. As I have 
discussed in the previous section, Gershon (2011), for her part, argues that the 
disposal of the concept of culture together with the analytical apparatus it provided 
left scholars with no sharp enough analytical tools to oppose neoliberal 
universalizing claims. In this dissertation, my approach – coming from my 
experiences as a Romanian anthropologist coming to England, for the first time, in 
order to do fieldwork – acknowledges that a dimension of cultural specificity might 
be intrinsic in the space and time that the people I met in Middleborough occupy 
and participate in. I understand this cultural dimension by adopting Moore’s 
definition of culture as ‘an “art of living”, as a means of engagement with the world’ 
(2011: 11). Therefore, the time modes that are described in this thesis can be 
regarded as connected to existing (and changing) forms of engagement with the 
world that are embedded, recognized, and performed, in the English provincial – 
and preponderantly middle-class – universe where the author carried out her 
fieldwork. 
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In such a universe, a particular view on time is enacted in kinship relations, as 
Strathern (1992) shows. This is a concept of progressive time that flows downwards 
in relation to the irreversible succession of generations.  The irreversibility of time is 
most visible here, Strathern (1992) outlines, in the relationship between parents and 
child where substance is passed from the former to the latter in an exclusively 
forward direction: ‘Causes thus flow forward in time. Consequently a person may be 
regarded as influenced by many things that happened before he or she was born, 
for he or she is born into a world already full of events and relationships. Parents 
affect children’s identity much more than children affect parents. This downward or 
forward flow in time recurs as a question of individual development’ (Strathern 1992: 
67). This reflection on the English sense of time in relation to kinship comes in the 
context of Strathern’s analytical endeavour of placing Victorian middle-class kin 
constructs and British anthropological kinship theory as ‘mutual perspectives on 
each other’s modernisms’ (ibid p. 8). She identifies three main ‘facts’ of English 
kinship: the individuality of persons; diversity; and the idea that individuals 
reproduce individuals. Her observation about progressive time is explained in 
relation to the facts of English kinship where a child is regarded as an unique 
individual that appears ‘as an outcome of the acts of other individuals’ (ibid p. 53) 
and time is seen to increase the number of persons as well as, generally, ‘the 
diversity and plurality of all the things in the world’ (ibid p. 60).  
In chapter V I will discuss in more detail some ideas from Strathen’s work on 
English kinship. For the moment I take her observation on the sense of time in 
kinship as a point of departure for my analysis of the ways in which families 
approach, experience, represent, and create domestic time. Therefore, if temporal 
direction is fixed to a forward flow and if people cannot influence time’s direction, as 
they cannot interfere with the past either, then, what can be influenced is the speed 
of time’s flowing. In order to engage with, and to change time’s gears, one might 
juggle with ideas of the present and of the future in various ways. Spontaneity, 
anticipation and ‘family time’, as I discuss them in this thesis, are time modes of 
domesticity that play with, blend, and knead the present and the future in various 
ways and, in doing so, they constitute themselves as counterdiscourses of time in 
relation to linear time. Spontaneity and anticipation make the future present, by 
creating wished-for future moments and by making them happen, and, respectively, 
by coating the present with the imagination of the future. ‘Family time’ aims at 
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making the present future by prolonging it, by operating in the present continuous 
mode.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I discussed the theoretical framework of my dissertation and I 
introduced the working concepts of ‘ordinary agency’, spontaneity, anticipation, and 
‘family time’ which will be further employed and developed in the corpus of this 
thesis. In order to show the way in which I arrived at the theoretical approach that 
my thesis follows, which is Moore’s (2011) post-vitalist approach, I started with a 
dialogue between my reflections related to some specific ethnographic experiences 
and a set of various possible theoretical interpretations of ethnographic materials. 
After this introduction, I discussed in dedicated sections anthropological re-readings 
(Faubion 2001; Moore 2011; Rabinow 1996) of Foucault’s (1990, 2000) work on 
ethical practices; the similarities between the ways in which Foucault’s work is 
employed by Moore (2011) in developing a post-vitalist theoretical approach and by 
Hobson (2011) in developing an alternative and critical approach in relation to the 
domestic sustainability agenda; Gershon’s (2011) critique of ‘neoliberal agency’; 
and the conceptualization of the relationships between cultural models of time and 
forms of agency developed by Greenhouse (1996). While the empirical chapters of 
this dissertation (chapters 3 – 5) will refer back to the theoretical corpus developed 
here and they will employ arguments and analytical tools that I first introduced in 
this chapter, the respective further theoretical discussions will be rather succinct 
and the reader is invited to turn back to this chapter for more theoretical detail, if 
needed.   
The working concept of ‘ordinary agency’, therefore, refers to forms of agency 
employed in everyday life, which are related to ‘non-conscious’ (unconscious, tacit, 
and non-intentional) acts of creating meaning, and to activities of ‘doing’, rather 
than of ‘making’. The time-modes of spontaneity, anticipation, and ‘family-time’ are 
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to be regarded as counterdiscourses to linear time, which are articulated inside 
domestic settings, and which engender specific forms of ‘ordinary agency’. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In this chapter I discuss the methodological framework and approach that I follow 
through my dissertation, in relation to my personal experiences as a fieldworker in 
an English town and in relation to the interdisciplinary and applied context that 
framed and made my research possible.  
The next part is an arrival story and it introduces my field site, a town situated in the 
Midlands area, which I present under the pseudonym of Middleborough. I will 
discuss the thoughts of wonder and doubt raised by the experiences related to my 
initial encounter with my field site, and the process through which the strangeness 
became familiarity. I explain the reasons why I chose this pseudonym and I position 
Middleborough in relation to two sets of cultural categories: the ‘city’ and the 
‘country’; and ‘the North’ and ‘the South’. In this part I also explore the relationships 
between the bodily process of becoming a Morris dancer and an academic interest 
with developing methodological tools for tackling tacit knowledge; and I look at the 
ways in which the agency that emerges from dancing can contribute to formulating 
academic conceptualizations of ‘ordinary agency’. 
In the third part I look at the two different sets of expectations that applied and 
academic anthropology bring about and I explore possible ways of integrating these 
two perspectives. I discuss my experiences of working as part of an applied 
interdisciplinary project, and of explaining and legitimating my work to peers in 
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academic anthropological contexts and I relate these experiences to existent 
literature on the topic. In this section I introduce the LEEDR project, an 
interdisciplinary project that my doctoral research was part of; I describe the 
processes of ethical approval and of participant recruitment that were led at the 
project level; and I discuss the methods developed within the LEEDR that I applied 
before and during conducting my doctoral fieldwork. I will then look at the 
relationships between the applied and the academic/ ‘traditional’ parts of my 
ethnographic fieldwork and I will describe my efforts to keep them separate through 
the use of two different sets of field notebooks, as well as their subsequent inherent 
interpenetration. I conclude this part by arguing that applied research cannot be 
separated from other forms of learning on the field. 
In the fourth section I am concerned with the methodological approaches and tools 
that would be needed in order to look at ‘ordinary agencies’ as forms of agency that 
are employed in everyday life and that are related to ‘non-conscious’ – unconscious, 
tacit, and non-intentional – acts of creating meaning. I introduce sensory 
ethnography as an approach to ethnographic practice that can provide a route to 
tacit knowledge and I discuss the ways in which two methods used in my fieldwork 
– participant observation and interviewing – are reinterpreted through the prism of 
sensory ethnography. 
The fifth section describes the participatory and arts-based methods that I 
developed and employed with my key-participants: the Tactile Time collage, the 
Evening Times self-video recording activity and the Five Cups of Tea self-
interviewing with video task. I show the potential of these methods to tackle tacit 
knowledge, especially the tacit knowledge in one’s relationships with time, which 
reached a multi-sensory expression through the process of making the Tactile Time 
collages. I discuss the capacity of the Five Cups of Tea method to engender a 
process of problematization or ethical work (Foucault 1990). Finally, I situate these 
methods in relation to the conceptualization of inventive methods developed by 
Lury and Wakeford (2012). 
In the sixth section I discuss the specificities of visual ethnographic methods, 
focusing on the use of video camera, as routes to tacit knowledge. I will discuss 
video materials filmed both by myself and by my key-participants, which are 
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included in the video appendix Mum’s Cup. This section can also be regarded as 
offering a visual ethnographic theoretical background for the video appendix. 
I conclude in the seventh section. 
 
2. Encountering Middleborough: surprise, skill, and tacit knowledge 
 
The opportunity to spend 42 months – the total length of my PhD studentship – in 
the town where I carried out my doctoral fieldwork has proven to be invaluably 
fertile and life-changing, though my reaction after first visiting Middleborough, in 
September 2010, was less optimistic. It was my first time in the UK, the place where 
some of my favourite writers, filmmakers and music bands originated, and I was 
somehow expecting each street corner to display the quality of exciting and creative 
heterogeneity, which provided inspiration for the people whose work I admired. This 
expectation was also related to a general predisposition, in Romania, to look up at 
Western countries as places that are better developed economically and where 
people are, generally, happier, nicer and smarter. Coming from the lively Bucharest 
where I was living in the city centre, surrounded by theatres and music venues, the 
perspective of spending the next three and a half years of my life in a place that 
looked dim and uneventful, instead of carrying out between twelve and eighteen 
months of fieldwork in a warm climate and then continuing my old life, as I thought 
that anthropologists ‘normally’ do, felt like ostracism. After that first visit I asked my 
supervisors if it would be possible to spend part of my first year in London in order 
to attend open lectures in anthropology departments (and to experience the city 
vibe); do multi-sited fieldwork; or move back to Romania in the final eighteen 
months in order to ‘get distance’ before starting to write my dissertation. The first 
two ideas did not materialize due to the constraints of working as part of a wider 
project that had a set research design in place – the aim of conducting research 
with twenty families based in Middleborough – and that required my presence at 
fortnightly meetings and my contribution to various tasks. I forgot all about the third 
idea when, towards the end of the year of my fieldwork, I met my boyfriend, Steven, 
a Middleborough resident.   
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As I am writing these words, my field site has (provisionally) become my home. I 
travel through its brisk quiet air every day, wondering how I could recapture, in 
order to better describe them, Middleborough’s overwhelming qualities of discreet 
smallness and persisting uniformity, which felt constraining at start, but familiar and 
nearly unnoticeable at present. In the evenings, on my way home, I pass by houses 
where my participants live and I try to tell whether they are at home and what they 
are doing by the rooms where the light is on. Looking at the lit windows of the 
people you are writing about – as a way of reassuring yourself that they are real; an 
everyday reassurance that is impossible to reach with similar intensity when one 
moves away from one’s field site after finishing the fieldwork.   
I moved to Middleborough and I started my PhD in December 2010. During my first 
months here, living with my landlady Natalie, who was also doing a PhD at the local 
university, I was utterly surprised by the fact that I could never see our neighbours. 
Natalie’s three-bedroom house was in a suburban residential neighbourhood, 
located at forty minutes walking distance from the town centre and at a twenty 
minutes’ walk from the campus. While not too long and time-consuming, the walks 
felt lonely as I was only rarely passing by other people walking on the pavement; 
the sound and sight of passing cars was, however, uninterrupted. The only way to 
see our neighbours, I realised, was in the moments after they got out of their 
houses and before they got in their cars – moments that I kept on missing. Houses 
with lit windows felt, then, like inaccessible fortresses where people were hiding 
away, hibernating.  
Springtime brought some changes: a football landed in our back garden. Full of 
hope, ball under my arm, I walked on the parallel back street trying to detect which 
the house with the garden in the back of ours was. I rang the bell, and a woman, 
two kids, and a dog all rushed to the door; they were glad to see the ball back but 
they did not offer me a cup of tea, nor did we introduce ourselves and shake hands 
as neighbours do in Romania. They told me not to bother next time and to just 
throw the ball over the fence. I started to be worried: how could I ever do fieldwork 
with English families when I was not able to meet any? In my home country, a 
village form of sociality, where everybody knows everybody, was reproduced in 
urban settings in the socialist blocks of flats – the exclusive form of urban dwelling – 
where everybody knew one’s neighbours, paid them regular visits, chatted 
endlessly in front of the lift, and they generally knew about, and were concerned 
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with their neighbours’ problems, related to different life stages and circumstances. 
What was going on inside English houses – what form of bliss, jolly complicity and 
inspiring harmony was reached at home in order to make up for isolation? I could 
not imagine an answer to this question at the time, as I could not understand why 
anybody would choose to live in Middleborough and what reasons a young person 
could have for spending their degree years here.    
Nine months later, however, when I started my ‘official’ year of fieldwork, I was 
already part of a series of local groups and networks – such as a Morris dancing 
group, the Transition Town Middleborough grassroots movement, and two other 
groups that organized fortnightly political discussions and meetings with council 
representatives on topics related to transport and urban planning in the area. I had 
English friends and I started to develop an understanding of their reasons of living 
in Middleborough. After moving, with a group of friends, closer to the town centre, 
where our cheerful neighbour, who was always chatting over the garden fence with 
us, was happy to try my home-brewed beer, I started enjoying living in 
Middleborough much more. My relationship with the town was ‘officialised’ when I 
found my photo and my name in the local paper: a couple of times it was a group 
photo of my Morris side; and once it was a photo taken at a mending event on a 
weekday morning, where an elderly friend, his elderly lodger and myself were the 
only participants. I bought several copies of that edition of the local weekly paper 
and I sent them to my parents and to my friends back home as a proof that I was 
‘an acknowledged presence’; a provisional member; ‘an anthropologist’. In time, 
amazing things happened: being in someone’s house for the first time, for a 
spontaneous after-party that followed one of the ceilidh group’s weekly sessions, I 
recognized someone I knew from a completely different context in a photo on the 
host’s fridge; at an open garden event I was recognized by a lady who had seen me 
Morris dancing and who knew other members of my Morris side; Saturday market 
trips in the town centre started to be accompanied by unplanned meetings with 
people I knew. Relationships and connections, like the streets on an emotional map, 
made the town alive and enjoyable to live in for me. 
Once, when I attended a public meeting organised by a local group interested in 
improving public transport, the ‘main characteristics’ of the town were discussed. An 
urban planner from the council read from documents part of the development 
master plan of the town centre a list of main features that, the local group members 
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agreed, made the town unique: its pedestrian market place; its walkable human 
scale [size]; the market on Thursdays and Saturdays; the architecture with its 
Georgian and Art Deco examples; the mix of shops that represented both the 
independent sector and big brands; the green parks; the university and the 
international environment; the Friday night culture. It was the mixture of these 
qualities, rather than their individuality, that made Middleborough different from 
other towns.  
While numbers (45,000 to 65,000 inhabitants) reveal a medium size town, an 
impression of smallness comes from the fact that there are no other buildings, 
besides a few student halls, higher than three levels. However, the impression of 
petit, I discovered, was one of the things that Middleborough residents found 
attractive. The vast majority of the people I met here, as well as the majority of the 
participants in the LEEDR project, were not originally from Middleborough, but they 
moved from other parts of the UK, following jobs, or following available nursery 
places and a direct rail connection to London. People often emphasized that 
Middleborough ‘is not too big, but big enough’; ‘it’s a town, not a city’; and that 
‘you’ve got everything you need in a walking distance’ while still being able, if you 
are living on the forest side of the town, to go to a walk in the woods straight from 
your back garden (from my field notes).  
The way in which I arrived at the name Middleborough as a pseudonym for my field 
site was, first, in relation to the cultural categories of ‘the city’ and ‘the country’ 
(Williams 1973) that the residents made use of in describing the town. In Williams’ 
(1973) analysis of English literature, images of the country and of the city appeared 
in opposition, the country representing a realm of simple and unadulterated life, 
while the city being depicted as a symbol of alienation and capitalist exploitation. 
While the meanings associated with these two realms have evolved and changed in 
time, the city and the country are, arguably, still regarded as representing 
essentially different ways of living in the UK.5 However, I argue that Middleborough 
can be seen as providing the best of both worlds; by being neither a city, nor a 
village, it is both. By living in Middleborough, people do not need to choose 
between a countryside living life-style and a city living life-style – or, in other words, 
between being a country-person and a city-person – and, by choosing one 
                                            
5 See (Barry 2005) and the visual narrative of the Opening Ceremony show for the 2012 Olympic 
Games in London. 
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alternative, to refuse the other one. Rather, as an assemblage of both worlds, in 
Middleborough the tensions inherent in the city vs. country dichotomy are 
domesticated through an emphasis on the positive dimensions of both forms of 
living and a triumph over the negative ones, such as the alienation and anonymity 
of urban life and, respectively, the normativity of the village where born and bred 
locals could be reluctant to welcome ‘newcomers’ (Strathern 1981), ‘offcomers’ 
(Rapport 1993), or ‘incomers’ (Edwards 2000). I now use a similar idiom when I 
describe the place where I live to my friends in Romania: I am renting an old 
Victorian terraced cottage in the town centre; when stepping outside of my house I 
can see the best pub in town, called The Lemon Tree; on my way there, I pass by 
two Chinese restaurants and a Fish and Chips shop; within a two-minutes’ walk 
from the pub one can get to a big leisure centre; within fifteen minutes to the 
University campus; and in a ten-minutes car journey to the Beacon hill, where some 
of the oldest stones in England can be found and where the local grove organizes 
May Day celebrations and equinox and solstice rituals. 
A relationship with a second set of cultural dichotomies that I wish to reflect in the 
name ‘Middleborough’ is a ‘neither, nor’ position in relation to what in England are 
the categories of ‘the North’ and ‘the South’, or, more accurately, ‘people from the 
North’ and ‘people from the South’. I encountered this distinction many times during 
my fieldwork and during my life in England, sometimes being asked, when my 
company found that I was an anthropologist, what I thought about the differences 
between the North and the South; other times, people told me that I was lucky to be 
a foreigner in the UK, because I could travel to any part of the country and the 
locals would treat me nice, while them, betrayed by their original accent, could not 
travel to an area situated at the other end of the UK and feel welcome. The 
awareness of differences between people from the North and people from the 
South, and an interest with constantly observing and comparing them, makes any 
English into (a bit of) an anthropologist. While these cultural differences have been 
situated historically (Jewell 1994), it was during the Thacherite government – when 
economic and political differences between these two regions (an affluent and 
Conservative South vs. a poor Labour-voting North) became more accentuated, or 
more visible – that what was called ‘the North-South divide’ has been particularly 
emphasized and discussed in the media, as Lewis and Townsend (1989) observe. 
Middleborough accommodates both people who moved from the North and people 
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who moved from the South, following jobs, partners, or changes brought by 
different life stages. The ones who came from the North prefer it here because it is 
less rainy than in the place they originated from; the ones who came from the South 
appreciate the fact that they have more routes for countryside walking here, than in 
the South, where a substantial part of the land is privately owned. Middleborough, 
thus, provides a critical distance that both the ‘rough’ North and the ‘stately’ South 
can be regarded from, and contested. 
In this way, by being neither on one side, nor on the other, of the ‘rough’ North and 
the ‘stately’ South divide, and of the ‘cosy but normative’ village and the ‘exciting 
but alienating’ city dichotomy, Middleborough is liberating in the sense that it 
represents a context that no strong characteristics have been necessarily 
associated with. One could say that, maybe, in the imagination of an English 
resident, life in Middleborough might be seen as less prescriptive than life in one of 
the well-defined four poles that I discussed. 
During the lengthy process of learning to understand the reasons why one would 
live in Middleborough, one of the experiences that broadened my imagination and 
my intuition the most, in tacit and embodied ways, was that of becoming a Morris 
dancer. I met Zia and Richard in late spring, in my first year in Middleborough, in 
The Lemon Tree pub after a performance organized by the University’s 
contemporary arts programme that both Zia and I volunteered for as performers. 
While chatting with Richard, he told me that they were starting up a border Morris 
side. When finding that I was an anthropologist and that I was going to be in 
Middleborough, away from my family and friends, for three more years, he insisted 
that I join them, saying that this would be a good way for me to learn about real 
English traditions; he also said that, if I join the group, they could become my family 
for the next three years. I started attending the weekly practices – that were held, 
during the first year, in the back room of a pub, and that later moved to a hall in a 
community centre – the Sunday after; Zia and Richard taught me the dance steps 
with great patience, and they, or other members of the group, always gave me a lift 
to and from practice. We grew very close in time and we got to know each other in 
a way that only shared physical tasks maybe permit. We did numerous public 
performances together, and we travelled and participated in folk and pagan festivals 
and events all across England and where, very often, I found myself to be the only 
non-British participant.  
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Besides opening up a whole new social world for me, the experience generated a 
new relationship with my body. I have never been good at choreographed dance 
and synchronization and, after the first few practice sessions, I thought it would be 
impossible to get attuned with the other dancers. In time, by learning the tunes, by 
getting to know the members of the group, by responding to the energy, complicity 
and closeness emanated when a dance is successfully accomplished, I arrived at 
the skill of cancelling my thoughts when performing and letting my body take charge, 
in responding to the music. One of the things that made border Morris different from 
other forms of choreographed dance, and that helped with my body’s learning and 
mastering the skill, was the dialogic relationship with the music. In border Morris, 
dancers use sticks that they clash during the chorus as a form of percussion: the 
sound of sticking supports the tune, integrates music and dance into a whole, and 
enhances the multi-sensory experience of performing the dance. After practicing 
and habituating a dance as a complex multi-sensory sequence of actions that 
displays a specific music-dance relationship, it will be with hearing the music that 
the body would remember and enact the dance. Having embodied the dances, I 
now find it easy to learn new ones during gatherings with other sides; the dances, 
their structure and combination of sequences make complete sense to me in a tacit 
way, like a new language that my body now knows.  
Even if I had been interested, theoretically and academically, with tacit knowledge 
before, it was through Morris dancing that I really learned to trust my body, my 
intuition and my emotions and to acknowledge them as instruments of knowledge-
formation. Following the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ (Ryle 
1949) – or, in Bloch’s (1985) terms, ideological (propositional) and everyday (non-
propositional) knowledge – Harris (2007) observes that ethnographers have usually 
dealt with the first category, ‘the explicit part of the information they gather in the 
field, such as what is told them, what they observe and can measure’ (2007: 12), 
and they have been less preoccupied with developing methodological practices and 
instruments that would tackle the ‘tacit aspects such as body techniques, skills, the 
senses’ (idem). Tacit knowledge, or what the body knows, is a form of everyday 
knowledge that people do not usually reflect upon. It is, thus, non-propositional: it 
appears rather in actions than in words. While my ethnographic fieldwork with 
English families did not involve folk dancing, I believe that the skill of Morris dancing 
that my body arrived to master, as a form of tacit knowledge, opened up research 
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questions that I was able to formulate and to address within the defined context of 
my ‘official’ research. I approach the relationship between these two distinct parts of 
my ethnographic fieldwork – one related to everyday life and serendipitous 
experiences on my field site, and the other to my well-defined research of English 
families as part of the LEEDR project – through Grasseni’s (2007) perspective on 
skilful vision. She argues that the process of coming to apprehend – or to ‘skilfully 
see’ – locally achieved understandings, or worldviews, that are embodied in a 
community of practice is essentially practical: ‘By participating in many different 
constellations of communities of practice, in various capacities and degrees in the 
course of one’s life, one pragmatically gains the capacity to relate to those “forms of 
life” that are in some way contiguous to one’s own’ (Grasseni 2007: 208). In other 
words, the wider the variety of activities one engages in on fieldwork, the further 
one’s capacity to relate, to intuit, and to understand the worldviews of others 
develops. Morris dancing was, thus, for me a form of bodily training – alongside 
gardening, English cooking and baking, beer brewing, ceilidh dancing, countryside 
walking, and other activities – in developing my sensitivity to other forms of 
understandings that my English participants tacitly held, such as understandings of 
domestic time.   
The expressive particularities of border Morris dancing, like sticking and shouting, 
make this a particularly agentive activity. The dancers look, and act, self-confident 
and loud. We wear tattered jackets and an abundance of accessories: collections of 
badges from Morris events or displaying the name of other sides, which show one’s 
experience and connections; hats decorated with ribbons and feathers; earrings, 
necklaces and rings; long gloves and knee-length colourful socks. We paint our 
faces in black; with stripes such as those from popular culture representations of 
Native Americans; or with various pagan patterns. We wear straps of small bells 
tied on ankles or under knees, which signal every step we take, by accompanying it 
with rings. Morris dancers are conspicuous presences that people acknowledge 
with amusement. By privileging a loud, physically intense, and playfully aggressive 
expression, Morris dancing makes performers into agents. I believe that the 
constant sense of agency that I derived from dancing contributed to shaping the 
focus of my thesis upon the pursuit of identifying and defining alternative forms of 
agency that are not conscious and end-driven, but ordinary and tacit. 
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3. The double bind of applied and academic anthropology 
 
While my initial experience of the town was that of a place of hidden and 
inaccessible inhabitants, my work life was populated by strong presences and I was 
engaged in frequent and lively interdisciplinary encounters with my teammates from 
the LEEDR project. The LEEDR team consisted in fifteen investigators and 
researchers from the disciplines of building engineering, electrical and systems 
engineering, computer science, design and social sciences. During the project’s 
initial fortnightly meetings, before advertising for and recruiting the participants, our 
dialogues, focused on the pressing question of what sort of research we all wanted 
to do together, turned, very often, into discussions about our disciplines, 
epistemological and methodological beliefs, points of view on what important and 
worthwhile research was – all of which could not be more different from each 
other’s. I enjoyed these dialogues and I found the challenge of explaining what 
anthropology is, and does, to peers coming from technical backgrounds, to be a 
useful exercise in refining my own thinking about the ways in which knowledge 
gained from ethnographic research could be used to make the world better. 
However, as I was the only representative of the social sciences branch of the 
project for the first seven months – my supervisor was away on a sabbatical year 
and a social sciences Research Associate was appointed only later – there were 
moments when this demand to constantly explain and legitimate my disciplinary 
approach felt daunting, such as when I was asked to think about all the questions I 
will address to participants during my fieldwork and about how the answers to these 
questions could contribute to the overall aim of the project. 
I recovered the comforting sense of mutual disciplinary understanding while 
attending monthly open lectures and a postgraduate discussion group in material 
culture at UCL, thanks to a few friends who were studying there and in relation to a 
previous interest in material culture. This time, when talking about my doctoral 
research with peers, I found that there was a different wall that our conversations 
would invariably hit. This wall materialized when I mentioned that my research was 
part of an applied project whose aim was to develop interventions that would help 
reduce domestic energy consumption. While never due to explicit verbal reactions, 
after these exchanges I was sometimes left with the feeling that my research was 
not as interesting, as sophisticated, as ‘anthropological’ as the research carried out 
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by other doctoral students who were working individually, who did not have any 
‘applied’ concerns to respond to, and who were doing fieldwork outside the UK. 
Looking at the ways to respond to, and to contribute to improving, a societal issue 
of actual public concern in England was considered to be the endeavour of 
sociologists rather than of anthropologists. The questions that informed the overall 
research project as part of that I was working did not have enough anthropological 
sophistication – which meant that, probably, my own research could not be 
‘anthropological’ enough.        
I found myself between these two positions, an applied interdisciplinary one, and an 
academic anthropological one, wanting to occupy them both. The main reason why 
I came to the UK in the first place was in order to become an anthropologist, and I 
was animated by my previous academic training in this discipline. At the same time, 
I had soft green political convictions and I believed that reducing (energy) 
consumption in the global North was generally a good idea. I could not see why 
these two positions had to be incompatible. The constant exercise of challenging – 
in order to reconcile – two distinct positions brought me to the point of wanting to 
move from an ‘either, or’ choice between academic and applied anthropology, to 
finding ways to bring both dimensions together. 
Anthropologists who found themselves in a position of the ‘in between’ – that is 
usually of the academically postgraduate trained researcher who arrives at doing 
applied research – have written about the relations that their new status engages 
both with the ‘traditional’ academia and, respectively, with teammates and co-
researchers with other backgrounds. Regarding the view from the academia, it is 
argued that applied work may still be viewed as ‘impure’ and compromised (Roberts 
2006, Sunderland & Denny 2007, Wright 2006). When Sunderland and Deny 
started out their own qualitative market research company applying the 
ethnographic methods and the anthropological lenses that they had been 
academically trained to use, their applied work was assumed, from the academic 
side, to be ‘less theoretical, less sophisticated, and ultimately less valuable’ 
(Sunderland and Denny 2007: 31). In trying to explain this assumption that he as 
well encountered, Roberts (2006) identifies a series of elements that are ‘anathema’ 
for academic anthropologists: ‘paid informants, the very short period of time spent 
with the households and a narrow focus of vision on the part of the research team’ 
(2006: 84). Concerning paying informants, Drazin (2006) observed that for his 
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research participants in the UK this was an expectation and a proof that the 
research was ‘serious’; he suggests that his British informants preferred ‘a 
commodity form of data’ while in his previous research in Romania the data was 
rather constructed ‘in a stereotypical “gift” form’ (2006: 105). 
More, the cited scholars talk about a possible scale of increasing degrees of 
‘impurity’ in relation to the goal of the research: ‘if “applied” in general was dirty, 
consumer research or “marketing” was filthy – wickedly so, in fact’ (Sunderland and 
Denny 2007: 31). This point is also underlined by the debate around the vocabulary 
used to term applied anthropology. In a historical account about anthropological 
applications in policy and practice in the UK over two decades, Wright (2006) 
shows how the name of the Group for Anthropology in Policy and Practice (GAPP), 
part of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth, 
was chosen in the 1980s as such as to avoid the term ‘applied anthropology’ which 
‘carried connotations of a separate profession, parasitical on “pure” academics for 
ideas which they applied without making contributions to the development of the 
discipline themselves’ (2006: 33). 
A more recent debate in the US focused too on the relation between applied and 
public anthropology. At Borofsky’s (2000) call to academics towards a public 
anthropology engaged with wider audiences, Singer reacted by showing that this is 
what applied anthropologists have been doing since a considerable period of time. 
He suggests that Borofsky’s appeal shows the ‘conscious nonrecognition of applied 
anthropology’ (Singer 2000: 6) and he outlines that ‘given that many applied 
anthropologists already do the kinds of things that are now being described as PA 
[public anthropology], it is hard to understand why a new label is needed, except as 
a device for distancing public anthropologists from applied anthropology’ (idem). 
At the other end, looking at the relationships between anthropologists and co-
workers from other disciplines, one of the most important questions is, as Drazin 
puts it: ‘not so much a question of how to engage with alternative methodologies, as 
of how to analyse and present anthropological data to a non-anthropological 
audience’ (Drazin 2006: 100). One of the times when I addressed this challenge in 
my work was for a half-day LEEDR meeting when the researchers presented and 
discussed data from pilot studies and the PhD students made poster presentations 
of their doctoral projects.  
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Figure 2 Poster that presented my doctoral project and that I presented during a LEEDR meeting (September 
2011). 
 
In the poster that I designed for this occasion I included a chart from the website of 
the National Grid that showed their predictions for the national domestic energy 
demand during the live televised broadcasting of the Royal Wedding. Deciding to 
include the chart was a conscious attempt to make the poster visually familiar and 
attractive to my physical sciences colleagues.  
A series of unequivocal advantages of applied interdisciplinary work started to 
manifest with the stages of recruitment and the preparation of the documents to be 
approved by the ethical committee. Both these processes showed that when 
working collectively – rather than as a lone researcher – responsibilities are 
distributed and there are advantages in acknowledging and in drawing upon the 
existent specialization of co-workers. While these processes were led by a 
colleague from building engineering, the vast majority of project members took part 
in several discussions about ethical issues and lone working procedures, and all the 
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researchers went through a CRB check in order to be able to spend time with the 
family-participants inside their homes. 
Twenty home-owner families were recruited following advertisements in the local 
paper, school and university newsletters, as well as posters that were placed in 
community centres and surgeries. The participants were not incentivised and they 
volunteered to take part in the research for three years, for various reasons, from 
an interest in sustainability and low-carbon ways of living, to a wish of lowering their 
energy bills. With the exception of one single-parent family and of one extended 
family where the maternal grandmother was living in, all the family-participants were 
two-parent nuclear families. Eighteen families could be described, in terms of 
income and education, as ‘middle-class’, while two families could be described – 
and they defined themselves during interviews – as ‘working-class’. Each family 
had between one and four children, with ages between one and 22; and all adult 
couples were heterosexual and married. In selecting the participants, the only set of 
criteria that was followed came from the discipline of building engineering and it 
was related to the size of the house and to the technical requirements for the 
monitoring equipment installation; thus, houses of similar sizes, of three to four 
bedrooms, were chosen in order to make data comparison possible. 
All the different disciplinary branches of the LEEDR conducted various types of 
research with the twenty self-selected family-participants following a pre-agreed 
schedule. The first research encounter was the Getting to Know You interview, 
developed by the colleagues from design, which consisted in two researchers (one 
from design and one from social sciences) visiting the family for one evening and 
joining them for a takeaway meal – provided by the project – while carrying out a 
semi-structured interview. After the meal, the family would take part in an interactive 
activity that consisted in mapping the floor plans of their house with their everyday 
activities and their daily pathway through the home. By taking part in some such 
encounters, I had the opportunity to meet some of my key informants and to 
experience, for the first time, evening time and a meal together with UK families 
inside their homes. Later, towards the end of my own fieldwork, I was invited again 
for dinner and for lunch, several times, by a family that I arrived to be very close 
with; and I also invited them to see my new place, meet my boyfriend and try my 
grandma’s apple cake at a later point, when I was writing my dissertation. 
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The second research encounter was the video tour of the house (Pink 2004), 
conducted by the social sciences branch. The majority of these tours were 
conducted by my colleague, Kerstin, and two of them by me. Even if this research 
stage was part of the LEEDR overall research design, and not of my doctoral 
research design, the knowledge gained from these encounters informed my future 
research questions and it brought a new perspective on the relationship between 
academic and applied anthropology, where a focus on ethnographic encounters 
could open up a discussion about the similarities, rather than the differences, 
between academic and applied research. After the Getting to Know You and the 
video tour of the house encounters I wrote down detailed field notes – of a length 
varying between ten and twenty A5 pages in pen – which represented the 
beginning of the process of thinking about family life in English middle-class 
contexts. Later, I took part in applying other social sciences methods, such as 
conducting video tour follow-up interviews and re-enactments of practices with 
video – focusing on laundry, cooking, digital media use and bathroom practices – 
with my five key family-participants. 
The next stage in the LEEDR research was the installation of monitoring equipment, 
which recorded electricity and gas consumption, as well as movement in the home. 
This was also the moment when the first year of my PhD was coming to an end and 
I was preparing for a year of fieldwork. Thus, when I carried out my doctoral 
fieldwork, my participants were already well-acquainted with the LEEDR project, 
with the other researchers, and, some of them, with me. It was in the quality of a 
LEEDR researcher that I first met them, and this quality opened their doors for me. 
As representing a serious research project that they previously agreed to take part 
in, I was welcome in homes of families for pre-arranged visits, much more than I 
would have been allowed access as a new neighbour who was living in a shared 
student house, as my initial experience in Middleborough showed. In time, while my 
relationships with my key participants developed, I arrived to be regarded as 
‘Roxana’, rather than as ‘a LEEDR researcher’. They came to know some things 
about me, such as the fact that I grew up in Romania where winters are snowy and 
mountains are high; that my parents lived in France and that they had a Labrador; 
that I was a Morris dancer – which some of them even witnessed – and that I was 
part of a student society of gardening and of the Transition Town local group. They 
sympathised with me when I had a bike accident; they tried my home-brewed beer 
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and my cakes; they knew about my holidays, my weekend trips and my conference 
participations. However, our relationships developed on the basis of the initial trust 
offered to a researcher working in a serious project; and it is in the initial 
legitimation that the LEEDR project gave me, where the greatest advantage of 
working as part of a project, rather than as a lone-researcher, stands for me.   
My response to the double bind created by the two different types of expectations of 
the academic and applied-interdisciplinary domains was, in the end, to design and 
to carry out my doctoral project independently from the research focus and 
methodologies of the LEEDR project, but, at the same time, conducting other 
research as part of the social sciences branch of the overall project. In this way, I 
did not need to hold both the academic and the applied aims into focus at once, but 
I was able to momentarily suspend the concerns of the LEEDR project during my 
ethnographic encounters and to focus on the exploration of other questions that 
were emerging from the data. 
My engagements and experiences related to everyday life on my field site, outside 
the focus of my doctoral project – such as Morris dancing and Transition Town 
activities, between others – continued during my fieldwork. In order to distinguish 
between my official research and the knowledge gained serendipitously outside the 
realm of the project, I scrupulously kept two types of diaries: one was dedicated to 
field notes that followed every encounter with the LEEDR families, which I wrote 
during daytime; and the other one was a continuation of the diary that I started 
when I first moved to Middleborough and it contained my thoughts about my out-of-
office-hours experiences, which I was writing down before going to bed. I used 
Romanian for both these forms of note taking and introspection.   
In order to think back at my fieldwork while writing my dissertation, I used both sets 
of notebooks, as the diary provided a track of where my thinking was at and of the 
general forms of practical knowledge that I had about English ways of engaging 
with the world at the time when I had specific rich research encounters with some 
LEEDR participants. For example, it was in the diary where my first ideas about 
anticipation emerged, in the form of a list of examples of what I called, at the time, 
‘anticipation techniques’; it was after that moment that I started to be interested in 
the actions of anticipation related to everyday family life and to address them in my 
research with the LEEDR participants. Therefore, I argue that applied research 
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cannot be separated from other forms of learning on the field. While applied 
research endeavours ask a specific set of questions, in ethnographic approaches 
the responses to these questions and the analytical work through which these 
responses are considered to extend existent knowledge, are informed by other 
forms of learning that the ethnographer engages with, in the larger cultural context 
that surrounds and that pervades the locus of the applied research project.  
 
4. Sensory ethnography as a route to tacit knowledge 
 
In the previous chapter, that discussed the theoretical framework of my dissertation, 
I developed my argument in relation to an idea drawn from the works of Moore 
(2011) and Hobson (2011). This was a suggestion for scholars to approach ordinary 
and ‘non’-conscious actions – actions that have no conscious meanings and 
intentions attributed to – as being meaningful for social transformation. As a 
response to this call and, also, in relation to Gershon’s (2011) critique of ‘neoliberal 
agency’, I developed the working concept of ‘ordinary agencies’. While ‘neoliberal 
agency’ consists in acts of means-ends calculus and rational decision making, 
ordinary agencies are forms of agency employed in everyday life and that are 
related to ‘non-conscious’ – unconscious, tacit, and non-intentional – acts of 
creating meaning. An attention to ordinary agencies as forms of practical 
knowledge involves a process of developing methodological practices and 
instruments that could tackle, in Harris’s (2007) words, the ‘tacit aspects such as 
body techniques, skills, the senses’ (2007: 12). In this section I discuss the 
methodological approaches that I employ in order to situate the tacit knowledge that 
my participants and I accessed and manifested in the development of our 
ethnographic relationships.  
In the first part of this chapter, I suggested that an important form of ‘training’ for me 
in arriving to ‘skilfully see’ (Grasseni 2007) and in developing my sensitivity to the 
ways of engagement with the world that my participants tacitly held and enacted, 
was folk dancing. In order to methodologically integrate this experience in relation 
to my fieldwork with the LEEDR families and in order to show that, even if 
performed by wearing an ‘applied’ hat, my ethnographic encounters with the 
LEEDR participants were as rich in sensory and tacit information as the process of 
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learning folk dances is, I employ the methodological approach of sensory 
ethnography. 
Sensory ethnography is an approach to ethnographic practice that pays attention to 
the sensoriality of human experience by continuously keeping a double focus: on 
the ways in which research participants explain, represent, and categorise their 
multisensory everyday experiences; and on the way in which the ethnographer 
experiences and learns about other people’s lives through her own sensorium (Pink 
2009). Grounded in a phenomenological perspective – especially Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of embodiment that regards senses as being interconnected – and 
drawing from the works of Ingold (2000), Stoller (1989, 1997) and Seremetakis 
(1996), sensory ethnography responds to two important contemporary 
epistemological considerations in social sciences. The first one looks at what we 
consider to be knowledge that we can plan to ‘collect’ from research participants as 
what is called ‘data’; as I discussed in the first section, Harris’s (2007) take on this 
question is the observation that ethnographers traditionally favoured the explicit 
aspects of knowledge to the tacit ones. The second consideration asks how 
anthropological knowledge is produced: what it means to carry out ethnographic 
research and how could one arrive to understand the lives of others.  
My doctoral fieldwork with the LEEDR families comprised of two phases. In the first 
phase I used ‘traditional’ ethnographic methods, such as semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation, which I reinterpreted through the lenses of sensory 
ethnography. Based on my field notes from this first stage, I further developed a set 
of inventive participant-led methods that I describe in the next section. There were 
eighteen families, from the total of twenty LEEDR family-participants, which took 
part in the first stage of research.6 At the same time, after negotiations with the 
LEEDR team, I was allowed to pick five families to carry out long-term ethnographic 
fieldwork together with. I chose the families that I already knew better from the 
previous research encounters under the LEEDR focus – which I described in the 
last section – and the families which I felt that I ‘clicked’ with, or which I imagined 
that I would get along well with because of shared interests, such as having dogs 
as pets. Some of the families that I would have liked to work with declined the 
proposition and others volunteered by themselves, hearing from other people that I 
                                            
6 All the families were asked and two of them, both with very young children, declined to take part in 
my research.  
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was doing a selection for my PhD. The families that I ended up working with in the 
end were, as it happens, a mixture of choices and chance. In this thesis, when I 
mention my key-participants, I refer to these five families who, besides engaging in 
a long-term ethnographic relationship with me, were also the only participants who 
employed the inventive methods during the second phase of my fieldwork. 
I will now show how the methods that I used during my fieldwork are interpreted 
through the prism of sensory ethnography. I shortly discuss participant observation 
and interviewing below while in the next section I will discuss the set of inventive 
participant-led methods that I developed together with my participants. 
The traditional method of participant observation, that defines the ethnographer’s 
joining in with the activities that happen to take place in the everyday lives of the 
members of the community that takes part in the research, is considered in 
ethnographic practice both a way of understanding how other people enact and 
give meaning to their daily activities, and also a proof of ‘being there’ that will 
legitimate the researcher’s further writings. From a sensory ethnography 
perspective, this participation can represent a form of sensory apprenticeship, as 
the ethnographer learns ‘how to sense one’s environment in a culturally specific 
way’ (Pink 2009: 70) and as she learns new skills, such as the ‘skilled vision’ of 
being able to tell good from bad cattle (Grasseni 2004).  
The interview as event, from a sensory ethnographic perspective, ‘creates a place 
in which to reflect, define and communicate about experiences’ (Pink 2009: 87). For 
my research, the event created by the interview also brought out the opportunity for 
participant observation. With two exceptions of male participants who worked in the 
academia and who preferred to be interviewed at work in their offices, all the other 
interviews took place inside the homes of the participants, in the living room, 
kitchen, or conservatory. Pink (2009) suggests that interviews that take place inside 
the homes of the participants can bring a special kind of engagement and 
understanding: ‘[b]y sitting with another person in their living room, in their chair, 
drinking their coffee from one of their mugs, one begins in some small way to 
occupy the world in a way that is similar to them’ (ibid p. 86, original italics).  
Nearly half of the interviews that I carried out were part of wider LEEDR research 
visits, which meant that, while I was interviewing one of the adult participants 
downstairs, some of my colleagues were video recording other family members 
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upstairs, or they were checking or installing monitoring equipment. In these cases, it 
very often happened that all family members engaged with various parts of the 
interview and they spontaneously gave their opinion on one or more questions if, 
when coming in the room, they heard the main interviewees talking with me about a 
topic that they were interested in. For the rest of the interviews I was the only visitor, 
and one, or both, the adult participants sat down with me and responded to my 
questions. These interviews were semi-structured and they addressed the topic of 
usages of media and digital devices at home in relation to domestic time, lasting 
between one and two hours. 
These visits gave me the chance to experience and to be part of the home 
environments of the people I was studying. Family rhythms continued, and 
everyday events happened in my presence, such as family members coming in and 
going out of the house; having drinks, snacks or meals; using their mobile or 
landline phones, computers and tablets; watching TV or doing homework; going in 
and out the living room, as well as in and out of my interview setting/ voice recorder 
radius; checking on other family members by using mobile phones or by going to 
the rooms that they were in. During these visits, spontaneous questions arisen from 
some particular features of their homes, from family photos, or from an occasional 
display of cards. We had cups of tea together, checked the weather, laughed and 
wondered about what smartphones can do nowadays. Sitting with them, I 
experienced the view on their windows, the forms of lighting in the house, and what 
for them were the familiar sounds of the central heating going off, of the doorbell, or 
of the landline phone. During these visits I felt that, as Pink (2009) puts it, I 
occupied the world in a similar way with my participants, or, I occupied the same 
world with them, at the same time. I also realised that every home is different. The 
sixteen houses that I visited gave me a small experiential repertoire of ‘English 
homes’, which I broadened up by using various hospitability networks for traveling 
in different parts of the UK. Spending time with people inside their houses could be, 
thus, regarded as a form of training for arriving to ‘skilfully see’ the types of 
relationships that people have with the environment of their homes: with their 
domestic spaces and with their domestic time.  
While the sensory and tacit knowledge that I accessed through these encounters 
functioned as a sort of experiential repertoire, as a grounding layer that later made 
me able to make connections when I saw similar forms of domestic engagements 
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and relations, the opportunity to develop long-term relationships with my key family-
participants brought me to agency: by making me feel like an agent, the mutuality of, 
and the insight gained from these engagements, opened up the idea of ordinary 
agencies. 
 
5. Inventive methods and other occasions for ethnographic 
encounters 
 
After I carried out the initial set of semi-structured interviews, the need to develop 
other methods came both from the non-propositional particularity of the subject that 
I was trying to tackle – domestic time, and from the expectations that the LEEDR 
project raised in the family-participants. As they started with the Getting to Know 
You visit that involved a takeaway meal and an interactive task, which were very 
much enjoyed – for example, one of these visits that I took part in lasted for over 
four hours, not at our request but because people enjoyed the task – the initial 
engagements with the LEEDR participants created the expectation that taking part 
in research is exciting. This expectation, combined with the particular sense of 
privacy surrounding the domestic environment that I discovered in Middleborough, 
made me think, in the first few months of my fieldwork, that I needed to have some 
good reasons in order to visit the homes of the LEEDR participants again. I 
developed the method of the Tactile Time collage in order to give my participants a 
fun experience that would let me inside their homes again and that might bring up 
some new questions in relation to my research topic. At this point, I was free to 
develop relationships with my participants without the involvement of the LEEDR 
project; people knew that my visits were related to my doctoral research and that 
they did not have to take part in the tasks that I was proposing if they did not want 
to, without this decision affecting their participation in the LEEDR project. This 
situation was similar to the experiences of doing ‘traditional’ fieldwork, except for 
the fact that I was only allowed five LEEDR families to try this type of long-term 
ethnographic engagement with. In the case that they would have opted out of my 
research, my options would have been to use the existent LEEDR data for my 
dissertation, or to change my topic towards a field that I had succeeded to develop 
relations in, such as local environmental activism, or folk dancing. 
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The Tactile Time collage, an arts-based method, consisted in a research visit that 
asked family members to make together a series of collages that showed the ways 
in which they spent time at home around various digital devices. For this task, I 
provided a kit that contained cardboard sheets, photos – of digital devices, 
household objects and food items and drinks – coloured crayons, and textile fabrics. 
I presented the collage as a type of clock that placed in the centre a main digital 
device, such as the living room TV set, and I asked the participants to write down 
the times of the day when they used this device and to illustrate, using photos, the 
types of activities that they did around that device, such as using a smartphone, or 
having a snack while watching TV. When this stage was completed, the participants 
were asked to express the qualities of the different moments that they identified, by 
choosing a textile fabric from a selection of nine – from hopsack to cotton and felt – 
that I provided. This stage was much enjoyed and the participants took their time to 
feel all the textile fabrics available and to choose one – or a combination of more – 
that expressed best the way some moments usually felt for them. I video recorded 
this stage, asking participants to explain their choice of fabric.  
The collage-making activity brought for participants the occasion to reflect over 
family routines and it gave them the opportunity to talk to the other family members 
about the ways in which they experienced time at different moments of the day. For 
example, Elaine said about choosing a piece of felt to illustrate her lunch time by 
the TV: ‘I like this one because it feels smooth and calm. I’ll be on my own eating 
my lunch and that’s how I’ll be feeling: nice and calm’; while her daughter Becky 
explained her choice of hopsack to illustrate TV watching after coming from school: 
‘Hopsack because I had a hard day at school and I’m feeling rough’. There were 
four families who took part in the Tactile Time collage activity and they made 
between two collages - illustrating TV and computer usage – and four (for TV, 
computer, stereo system, and Wii usage). In one case it was just the female adult, 
Sam, who took part in the activity, making the series of collages and representing 
the routines of the other family members. In all the other cases, there were between 
three and four family members collaborating for the task, and in one case they 
represented as part of the collage the routines of a family member who was absent 
during this research encounter.   
By linking the invisibility of time with the sense of touch, my research questions on 
time were transformed: it suddenly became possible to address them. I found 
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myself having a conversation with my participants about domestic time; however, it 
was not a conversation which involved words, but which made use of sensory 
knowledge. During the encounter, my participants and I were able to touch and feel 
the fabrics at the same time; thus, when they were choosing tulle to express a 
particular moment of the day, I was able to imagine what they meant. This form of 
conversation involved our capacities for imagination, as well as sensory and tacit 
knowledge; and I discovered that it suited the topic of domestic time very well. 
The Tactile Time collage revealed that domestic time is made of different types of 
times, with different qualities, that are sometimes intersubjective and sometimes 
individual. On some occasions, shared time was represented as experienced in the 
same way, for example by using a piece of felt fabric to suggest cosines and 
warmth; and on other occasions, participants represented their experience of 
shared time as different than other family members’. The collage also showed that 
one’s approach to domestic time differs with the presence and with the absence of 
other family members at and from home. In this ways, it opened up new questions 
that I was able to follow and to explore, by further employing other methods. 
The next method that I used addressed shared evening and weekend family time. 
This was the Evening Times self-video recording, a participant-led method that 
asked participants to take short video clips of their communal activities around 
various digital media. I provided families with a small video camera (a Sony Bloggie) 
and I asked them to share it between family members so that each person would 
film the others at least once, during a period of a week. All the five key family-
participants took part in this task, making video clips of a total length of 85 minutes, 
with various degrees of time involvement, the recording time for each family varying 
between 4 and 52 minutes.  
The resulting video clips show how family time looks like when no visitor/researcher 
is present. By capturing and showing the spontaneity of domestic life, they produce 
a different form of knowledge than my interviews, for example, which asked the 
participants to think about and to formulate a general response that could account 
for what happens ‘daily’, or ‘normally’. The clips also show the responses of family 
members to each other’s action of filming, which are revealing of the nature of the 
interactions and relationships between them in a more intimate way than what can 
be learned through interviews and participant observation. Watching the recordings 
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was for me utterly surprising, in terms of their heterogeneity as well. The self-video 
recordings are so different, in both content and aesthetics, from one family to 
another, that I found it very hard to think about ‘analysing’ them as a set of 
materials that could embody communal ‘themes’. They are rather like different trips 
into different realities, each with its own chromatic, lighting, form of movement, 
soundtrack, types of engagements, and ways of acting. The clips show the 
perspectives that my participants provided over their family time, during this family 
time. Being part of ‘family time’, the act of video recording the other family members 
is framed by a particular set of emotions, dynamics, individual and collective habits, 
intersubjective meanings, and expectations, set which is particular to, and only, this 
form of sociality and of experience that is called ‘family time’. The video recordings 
are, thus, products, and not just representations of ‘family time’. The video camera 
that I gave to my participants became just one of the multiple digital devices that 
they were able to use in the evenings and weekends; thus, it was integrated into 
their routines much more smoothly than I had expected. 
The Evening Times self-video recording activity created the opportunity for two 
visits: one for bringing the bloggie and one for picking it up. In one case, the 
participants were not happy with the quality of the resulted materials and they 
chose to repeat the exercise using their own video camera – which brought the 
opportunity for me and Elaine to meet in a cafe in the town centre for a few times to 
pass the materials on a USB stick over a cup of coffee and a chat. In the meantime, 
while my key-participants and me were getting to know each other better, other 
occasions to visit them came up, such as bringing them souvenirs from my trips to 
Romania and France, and conducting other research for LEEDR, such as filming 
the performance and re-enactment of a set of domestic practices (cooking, doing 
the laundry, using digital media, and bathroom practices). Some participants 
watched me dancing with my Morris side in the town centre or in the park, and 
Chris, Elaine’s husband, was regularly attending, as I was, the meetings of 
Transition Middleborough and of a left-wing political discussions group.  
The next research encounter for my doctoral fieldwork was an interview on 
childhood memories about using media at home, such as watching TV, listening to 
the radio, or buying, recording, and listening to music albums. This interview was 
for me a way to know my participants better, and I later looked for, and listened to 
their teenage music preferences, as a way of accessing aurally something from 
68 
 
their experiences of buying and listening to their first album as teenagers. These 
interviews also created a space for self-reflection and for developing comparisons 
between the ways in which they experienced family life as children and the ways in 
which they were experiencing it now, as adults, or, in other words, comparisons 
between the families that they grew up in – which they did not choose and where 
they did not necessarily have the agency to change the things that they did not 
agree with – and the families that they were making now. 
The memories interview took place towards the end of my fieldwork, when my 
participants and I were closer, and it was followed by the last method that I 
developed, the Five Cups of Tea self-interviewing with video activity. This activity 
involved using a small video camera – a Sony Bloggie that the participants had 
previously used for the Evening Times activity – during the preparation, and the 
drinking, of a cup of tea. There was a set of two questions to respond to every time 
– one about the activities that they did before, and the ones they were planning to 
do after having the cup of tea, and one asking them to describe how they made 
their cup of tea, while making it – and one question that was different with every cup, 
and that was to be responded to while sitting down with the cup of tea. This method 
looked at domestic daytime and at moments of solitude and it only addressed the 
female adult participants.  
I reached the idea of developing this method when, looking back at my field notes 
and at the materials that resulted from my fieldwork, I arrived at the topic of 
mothering. It seemed that some important motivations, explanations, and, also, 
contradictions in the ways my female participants were talking about their domestic 
activities were related to the individual and cultural meanings attributed to being a 
mother. I also discovered that most of my materials were about family activities, and 
they represented domesticity uniquely as a locus for family, with just very few 
insights about how the domestic environment was experienced in solitude, when 
the other family members were not at home. This was because many research 
encounters involved several family members – who, even if not actively 
participating, were still making the home a collective social space – and because 
even during one-to-one encounters with female participants, they sometimes talked 
more about the other family members than about themselves.  
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The Five Cups of Tea task created a situation of self-interviewing that was flexible 
and non-intrusive, exploring the moments of reflexivity brought out by the ordinary 
event of having a cup of tea, an event that marked a break in activities or that 
produced a wished-for change in one’s bodily and emotional state. With this method, 
I wanted to create a moment of taking distance from the constant requirements and 
expectations related to having a family-style lifestyle and from the everyday chores 
that were embedded in my participants’ domestic lives. The five questions to be 
responded to while drinking a cup of tea were, this time, not about domestic 
routines, but about personal experiences and memories. The first two questions 
were meant to focus my participants’ attention on the moment and on the 
experience of drinking tea, by asking them to describe the taste of tea, and asking if 
they remembered their first cup of tea and the way in which their parents used to 
prepare tea. The next three were rather personal questions that I previously could 
not find the right moment to address directly: I asked them to tell me something that 
they wished for in that moment; what kind of mothers they were and if they could 
describe one thing that they were sure that they were doing well, and one that they 
thought they were not doing well enough as mothers; and how they would like the 
world to change.  
One could argue that these questions or, specifically, the question about being a 
mother, invite practices of problematization, or ethical work (Foucault 1990). They 
do, indeed, but the particular way in which they are responded to, through the video 
camera, shows problematization as being more than a work of conscious self-
reflection, because it engages sensory experiences and affect. The video camera is 
a witness that shows the multisensory and emotional dimensions of the process of 
problematization in the moment that it takes place, and in the context of having a 
cup of tea and of completing a self-interviewing task that triggers it. The recordings 
that my participants made during the Five Cups of Tea task show problematization 
in Moore’s definition, as containing multiple engagements with imagination and with 
tacit knowledge, such as ‘affect, emotion, the placement of the body, fantasy, and 
relations with objects, technologies and the material world’ (Moore 2011: 21). 
In defining the methods that I describe in this section as ‘inventive’ I follow the 
conceptualization of inventive methods sketched by Lury and Wakeford (2012), as 
methods not of investigating, but of engaging the social world. They argue that the 
examples discussed in their edited collection, such as the anecdote, the experiment, 
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probes, and speculation, can be considered inventive methods if what emerges 
from their application can change the problem that the method addressed. The 
inventiveness, thus, is not inherent to the method and it cannot be known in 
advance of its use, but it can, sometimes, emerge from the method’s application. 
For the two sociologists, inventive methods can produce subversive disruptions, as 
they ‘have the capacity to display a kind of self-displacing movement; that is, they 
comprise processes of imitation and repetition in which a surplus is created that 
allows an event – what happens, the happening of social life – to become inventive’ 
(Lury and Wakeford 2012: 7).    
This characterization of inventive methods would probably best suit the Five Cups 
of Tea activity, whose enactments, even if based on the ordinary event of having a 
cup of tea, redefined this event as a moment for self-reflection, and gave voice to 
thoughts that might have previously accompanied this type of event in a latent, 
interior, or tacit form. The application of the Evening Times self-video recording 
activity also generated inventiveness: it created new situations during family time, 
such as that of ‘mum as a filmmaker’, which produced unique responses and 
reactions that could not have been predicted before the method was used. In 
developing the Tactile Time collage method, however, I was particularly inspired by 
the ways in which the British artist Richard Hamilton used the technique of collage 
to raise questions about domesticity, female identity and consumerism in the late 
1950s - early 1960s. Hamilton’s use of collage is intentionally subversive, as he 
brings together representations of familiar everyday domestic objects in unexpected 
compositions that have the power to displace and to trigger the questioning of a 
taken for granted domesticity, such as, for example, in the work $he (1958-61). 
While intentionally inventive from the start, as an arts-based methodological 
proposition, I argue that the application of the Tactile Time collage method also 
produced inventiveness in the performance, particularly in the textile-selection 
stage. During this stage, the participants gradually learned that they could express 
the qualities of time through the tactility of textile fabrics, while I discovered that a 
conversation about domestic time has just become possible, through tactile 
mediation.     
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6. Visual ethnography as a route to tacit knowledge 
 
The use of video camera in my research was twofold. First, it was me holding the 
camera for conducting video tours and for filming performances and re-enactments 
of practices, as part of my work within the social sciences branch of the LEEDR 
project. Second, the participants were in control of the camera for filming snapshots 
that would represent their families’ evening times and, respectively, the experiences 
of having a cup of tea on one’s own. In both situations, I argue, the use of camera 
as a research method created a route to tacit knowledge that was distinct from the 
routes that other methods could have brought out. 
In emphasizing what is special about video practices as forms of visual 
ethnography, I follow the work of the anthropologist and filmmaker David 
MacDougall. For him, visual methods are not just instruments to record ‘data’ but 
they provide the opportunity for the ethnographer to engage with new dimensions 
and with a different way of seeing. MacDougall believes that the ‘prelinguistic’ 
aspect of film and video makes them good ways of engaging with ‘a different 
experiential world’ (MacDougall 2006: 270). I would add that this is not the world of 
ideological propositional knowledge, but rather the one of what can be called 
embodied, tacit, or everyday knowledge. Moreover, the primacy of the visual in 
visual ethnographic methods does not restrict these tools to representing just one 
type of information, as ‘the visible is equally a pathway to the nonvisible, and to the 
larger domain of the feelings, the intellect, and the remaining senses’ (MacDougall 
2006: 269). In ethnographic research, the video camera, as an instrument of 
looking that ‘domesticates and organizes vision’ (MacDougall 2006: 3), has the 
potential to record the moment of the encounter. The process of image-making with 
video is, MacDougall argues, inherently reflexive in two important ways: it refers 
back to the moment of the encounter and it captures the ‘corporeal image’ of its 
producer, of the body behind the camera. ‘We see with our bodies, and any image 
we make carries the imprint of our bodies’ (MacDougall 2006: 3), the anthropologist 
suggests. Therefore, as they result from one’s multisensory encounter with the 
world, images embody the moment of that encounter and the body that experienced 
the encounter, as well as a representation of what was seen and experienced 
during that moment. 
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Following this perspective, I suggest that the video materials that resulted from my 
research provide a route to tacit knowledge in two main ways. First, they reveal the 
multisensory aspects of one’s encounter with the world. In a video extract from the 
recording of Joyce’s laundry practices, which opens the Mum’s Cup video appendix, 
aural and tactile elements of that particular encounter with Joyce are recalled: one 
could hear the sound of birds singing and one could see the swinging of the sheets 
on the washing line, produced by the wind. These are part of the elements that 
framed that encounter and that made possible a way of imagining the tacit 
knowledge embedded in Joyce’s domestic environment, and in her everyday life. In 
a recording made for the Five Cups of Tea activity – which is also part of the video 
appendix – Cynthia starts by sneezing, and she explains that this is from rabbit hair 
from putting the rabbit out; she then starts unloading the dishwasher and we can 
hear the sharp sounds made by the cutlery; she later takes the cup of tea in the 
study, and we can see the sun’s reflection in the laptop’s screen; then, she tries the 
cup of tea, and she describes the taste by saying that what she perceives when 
drinking it is rather a feeling of comfort, than a taste. All these multisensory 
elements are part of Cynthia’s domestic world, and we can arrive to imagine them 
through the video camera. 
Second, the video images refer to the body behind the camera. In filming Joyce’s 
garden, I stand in her preferred spot, experiencing the view of the house and of the 
garden that she would normally regard when sitting there; when she reaches me I 
lift up and stand, continuing to film Joyce while having a conversation. While filming 
Elaine loading the washing machine, I hunker down, as she does; this is how she 
needs to sit in order to do the sorting and the loading of the laundry. By sitting in the 
same way, by feeling the pressure from hunkering in my hips, I am able to imagine 
how the action feels for Elaine; the video camera captures this particular type of 
empathy by containing my corporeal image. When Elaine uses the camera for the 
Five Cups of Tea activity, she moves around the kitchen, preparing tea or coffee, 
opening drawers, pressing buttons and moving the camera with her. When she 
talks about her experiences of mothering, the camera is filming the kitchen and the 
cup of tea; then, suddenly, it turns towards Elaine’s face, when she reaches the 
conclusions. These movements capture the corporeal image of Elaine, while she is 
involved in what can be called, in Foucault’s (1990, 2000) terms, ethical work; the 
movements accompany and punctuate the development of her self-reflective talk, 
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revealing a process and, suddenly, when the direction of the camera shifts, a result: 
a set of conclusions. 
The route to tacit knowledge created through the use of the video camera is, 
therefore, a route that is inherently reflexive in two important ways, as emphasized 
by MacDougall (2006), that are based on the special qualities of video to show the 
multisensory aspects of one’s encounter with the world, as well as to capture the 
person behind the camera. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I situated my methodological approach and I described and 
discussed all the specific methodological tools that I employed during my 
ethnographic fieldwork. I introduced my field site, Middleborough, reflecting on my 
initial arrival experiences and on the process that made my glance shift from 
surprise to acceptance and understanding. I discussed the interdisciplinary applied 
context of my research and my relationships with applied and with academic 
anthropology. Next, I introduced the approach to ethnographic practice that my 
work follows – sensory ethnography – in relation to my interest for tacit knowledge 
and everyday actions, which I discussed in the theoretical chapter. Last, but not the 
least, I described all the individual methodological elements of my research: semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, arts-based methods, participatory 
methods and visual ethnographic methods. 
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Chapter 3: Spontaneity 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In this chapter I discuss spontaneity as a time-mode that articulates a 
counterdiscourse to the dominance of linear time expressed by digital clocks, 
between other time-reckoning tools, and that engenders and makes visible specific 
forms of ‘ordinary agency’. Drawing from the work of the British philosopher 
Elizabeth Anscombe, especially her monograph Intention (2000 [1957]) and her 
reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of ‘practical truth’ (1981), I propose a 
theoretical framework for approaching spontaneity as immediate action that is 
oriented towards ‘doing the truth’ (Teichmann 2008: 80). In a different wording, how 
the philosopher Charles Taylor puts it, spontaneous actions oriented towards 
fulfilling one’s immediate wants can be regarded as ‘happy actions’ (Taylor 1979). 
This felicitous formulation is suggestive of the forms and nature of the agency 
engaged in enactments of spontaneity: outbursts of enthusiasm as everyday forms 
of empowerment emerge from the immediate accomplishment of spontaneous 
actions.   
The significance of spontaneity in my participants’ everyday lives emerged from my 
fieldwork particularly in relation to actions that involved digital media, such as using 
a smartphone to instantly check facts and information related to one’s immediate 
ideas, desires, and needs. However, this chapter discusses examples of ‘non-
technological’ spontaneous actions – such as having a friendly argument, or nipping 
to one’s allotment in order to harvest vegetables for that evening’s dinner –, all 
along with cases of digital immediacy, in order to move away from a 
technologically-deterministic approach that makes ICTs into an a stereotype, in 
Green’s (2002) words. Thus, I will not argue that digital devices are generating new 
types of human action, but that my research participants used them in order to 
transform a wider variety of actions into ‘happy actions’ (Taylor 1979). In the ways 
in which spontaneity was articulated through digital media, existent cultural 
understandings of what it is to be an agent, of how one could convey the sense of 
being in control of one’s life, and of the ways in which one could express one’s 
individuality, were reformulated. 
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Spontaneity is an approach to, and expression of, human action that is visible and 
intersubjective; it can be articulated through appropriate ‘techniques of the body’ 
(Mauss 1979 [1935]) and through displays of emotion linked to shared emotional 
codes (Luhrmann 2006). Associated with specific forms of sociality, such as friendly 
arguments, spontaneity was expressed, before the emergence of digital devices, 
through other recognizable sets of movements, tone and gestures, such as those 
related to searching for the solution to the argument in encyclopaedias; and it was 
sometimes encouraged by keeping a special bookshelf dedicated to situations of 
casual family arguments, as I will discuss in the third section in relation to an 
example extracted from an interview with Brett.     
At the same time, spontaneity depicts a specific type of relationship with time, in 
which the short-term future is domesticated by being transformed into action. As a 
distinct way of blending the present and the future together, spontaneity makes the 
future present, opposing the logic of linear time as a dominant form of temporality 
that is expressed and maintained through digital clocks, among other devices that 
claim to provide ‘objective’ representations of time. Spontaneity contradicts a 
managerial approach to time (Hochschild 1997) in which time is regarded as a 
resource that people consume (Shove 2009) and that needs to be efficiently 
organized. Instead, what spontaneity proposes is a playful and subjective approach: 
it operates by interrupting the uniform linearity of time in order to create wished for 
future moments and to make them present. 
In this chapter I will look at a series of situations when the spontaneity expressed in 
my research participants’ relationships with digital media can be regarded as 
contributing to extending the ‘ethical imagination’ (Moore 2011) of the people 
involved, both participants and researcher, and to developing new forms of sociality. 
First, I will show that the capacity to produce immediacy of new technologies was 
used by my participants in order to expand and diversify the category of what could 
be considered as achievable, or attainable, wants. Second, I will discuss the ways 
in which the sense of an enlarged  group of achievable wants is employed in 
developing specific forms of sociality, and it can contribute to broadening one’s 
‘ethical imagination’.  
In the next section, I describe the forms of ordinary agency that emerge with 
enactments of spontaneity. I depart from the way in which the British 
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dramatherapist Peter Slade defined spontaneity, and I discuss ethnographic 
examples that articulate a specific set of positive emotions associated with 
empowerment and self-confidence, which arrive with the accomplishment of 
spontaneous actions. The third part develops a theoretical framework that situates 
spontaneity as action oriented towards ‘doing the truth’ (Teichmann 2008: 80), by 
discussing ethnographic examples in relation to the work of the British philosopher 
Elizabeth Anscombe (2000 [1957]; 1981). The fourth section focuses on specific 
forms of sociality developed through the spontaneous use of digital devices, and it 
discusses the idea that the intersubjective understandings which appear with these 
developments can contribute to broadening one’s ‘ethical imagination’. In the fifth 
section, I describe forms of sociality that emerge from spontaneous sharing of 
pictures with physically absent others, and I introduce the idea that in some 
situations ‘happy actions’ (Taylor 1979) can be regarded as supporting one’s ethical 
practices. The chapter concludes in the sixth part. 
 
2. Spontaneity and agentic emotions 
 
When, in the 1950s, the British dramatherapist Peter Slade proposed and 
introduced child drama and improvisation play in education and in therapy, he 
suggested that the ability to improvise ‘has something to do with drama, but is much 
more nearly a function of everyday life, where spontaneity, natural wit, courage in 
adversity, sympathy with sorrow or just sheer high spirits contribute to all that might 
be called the golden hour’ (Slade 1968: vii). For Slade, spontaneity was both an 
ability that could be trained and a particular way of engagement with the world. 
Writing about the value of spontaneity as a capacity, Slade outlines that: ‘Apart from 
developing the ability to speak (and incidentally to write with more imagination), 
other qualities become evident – a growing absorption in the task and a sincerity 
about the way of doing it, particularly in children, useful for all learning and general 
attitudes to life; also a mounting confidence and ultimately a mounting happiness’ 
(Slade 1968: 4).  
This chapter reflects, in a way, Slade’s view on spontaneity, specifically 
emphasizing two elements of his definition. The first one is the sincerity about the 
way of doing the task, which is an important characteristic of spontaneity that I 
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discuss at large in the next section in relation to Anscombe’s (1981) reinterpretation 
of the Aristotelian concept of ‘practical truth’. The second one is the suggestion that 
spontaneity generates mounting confidence and happiness and it is addressed here 
by looking at the forms of ordinary agency engendered by spontaneity, especially at 
the emotions associated with the accomplishment of ‘happy actions’ (Taylor 1979). 
These emotions are expressed below in two distinct quotes from interviews with 
Elaine and Brett where they describe how they use their smartphones in order to 
immediately find answers to questions that they are concerned with momentarily. 
These examples show that the awareness of having the ability to instantly ‘find out 
anything’, as Elaine puts it, can change one’s understandings of, and relationships 
with, the world, as well as the ways in which one sees oneself. Below, Elaine 
describes the situations when she prefers to use her smartphone to using a laptop 
or a tablet. 
Elaine: I usually look on the phone, because it’s so instant. I also use it if the 
children ask me questions I can’t answer: I’ll go straight to the internet to find the 
answer (…) So, for instant answers to things I just go on my phone.  
Roxana: When would you do that? 
Elaine: At any time. When I’m in the house; out of the house. When things just 
pop in my head. Lying in bed; going to sleep: ‘Oh, I’ll just look at that up’. It’s 
brilliant; I wish we had that information when we were young. It’s at your fingertips, 
really, to find out anything. (interview Elaine) 
What Elaine describes in this quote can be regarded as a dialectic relationship that 
she has with her phone: any question that comes in her mind and that she 
addresses to the phone, bounces back to Elaine with an immediate answer, in a 
never-ending exchange that can take place anywhere and anytime. The awareness 
that she can access this relationship anytime she needs to makes Elaine feel 
enthusiastic and also confident in relation to her children – she can find the answer 
to any of their questions, on the spot. 
I cannot emphasize enough the enthusiasm expressed by all my participants in 
relation to situations when they were able to instantly reach the piece of information 
they needed. Ultimately, the scope of this chapter is to retain this enthusiasm and to 
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find and develop a suitable theoretical framework to express it to an academic 
audience. 
Mother of two, Elaine got used to continuously swing between working full-time, 
part-time, and taking longer periods of time off-work in the last eleven years since 
her first child was born. Her multiple interests and responsibilities, which she has 
learnt how to juggle with simultaneously, are reflected in the types of questions that 
she uses her phone to find answers for. The ability to find out what she needs, 
when she needs it, makes everyday life easier and it helps Elaine to stay in control 
and to find solutions for various contingent situations, such as, in the example 
below, when she needs to decide over the right type of product for her daughter. 
Below, there is a partial list of pieces of information that Elaine searched for on her 
phone in the last two days before the interview was taken. 
I was looking at somebody else’s website. I was translating 4 foot 10 inches into 
centimetres – I was in a shop buying some tights for Becky and she’s between girl 
and adult (…) and I only know her height in centimetres, so I had to translate that. 
And, then, there was something medical – I was looking up about what exercises 
you can do. And I was looking at some holiday company. For some reason, I 
looked up the word ‘consensus’, but I can’t remember why. And I was looking at 
hairdressers in Middleborough, because I had to find a new hairdresser. And, then, 
I was looking at jewellery boxes, because I need to find a present for somebody. 
(interview Elaine) 
This list, like any ‘to do’ list, could be very telling of someone’s everyday life and 
concerns. Using her smartphone, Elaine looks for relevant information that she 
momentarily needs to find out in relation to her work, family, and, generally, to any 
of her various relationships and social roles. She is aware of her ability to 
immediately find solutions, using her phone, to all the things that ‘just pop in’ her 
mind. I argue that this awareness, which Elaine enthusiastically shares with me, is 
empowering in itself: it makes Elaine feel able to respond to any contingent 
situations, and, thus, making her feel in control of her life. At his turn, Brett, father of 
two young children and a physical science academic, talks about a particular way of 
using his smartphone in order to check if what politicians say on TV is true or not: 
People say things on TV and I don’t think they’re right. So, I go and check them. 
Especially politicians. (…) It was on Question Time a couple of weeks ago. I can’t 
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remember exactly what it was, but somebody said something about how the 
deficit would change. So, I googled it and looked at that. (interview Brett) 
Brett describes his strategies for staying in control of the information that reaches 
him; of the information that he would believe. He is aware that the facts discussed 
by the media are not objectively ‘true’, but they just represent specific perspectives, 
which is especially visible in political discourse. Using his smartphone, he is able to 
immediately research for other sources, or perspectives upon, the same piece of 
information: by bringing all the perspectives together, he is able to reach his own 
conclusions, which are different from the conclusions offered by only one media, 
the TV. Various types of information, such as information on macroeconomic 
predictions, are approached by Brett as being immediately available, and not 
restricted to a small field of incontestable experts. Thus, by doing nothing more than 
using his phone skilfully while sitting on the sofa, Brett expresses himself as an 
agent who is able to contest political discourse and the power of government 
representatives. As for Elaine, the awareness of him being able to do so at any time, 
and in relation to any potential piece of information, is empowering in itself: it makes 
Brett feel in control of his own worldview, which cannot be easily influenced or 
manipulated by the media and by political discourse. 
 
3. Intentionality and wanting as per Anscombe 
 
In Intention, the influential work that the British analytic philosopher Elizabeth 
Anscombe published in 1957, she patiently turns upside down all the existent 
assumptions about what intentions are and where they are to be found. One of her 
essential claims is that intention resides and appears with action and it is not 
something premeditated and carefully constructed before the action starts. 
Anscombe suggests that we should look for intention not in the content of one’s 
mind but in what one is doing. ‘Roughly speaking, a man intends to do what he 
does. But of course that is very roughly speaking. It is right to formulate it, however, 
as an antidote against the absurd thesis which is sometimes maintained: that a 
man’s intended action is only described by describing his objective’ (Anscombe 
2000: 45).   
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The philosopher Roger Teichmann summarizes Anscombe’s reconceptualization of 
the Aristotelian concept of ‘practical truth’ by suggesting that for her ‘practical truth’ 
is when ‘what is aimed at by the agent is what he actually does: that the description 
of what he aims at is the same as the (or a) description of what he does’ 
(Teichmann 2008: 81). In order to arrive at this formulation, Anscombe draws a 
parallel between ‘good action’ and ‘true belief’. She suggests that the ‘conceptual 
connexion between “wanting” (…) and “good” can be compared to the conceptual 
connexion between “judgement” and “truth”’ (Anscombe 2000 [1957]: 76), so that, 
as truth is the object of judgement, the good can be regarded as the object of 
wanting. In other words, as Teichmann puts it: ‘The question whether an action or 
end is in fact good is like the question whether a belief is in fact true’ (2008: 74) – 
which is an idea that, I believe, can find reflection in what makes anthropological 
perspectives on the world different from approaches from other social sciences. 
However, practical truth is something that concerns actions, not judgements; 
following Aristotle, Anscombe sees ‘good action as embodying “practical truth"’ 
(Teichmann 2008: 79). The notion of ‘good’ should be regarded here as relative; if 
the thing wanted has a ‘desirability characterization’ given by the agent, then the 
thing wanted is ‘good in some way’:  ‘Bonum est multiplex: good is multiform, and 
all that is required for our concept of ‘wanting’ is that a man should see what he 
wants under the aspect of some good’ (Anscombe 2000 [1957]: 75). To summarise 
Anscombe’s reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, I will use a 
quote from Teichmann’s discussion of Anscombe’s work: ‘Where what is wanted is 
wanted as good, and is in fact good, the action arising from the want embodies 
practical truth. Acting thus is, as Anscombe liked to say, “doing the truth”’ 
(Teichmann 2008: 80).  
This philosophical understanding of immediate action relates to one of the benefits 
of spontaneity identified by the dramatherapist Peter Slade. This is ‘a growing 
absorption in the task and a sincerity about the way of doing it’ (Slade 1968: 4). The 
sincerity of doing the task, or, for Anscombe, acting as ‘doing the truth’, is what 
differentiates spontaneous action from a ‘means-ends calculus’ approach – or what 
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the novelist Jane Austen called ‘acting by design’7 – that characterizes ‘neoliberal 
agency’ (Gershon 2011).  
In an essay inspired by Anscombe’s work, Charles Taylor (1979) approaches the 
question of practical truth using different wording. He writes about action as an 
expression of desire (what for Anscombe is ‘wanting’) and he defines ‘happy action’ 
as a ‘qualitatively different’ type of action when ‘awareness of what I want is 
inseparable from awareness of what I am doing’ (Taylor 1979: 86). Happy action is 
when the desire takes the form of unconstrained action; it is ‘a situation marked by 
an absence of conflict’ (ibid p. 88). Happy action is a situation when one is able to 
instantly do what one wants to do.  
‘Wanting’ (or, for Taylor, ‘desire’), thus, plays an important role in triggering 
spontaneous actions. But what is ‘wanting’? Anscombe finds it important to 
delineate wanting by outlining one basic characteristic – or ‘sign’ – of wanting that, 
as Teichmann suggests, would allow us ‘to see how wanting is different from 
wishing or hoping’ (Teichmann 2008: 64). Developing her argument against the 
Cartesian account of first-person authority that reifies what Teichmann calls 
‘“private”, mental events’ (ibid p. 17) and an ‘interior’ causation for action, 
Anscombe insists that ‘wants’ should not be seen as ‘inner causes’. Instead, the 
way she approaches wanting is by reifying its ‘primitive’ mark: ‘trying to get’. 
Furthermore, she identifies two essential elements of wanting: a movement towards 
the thing wanted and a supposition that the thing is there.  
The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get: in saying this, we describe the 
movement of an animal in terms that reach beyond what the animal is now doing. 
When a dog smells a piece of meat that lies the other side of the door, his trying to 
get it will be his scratching violently round the edges of the door and snuffling 
along the bottom of it and so on. Thus there are two features present in wanting; 
movement towards a thing and knowledge (or at least opinion) that the thing is 
there (Anscombe 2000 [1957]: 68).  
One could say that this description accounts for objects of desire that are material 
and reachable. I will illustrate this case with an example extracted from an interview 
                                            
7 ‘”Your plan is a good one”, replied Elizabeth, “where nothing is in question but the desire of being 
well married; and if I were determined to get a rich husband, or any husband, I dare say I should 
adopt it. But these are not Jane’s feelings; she is not acting by design’ (Austen 1993: 20). 
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with Sam. Sam and her husband, Peter, live in a detached house together with their 
children, Alex and Julie, who are 8 and 11. They have an allotment on the other 
side of the town, where Sam and Peter usually spend their Friday mornings from 
March to October, digging, planting and growing vegetables, while they are listening 
to music, or doing the pub quiz on Radio 2 on their portable radio.8 While Peter 
works in shifts, Sam works part-time and she is at home on Fridays; she sometimes 
spends Friday afternoon making chutney and jam from their own allotment produce. 
Their house had solar panels installed and they rear chickens in their back garden, 
whose eggs, Sam says, suffice for the household’s consumption, so they do not 
need to buy any extra. They also never buy milk from a supermarket, as they have 
it delivered by a milkman. Sometimes, when they run out of vegetables that they 
need for dinner, Sam and her family would make a quick visit to the allotment:  
We’ll nip down if we just need to pick something for dinner. Like, say you want 
some carrots, or something, and you haven’t got any. (interview Sam) 
This would be a spontaneous, rather than a planned Friday morning, visit, which 
usually emerges from Sam’s discovery that they ran out of vegetables. Going back 
to the two elements of wanting identified by Anscombe, the movement towards the 
thing wanted is exemplified here by the spontaneous journey to the allotment; while 
the supposition that the thing is there is expressed by their knowledge that they 
would find, hidden in the ground, carrots that they had previously planted and 
grown.  
In situations when the objects of desire are less close and apparent, Anscombe 
sees the two features differently:  
But where the thing wanted is not even supposed to exist, as when it is a future 
state of affairs, we have to speak of an idea, rather than of knowledge or opinion. 
And our two features become: some kind of action or movement which (the agent 
at least supposes) is of use towards something, and the idea of that thing 
(Anscombe 2000 [1957]: 70). 
At first glance, this case could apply to spontaneous actions oriented towards 
finding a piece of information provisionally needed. I will illustrate this case by using 
an example given by Matthew. 
                                            
8 Two interesting approaches to gardening in England can be found in Degnen (2009) and Tilley 
(2006). 
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Matthew is in his fifties and he lives together with his wife Carol and their two 
teenage children. He is passionate about history and he enjoys doing Taekwondo 
together with his son and going to church every Sunday with his family. He is not 
very fond of new technologies – for example, he says that he prefers reading a 
paper book than using Carol’s Kindle because he is ‘not good with buttons’ – but he 
has an iPod that he uses at home with headphones to listen to audio books when it 
is his turn to clean the bathroom. Until very recently – a few months before the 
interview was taken – he did not ever have his own email address and they used 
Carol’s email to receive information about the church rota and about other familial 
interests and activities. However, when I ask them, during my interview, if they ever 
use other digital devices while watching TV and in relation to the TV content, 
Matthew recounts an episode when he used his laptop to find information about the 
writer of a sitcom that he was just watching: 
The other day, ‘Red Dwarf’ was on. And the first few series are written by two 
people, and the later are written by only one of them. And I thought: ‘What 
happened to the other one? Did he die or something?’ So, I just googled his name. 
He didn’t die; he just didn’t want to write it anymore. He was known as Rob Grant. 
And that’s how I put it, and I found out. He said he wanted more than Red Dwarf 
on his tombstone, so he went on doing something else. So, it piqued my curiosity 
and I wanted to find out. (interview Matthew) 
In this case, one could say that Matthew’s drive to search for the information about 
the co-writer of Red Dwarf was not related to a skill, or habit, of mastering digital 
devices in a particularly technological-savvy way. It was rather a spontaneous wish 
related to what another participant defined as the cultural category of ‘is X dead?’ 
questions. Thus, with his action, Matthew satisfies his immediate curiosity, which is 
linked to a cultural genre, through a new way of using his laptop in front of the TV. 
In this action, cultural continuity, technological change and individual creativity are 
tightly intertwined. 
Going back to Anscombe’s theoretical apparatus, the two elements of wanting that 
can be identified in Matt’s example are: the action of writing down the name of the 
actor in the Google bar, which is ‘some kind of action’ that the agent supposes is of 
use ‘towards something’; and finding out what happened with Rob Grant – whether 
he is dead or not, and, if not, what was the reason for him stopping to co-write Red 
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Dwarf – which is the idea of the thing needed. But if finding out what happened with 
Rob Grant is just ‘the idea’ of the thing needed, then what is the thing needed? The 
main difference between Sam’s and Matthew’s examples is that in one case the 
object of desire is material and edible – carrots for dinner – and in the other one is 
non-material / ‘virtual’ – information about a name in the credentials of a TV series. 
The means of ‘trying to get’ the objects are a combination of intense physical 
activities – such as driving, digging and pulling out – in one case, and typing down a 
name, in the other. But both approaches are based on the supposition that the thing 
wanted is there, be it inside the ground or on the Internet. It is with certainty that 
Matt googles the name of the Red Dwarf co-writer; he is sure that he would find out 
at least if Rob Grant is dead, but he finds out more instead: he finds the writer’s 
reasons for stopping to work at the series, and he shares them with me as if we 
were talking about a common friend. 
Another difference between Sam’s and Matt’s example, one could argue, might be 
the fact that digging out vegetables to have for dinner could be seen as a ‘need’, 
while looking up for information about a sitcom writer would be a desire related to 
one’s curiosity, without being a ‘need’. However, in this chapter I argue that the 
possibility to immediately accomplish both these types of needs/ desires generates 
agentic emotions and brings out the opportunity for one to imagine oneself as an 
agent. Thus, for the purposes of the present chapter, the content of the desires per 
se is less important than the emotions generated by the acts of accomplishing them.  
The next example compares the activity of physical search through encyclopaedias 
with the activity of searching on Google. Brett describes his in-laws’ concept of the 
‘pedant’s corner’, which institutionalizes a family tradition of what can be called 
‘friendly arguments’. The ‘pedant’s corner’ is a book shelf situated in the living room, 
filled with encyclopaedias that are to be used spontaneously in case of unexpected 
friendly arguments over ‘small’ (but not unimportant!) issues. 
People get pedantic about something. And sometimes, in families, when you had 
a few glasses of wine, you can have an argument. Say, ‘Christian Slater was in 
this film’. And then you say: ‘No, he wasn’t in that film! He was in this film. In that 
film, wasn’t it Kevin Bacon?’ You debate about that until you say ‘OK, we’ll check 
it’. So, a pedant’s corner, in Jane’s family, used to be a shelf: a book shelf where 
they had things like encyclopaedias and dictionaries and the histories of people 
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and all that sort of things; so, very factual books. And that’s where they would go. 
But now it’s all in the phone, basically. So, Wikipedia, really, it has become like the 
pedant’s corner. Obviously, don’t believe everything that’s there (…) so, just in 
order to see who’s right in a family discussion or argument. It’s imperative that we 
have internet signal. The worse thing is, if you have these discussions and you 
are on holiday overseas, and you don’t get the internet. Or, you stay somewhere 
in the country, in this country, and there isn’t mobile signal. And, then, you have to 
write it down, and check it out [later]. It’s not something that rules our lives, but it’s 
something that it’s there in case we need it; the ability to prove yourself right or 
wrong. And, if you prove yourself right, then you tell everyone; and if you prove 
yourself wrong, then you don’t say anything more about it. (interview Brett) 
In this story, Brett describes friendly arguments in families as an arena for 
spontaneous action that existed long before the development of new digital 
technologies. Friendly arguments are such a constant part of domestic life that his 
wife’s family used to keep a whole bookshelf dedicated to these occasions. What is 
spontaneous is the subject of the debate – nobody can anticipate what the topic of 
this evening’s friendly argument would be – and the moment when the opponents 
would decide to check who is right, which happens after they presented, more than 
once, all their arguments. During my fieldwork, I often took part in friendly 
arguments that usually happened in pubs, when I was sitting with groups of local 
friends and acquaintances.9  According to Brett’s account, friendly arguments 
happen today in similar ways to how they used to happen before new digital 
technologies were wide-spread; what has changed is the research method for 
finding the answer. But, when new media fail to immediately provide the right 
answer due to technological constraints, people are left in limbo between the state 
of being right and the state of being wrong. To resolve this ontological dilemma in 
an everyday situation, people enact forms of ordinary agency that they have at 
hand and that they find appropriate. The question whether immediate media fulfil a 
need or a desire that is not a need is surpassed here; the ability to find a piece of 
information provisionally needed is equated with the ability to prove oneself right or 
wrong.  
                                            
9 An example of memorable friendly argument that my local acquaintances and friends engaged in 
while in a pub was over the origins and the right pronunciation of the word ‘mum’. 
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Summarizing Anscombe’s approach to wanting, Teichmann concludes that ‘an 
object of wanting has to be taken as attainable by the person who wants it, and 
likewise has to be conceptualizable by that person’ (Teichmann 2008: 65). This is 
the case in all the three examples of Sam, Matt and Brett: carrots for dinner, 
information about a sitcom writer and the solution to a friendly family argument are 
taken as attainable (if the Internet is working). These examples also show that 
‘trying to get’ – which for Anscombe is the ‘primitive’ sign of wanting – is a feature 
present in both cases of a ‘material’ and of a ‘virtual’ object of desire, such as 
vegetables for dinner and, respectively, a piece of information that would respond to 
one’s momentary curiosity or that would prove if one is right or wrong. I argue that, 
in these cases, new technologies do not alter the nature of wanting, but what they 
do is to make a wider variety of wants achievable instantly. In Teichmann’s (2008) 
terms, new technologies make new and diversified objects of wanting to be taken 
as attainable by the persons who want them.  
I have discussed examples when spontaneity appears as an impulse to accomplish 
momentary wants. But there are also cases when specific wants appear first as 
elusive ideas that need to be accommodated until the stage when they will be 
considered ‘full’ wants that ask for action. It was Chris who described this type of 
‘fermented’ spontaneity. Before our first interview, I knew Chris from meetings of 
Transition Middleborough – a local environmental group part of the Transition 
Towns network – and also from the fortnightly sessions organised by a political 
action discussion group in town. In his forties, he lives with his wife, two children 
and two cats in a detached house, in a recently developed residential 
neighbourhood. He is interested in new technologies, in hacking as a way of 
making things – such as solar panels – from scratch, and he has subscriptions to 
the American magazines Wired and Make. He is one of the founding members of a 
residents’ association whose protest actions regarding a specific urban planning 
decision appeared in the local paper. In the next extract, Chris describes the way in 
which he reached the decision, and then he used his smartphone, to buy a new 
game for his children. 
I bought a game of Cluedo. I was talking with the kids, or something. I must have 
seen it online, a reference to Cluedo, and then that made me think: ‘actually, 
Cluedo’s quite a good game for developing logical reasoning, and our kids are 
about the age where they can accept that sort of concept’. So, that jumbles 
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around in my head for a while. I’m the sort of person who, kind of, I like to allow 
things to bounce around in my head for a while and, then, it may look 
spontaneous from the outside, but it’s been fermenting for a while. Then all of a 
sudden I’ll go: ‘Aha, we need a game of Cluedo!’ And the problem with the 
modern life is that there’s so little time to do anything, that I’m now in the situation 
where if I decide that I think I’m probably going to do something, at that moment I 
just say: ‘Well I’m going to do it!’ That’s why I ordered Cluedo. I was, I don’t know, 
I was in bed or something. I woke up and I thought: ‘Oh, I think we need Cluedo’ 
and then it’s done, you see. It’s just done. It’s gone, without occupying any more 
of my mind, if you see what I mean. (interview Chris) 
In Chris’s case, spontaneity is put on waiting while the idea ‘ferments’ in his mind. 
The moment when the desire reaches maturity is also the moment when it is 
fulfilled: once he realized that he wants to buy the Cluedo game, Chris immediately 
buys it by using an Amazon application on his smartphone. He explains his action 
by stressing lack of time as a characteristic of modern life, and by suggesting that 
there are lots of other things that he is preoccupied with. If time is essential for an 
idea to ‘mature’, once the idea has become a decision there is no need to wait 
anymore in order to turn the decision into action. By acting spontaneously, Chris 
liberates the idea from his mind, making place for other thoughts. 
Going back to Anscombe’s philosophical framework, one could connect her 
conceptualization of wanting with her reconceptualization of the Aristotelian concept 
of ‘practical truth’. As discussed, for Anscombe wanting involves two elements: 
‘trying to get’ (a movement towards the thing wanted which is spontaneous and 
almost concomitant with the occurrence of desire); and the supposition that the 
thing wanted is there. In reconceptualising the concept of ‘practical truth’, 
Anscombe suggests that acting is ‘doing the truth’ (Teichmann 2008: 80) because 
‘the description of what he [an agent] does is made true by his doing it’ (Anscombe 
1981: 77). In order to connect these two ideas and to express, in only one sentence, 
the significance of Anscombe’s argument, one could suggest that in ‘trying to get’ 
what they want, people are ‘doing the truth’. This idea liberates any form of action 
from moral judgement, and, in doing so, I believe that it is congruent with an 
anthropological gaze. 
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In this section I discussed the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe’s ideas on 
intentionality and agency, in relation to specific ethnographic examples. These 
examples, although employed here in order to show how individuals engage in 
spontaneous action, reveal spontaneity as a social, rather than an individual, 
activity. A family visit to the allotment; having a friendly argument as a form of 
domestic sociality; buying a new game that attests the developing abilities of one’s 
children, are social preoccupations that are done together with, or that are oriented 
towards, the others. The next section goes further by describing a few forms of 
sociality developed through the use of spontaneity and the ways in which the 
emotions generated from these processes contribute to broadening the ‘ethical 
imaginations’ (Moore 2011) of the people involved, both participants and researcher. 
 
4. Shared spontaneity and ‘ethical imagination’ 
 
I am hosting Annie, a couch surfer from the US.10 She came to Middleborough for a 
conference, and she had one extra day for exploring what she enthusiastically calls 
an ‘authentic and non-touristic’ small English town. I am hosting her for one night in 
the Victorian terraced house that I share together with three friends. After showing 
her bedroom, we sit for a while in the living room, having a cup of tea and talking 
about ourselves. At one point, she mentions her favourite band, Bright Eyes, who 
are big in the US, but that, I am ashamed to say, I have never heard of. Curious to 
find more about the band, I instantly download a couple of their albums on my 
phone through a music application. Then I ask what her favourite song is. I find it 
easily and I press play. The song fills the living room. For me, new sounds are 
mixing with a familiar space, creating something different. For Annie, a familiar tune 
has just broken out, filling a strange place. We first met only two hours ago, but this 
is a moment when we kind of come together. We listen to the song and smile.11 
Thinking back about this moment when I effortlessly enacted the spontaneity that 
my participants have been talking about for over a year, I realize that it was Erin 
who taught me about instant gifting. I learned this form of sociality and of exchange 
                                            
10 Couchsurfing.com is an international online network for hospitality. 
11 Bialski (2012) defines the interactions between Couchsurfing hosts and surfers as ‘intimate 
mobility’. 
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on a gloomy late August morning, when I visited Joyce and Erin, one of my key 
participant-families, in order to give them a small souvenir that I brought from my 
holiday in France.  
The mum and daughter live by themselves in a detached house close to the town 
centre, and most of Joyce’s everyday activities as a homemaker are focused 
around Erin’s upbringing. Comparing to the other four or five times when I visited 
their place for specific research activities, this time there is no task we need to 
complete. We are in the living room, around cups of tea, when Joyce remembers 
about the photos she took with me two months ago, at Picnic in the Park – the 
town’s fête – when both Erin and I performed as part of the artistic program: Erin 
walked on stilts with her circus group, and I danced with my Morris side. We were 
talking about these photos for a while. Joyce took them using the camera of her 
smartphone; and now she transfers them to my phone using Bluetooth. Erin has her 
own smartphone, which is a different and less expensive model than Joyce’s and 
mine, but during the photo sharing, we both consult her as an expert. When Joyce 
and I finish with the photos, Erin uses Bluetooth at her turn in order to connect her 
phone with mine. What can we share now? We sit next to each other on the sofa, 
she is 11, I am 29 and I talk with a strange accent, but we were performing as part 
of the same parade a couple of months ago, and we are now connected through 
Bluetooth. She asks me what my favourite animal is. ‘Well, I like dogs. My parents 
have a Labrador’, I say. She turns to her phone, does something there and a new 
file arrives to download on mine. It is a cartoon of a very funny dog, his tongue out. 
We laugh together. Then I send her a photo that I took of our dog, Rich, lying in the 
grass. ‘What’s your favourite colour’, she then asks. That’s easy: it is orange. Erin 
does something else on her phone, captivated, mumbling. Then, a new file starts 
downloading on mine. What can it be? I look at the blue downloading line growing 
and growing. I open the file directly from there, from the list of downloads. It is a 
beautiful orange tiger lily! I am so conspicuously impressed, that Joyce, who returns 
from the kitchen with Erin’s lunch, comes to see what it is all about. I show her the 
tiger lily and she is also impressed; she did not know that Erin had such a picture 
on her phone. 
During a subsequent visit, I ask Erin how she managed to send me pictures of my 
favourite animal and colour after I had just named them, like a fairy that could 
instantly make one’s three wishes come true. She did not have the photos on her 
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phone, but she searched the words on Google Images, chose and saved the 
pictures in her phone, and then she transferred them to me. This series of actions 
were creatively employed together by Erin in that situation of exchange and of 
connectedness; they were not typical ways of using smartphones that one would be 
presented with in a user manual, for example, but they were adapted from previous 
actions of using Google on a computer, and crafted together by Erin herself. In this 
activity of crafting, Erin was aware of the capacity of the technologies she was 
using to provide immediacy. She had the knowledge that she would be able to 
instantly gift me with my favourite animal and colour, if she only wanted to; in 
Teichmann’s (2008) terms, Erin knew that her want was attainable. And, by acting 
out this knowledge, Erin was extending her ‘ethical imagination’, meaning the ways 
through which she imagined relationships with herself and with others (Moore 2011). 
Specifically, by proposing and by getting engaged in a process of instant gift 
exchange, Erin created a spontaneous relationship between herself and a 
significantly different other. By surprising me and by jazzing up a gloomy uneventful 
morning, Erin is empowered to imagine that she would be able to recreate this form 
of sociality in other contexts, and with various socially different others. I am 
empowered to think this as well, even if I do not realise it at the moment, but only 
later, after I enact Erin’s instant gifting with Annie. Thus, both Erin and I extend our 
‘ethical imaginations’ by realising that we are able to spontaneously bring joy to 
significantly different others – who, like Annie, were strangers one day before – just 
by using an ordinary digital device in a specific way.  
Indeed, being able to achieve something instantly is valuable when it is a shared 
activity and ability. My participants often described situations when, in the evenings, 
they would sit together in the living room around the TV, picking up facts that they 
would transform into ‘common goals’ or into ‘friendly arguments’, such as finding 
quiz show answers before the TV contestants. This is how Cynthia and her 
daughter, Kelly, who is in her early twenties, talk about the ways in which they 
collaboratively work to find out information about an actor that they vaguely 
recognize on TV: 
Cynthia: Sometimes Kelly and I are watching TV, and there would be an actor: 
‘Where do I know him from?’ And, so, you pull up the information for that 
programme, and you get the actor’s name, and you go to his page and find out 
what he was in. And you go: ‘Aha!’ That sort of thing.  
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Kelly: Yeah. ‘Oh, what’s his face, from what programme?’ So, we have to look and 
find out who he is. (interview Cynthia and Kelly) 
During one of my visits at Cynthia’s place I have the chance to better understand 
the joy of instantly finding answers to collective questions, and of sharing one’s 
findings with the others. 
The living room is taken over by Kelly and her younger sister, Emma, who are 
making Wonder Woman costumes that they would wear at the jamboree they are 
attending with their guides group, in one week’s time. Kelly is already wearing a 
new blue skirt and a red top, with their price tags still on, while she is cutting white 
star shapes from an adhesive material sheet, which she will later iron onto the skirt. 
The screen of a laptop, placed on the living room table, shows a picture of the 
original Wonder Woman standing brave, hands on her hips, wearing her unique 
costume. At the other side of the table, Emma is working in silence, absorbed, at 
her own costume. I am sitting on the sofa with Cynthia, drinking squash and 
watching the girls. I ask her where the jamboree is held. It is in Essex. I know this 
area well enough, as a couple of friends live there and they showed me many 
places around the county during my several weekend visits. I ask where exactly in 
Essex. ‘Let’s see’, Cynthia says and she lifts her own laptop from the floor, with the 
enthusiasm of a detective who is given a new mysterious case to solve. The laptop 
is already on, so Cynthia just types ‘Essex jamboree’ on the Google bar, and she 
finds the webpage of the camp site straight away. From this webpage, she clicks on 
the ‘How to find us’ button; a map of the area instantly pops out on the screen. The 
camp is located west from Chelmsford and the names of the surrounding villages 
are not familiar to me; we mostly travelled towards north and east, I believe. Aware 
that her mum has the website of the jamboree on her laptop screen, Kelly starts 
asking Cynthia questions about the camp’s schedule, such as which themed party 
is planned for the first evening. Cynthia clicks, navigates, and finds the answers for 
her daughter. Kelly listens without turning around, absorbed by her work at the 
costume. Cynthia puts the laptop back down on the floor. Mission complete. Now 
Kelly hands to her mum a white piece of paper in an almost-star shape, and 
Cynthia starts trimming it carefully. 
The laptop is used here as a way for Cynthia to participate in her daughters’ 
preparations for a guides jamboree. She first attends to my momentary curiosity, 
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and later she explores the website in response to Kelly’s questions, in anticipation 
of the jamboree that she will not take part in herself, but her daughters will. In this 
way, we all participate in the preparations for the camp: the girls, by using a set of 
material objects and tools that they previously acquired specifically for the purpose 
of making their costumes; Cynthia and I, by spontaneously using the laptop. We all 
share the anticipation of the event. This form of sociality was not planned, but it 
arises through the spontaneous use of the laptop in response to my question, and 
through Kelly’s spontaneous interest, in response to Cynthia’s navigation of the 
jamboree’s website. Cynthia provides for her girls what they immediately need and 
ask from her: information about the jamboree and help with trimming the star 
shapes; and the spontaneous enactment of these actions of care and response 
generates agentic emotions. The awareness that Kelly’s and my wants for 
information are attainable, and that she could fulfil them in a moment using her 
laptop as a tool, empowers Cynthia to extend a set of actions of care – that can be 
regarded as related to mothering – to others besides her children: she provides for 
me by immediately responding to my momentary curiosity related to the 
geographical location of the camp.  
Subsequently this episode, and after I visit them for several more times – a couple 
of times for dinner – we are planning a Saturday lunch visit when I would bring 
homemade lemon drizzle cake that I am particularly proud of. We fix the meeting for 
12.30. However, that morning Cynthia texts me asking to postpone the visit for 2 
pm, as Kelly asked her to join her at hairdresser’s that morning. I already have 
another appointment at 4 pm in a nearby town, so I text her back suggesting that I 
just pop in to leave the cake, and that we arrange lunch for another date. Cynthia 
texts me back: ‘I can quickly feed you at 2 and we can plan a proper catch up time 
too’. This suggestion, that is, indeed, utterly comforting for an anthropologist when 
coming from one’s participants, makes me think that Cynthia does not want me to 
travel to a different town without having had lunch and that she believes it is her 
responsibility to feed me, as she already planned to do so. I go, and we all have a 
nice quick lunch. This extension of actions of care that, arguably, started with 
interactions that involved the use of digital media and that developed with the 
development of our relationship, is an extension of both Cynthia’s and my ‘ethical 
imaginations’. 
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5. Sharing beyond co-presence 
 
Another form of sociality that emerges from spontaneous actions in the use of 
digital media devices concerns situations when the participants in the exchange are 
not physically co-present. I will illustrate this form of sociality by discussing 
examples drawn from a research encounter with Lara, who emphasized the 
importance that the visual feature – the photo camera – of her mobile phone had in 
her everyday life. 
Lara and Dominic are in their forties and, respectively, early fifties, with three 
children from their actual and previous marriages. The two older children, who are 
in their early twenties, moved away when they started university, and now Lara and 
Dominic live with their younger son, who is 12, and with their two dogs – one of 
which has its own Facebook profile – and one cat. They have a wide extended 
family living partially abroad. Lara’s mum moved to Spain when she retired, while 
Lara’s brother lives and works in the south of France. Every time I visit them, we 
talk about dogs and about places to visit in France – where my parents moved with 
work as well. 
This time I am video recording, for one of the LEEDR research activities, and I am 
asking Lara about the ways in which she uses her smartphone. The photo camera 
feature of the phone seems to be particularly important for her, as Lara often uses it 
in order to instantly ‘convert’ material objects into digital ones, sometimes as part of 
an artistic process. For example, she takes photos of their own grown vegetables, 
in order to be able to return to the pictures when she needs to draw and create 
patterns for the pots that she makes during evening pottery classes. Every time she 
gets out, even just for walking the dogs, Lara remembers to take her phone with her 
in order to be able to spontaneously take photos of anything that will grab her 
attention and that she would like to record, to ‘keep’, such as blossoming trees and 
green fields. The other day, she was looking through old photo albums, and she 
found a funny picture of her older daughter as a toddler. She took a photo of the 
material picture with her phone, so that she would have it with her, and be able to 
check it at any time, similarly with the way in which people used to carry small 
pictures of their loved ones in their wallet. By using her phone, she also posted the 
photo on Facebook, and her daughter, who is a friend of her on Facebook, saw it 
94 
 
and posted a comment. She shows me the picture while talking about it, as it is so 
easy to instantly access it in the gallery section of her phone. Lara also uses 
Instagram – a social networking application focused on sharing photos – in order to 
post pictures of her pots, as well as some more abstract and arty pictures that she 
shoots from unusual angles, or in original compositions. 
In her everyday life, while performing ordinary tasks and activities such as walking, 
cooking, or washing the dog, Lara’s absent kin and friends appear sometimes in her 
mind. There are moments, of joy, reminiscence, or ordinariness that she would like 
to immediately share with particular people. Moments like her dog looking like a 
soggy sheep after having been washed. 
I was taking photos of Fizz this morning, because we had to wash her when we 
got home – and she was really soaking wet; she was like a little soggy sheep. 
So, I was thinking while taking the photos: ‘oh, my mum would like to see this!’ 
So, then, I just emailed the photo to my mum, just straight away, so she could 
see what we were doing this morning. (transcription from video clip with Lara) 
In this example, it is through the photos that Lara thinks of her mum. The multi-
sensory experiences of her lived everyday life do not give the space for Lara to 
imagine that her mum could be physically present in her house and, for example, 
help her to wash the dog. When taking the photos, the complex lived moment is 
transformed into an image that Lara is able to see in the same way that her mum 
would subsequently see it. The act of taking the photo, and Lara’s ability to instantly 
send it, makes Lara feel that she is sharing that moment with her mum, even if they 
are not physically co-present. The mother is embodied in Lara’s eye, which looks at 
the dog through the camera screen. 
The domain of the visual can also bring out unexpected recollections for Lara. This 
happened when she was playing a guessing game based on drawing, called 
Drawsome. Lara is used to playing this game on her phone, with various people: 
old friends who now live abroad, recent acquaintances living in proximity, and 
people that she does not know personally, but who were proposed by the game. 
The game is played in pairs: one of the players is given a series of words from 
which they choose one that they will represent in a drawing, in order for the other 
player to be able to guess it. Lara describes the situation when, while playing the 
game with an old school friend living abroad, she got the task to draw the word 
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‘tennis’. This unexpected occurrence reminded her that she and her friend used to 
play tennis together, which made Lara write a note about this memory to 
accompany her drawing. 
She’s somebody I went to school with; I’ve known her since I was seven, and 
now she’s living in Australia. So, that’s really bizarre. Sometimes you can talk 
on it; you can add a little note. So, one of the things she needed to guess was’ 
tennis’. And, when she was a child, they used to have a tennis court in their 
back garden. So, I said to her: ‘Do you remember we used to play tennis in 
your garden?’ And, when it was her turn… You know, little things like this. 
(transcription from video clip with Lara) 
It is the game that unexpectedly triggers the memory, as would be the case of, for 
example, a walk that Lara and her friend would take together and that might 
serendipitously bring them in the proximity of a tennis court. By accompanying her 
drawing with a note concerning a specific memory, Lara redefines the drawing 
exchange in relation to the history of their relationship. She does not need to write a 
long letter with the specific scope of reconnecting with her friend; through the game, 
she can spontaneously bring out that memory, as it would happen if she and her 
friend were physically co-present, and taking a walk, for example.12 At the same 
time, the opportunity to illustrate the word ‘tennis’ to a friend which one used to play 
tennis with as a child brings back the memory of one’s own childhood self. Lara is 
reminded that she has a history that might suggest a form of expertise for her in 
playing, talking about, and creating visual representations of the game of tennis. 
These examples illustrate forms of sociality that could be described as ‘virtual’: they 
are articulated between people who do not share the same geographical location, 
and they are facilitated through internet-based communication – more specifically, 
through sharing images. What is different in these situations from other forms of 
communication between friends and kin living in different countries, which were 
sensitively documented in various studies on digital co-presence (for example 
Madianou and Miller 2011), is that, in the examples discussed, communication is 
not a planned and anticipated event – such as a Skype talk that was arranged 
beforehand could be – but it arises unexpectedly as part of everyday actions and 
                                            
12 Paula Uimonen (2012) uses the concept 'transtemporal' to define the way in which her participants 
used Facebook in order to maintain relations with people from different stages of their lives. 
96 
 
routines. Being articulated through a combination of spontaneous actions of using 
digital media, together with the spontaneous character of acts of recollecting, the 
types of sociality that Lara formulates do not necessitate the responses of her mum, 
and of her friend, in order to emerge. For Lara, the forms of sociality are created in 
the moment when she sends the picture, or, respectively, the message, and, still, 
they are not one-sided. Rather than open-ended questions, her messages are 
instant gifts that Lara is able to imagine how the recipients would react to. The 
domain where these forms of sociality are formulated is, I argue, the domain of 
Lara’s ‘ethical imagination’ (Moore 2011). 
By describing a variety of situations when she spontaneously uses her phone for 
taking photos of things, and of moments, that she would like to remember, and for 
sharing them with the others, Lara emphasized the importance of the visual in the 
way she expresses herself and communicates with others. I argue that, in this case, 
the photo camera of Lara’s phone can be regarded as a tool for ethical work. 
Through the act of taking photos, Lara ordinarily articulates her perspective upon 
the world: she is aware that she can choose what to photograph, and the 
perspective that she would regard an object from; she also knows that these 
choices are expressive of her subjectivity – of who she is, of who she was and of 
who she would like to be: a potter; a gardener; a dog lover; a mum who has seen 
her daughter, now grown-up, as a toddler; a childhood friend of someone who lives 
in Australia; a daughter who thinks about her mum who is in Spain. Past, present, 
and future are blended in the way in which Lara redefines herself, moment by 
moment, by taking new photos of what surrounds her. The ‘happy actions’ (Taylor 
1979) of taking and of sharing photos at the moment when the wish arises, are, 
here, part of Lara’s ethical practices. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I proposed a theoretical framework, based upon the work of the 
British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, for situating spontaneity. As a time-mode 
that articulates a counterdiscourse to linear time, by making the future present, 
spontaneity expresses forms of ‘ordinary agency’ engendered by emotions 
associated with self-confidence and empowerment. As a means of engagement 
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with the world, spontaneity is characterized by ‘sincerity in the way of doing’ a task 
(Slade 1968). I discussed examples of spontaneous actions related to the use of 
digital devices, and I showed that these actions can contribute to broadening one’s 
‘ethical imagination’ (Moore 2011), in two stages: first, I suggested that my 
participants used digital media in order to make a wider variety of wants attainable; 
second, I showed that the broadening of the category of immediately attainable 
wants contributes to the development of new forms of sociality and to extending 
one’s ‘ethical imagination’. 
In this chapter I also developed an interesting perspective upon the Aristotelian 
distinction between ‘doing’ and ‘making’, distinction that, Faubion (2001) argues, 
the philosopher Michel Foucault (1990; 2000) has built his conceptualization of 
ethical work upon. Aristotle suggests that ‘doing and making are generically 
different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in 
doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end’ (NE 
VIv3-4). For Aristotle, making is concerned with the creation of a new, finite, object; 
while doing contains its scope in itself. In the first chapter, I argued that this 
distinction provides a way of regarding the relation between the concept of 
‘neoliberal agency’ (Gershon 2011), and the concept of ‘ordinary agency’ that I 
propose in my dissertation. Thus, while ‘neoliberal agency’ can be regarded as 
concerned with ‘making’ – making selves as collections of skills that are always 
extendable, making alliances, making means-ends calculations – ‘ordinary agency’ 
is concerned with doing, where doing is an end in itself. 
In this chapter, I continued and advanced this line of argument, by showing that 
spontaneous actions are actions of ‘doing’, rather than of ‘making’. The work of the 
philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe provided important support for this argument. As I 
have shown, Anscombe was also interested in the approach to the realm of the 
practical developed by Aristotle. She developed a reconceptualization of the 
Aristotelian concept of ‘practical truth’, in relation to her work on intentionality, and 
in her definition of intention she strongly favoured doing over making, emphasizing 
the sincerity inherent in acts of doing. In discussing Anscombe’s argumentation in 
detail, my scope was to draw attention to a set of theoretical ideas that could 
provide real support for conceptualizing human action anew.  
98 
 
I believe that by developing methodological and theoretical tools that could help 
researchers pay explicit attention to actions of doing, rather than of making, a new 
world of action can be revealed, explored and understood. This is a world where 
means and ends coincide; a world of actions that are not concerned with a result, 
but only with ‘doing’, with ‘practicing well’. Some examples of such actions that I 
described in this chapter relate to instant gifting, to spontaneous collaboration 
towards finding factual information, and to taking and sharing pictures; but other 
actions of doing that could be researched and conceptualized by following the 
theoretical framework that I proposed here, could be related to many other fields, 
such as performing arts, sports, protest, play, or human-animal relationships. 
Certainly, there is already interesting research in all these fields, but what can be 
gained when letting oneself inspired by Anscombe’s (2000 [1957]) writing on 
intentionality, in relation to the Aristotelian concept of ‘practical truth’ and to the 
distinction between ‘doing’ and ‘making’, is the arrival at conceptualizing human 
agency in many different ways, beyond a universal ‘neoliberal agency’ approach 
(Gershon 2011).   
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Chapter 4: Anticipation and the Mother-Multiple ontology 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In this chapter I discuss the time mode of anticipation as one of the forms of 
temporality that is developed and enacted in the domestic domain and I describe 
the forms of ‘ordinary agency’ that are engendered when people employ 
anticipation. I focus, specifically, on actions of anticipation that are related to 
activities of caregiving oriented towards one’s kin. In order to look at experiences 
and enactments of care inside kinship systems, I propose the concept of Mother-
Multiple ontology. By employing this concept, I want to both acknowledge the close 
association between caring and mothering in Euro-American contexts (Bowden 
1997)13, and to open up the category of ‘mothering practices’ to anyone, regardless 
of their gender, age, and child-bearing status. The Mother-Multiple ontological 
position describes a mode of being that any individual can access when acting as 
the caregiver of family members, pets, and the home itself as an entity – collection 
of elements which I call ‘the domestic others’. However, the vast majority of 
examples discussed in this chapter refer to experiences of enacting the Mother-
Multiple ontology of female adult participants who are mothers. 
The relationships between Mother-Multiple and anticipation are of mutual 
reinforcement. The ontology of the Mother-Multiple is enacted through activities of 
anticipation oriented towards the domestic others; this is most visible in activities of 
imagining the time of the other and of creating a common time, expressed in 
actions of scheduling, coordinating and reminding, as I will discuss in the sixth 
section. While part of the general ways in which people manoeuvre time in 
everyday life, activities of anticipation have been described during my fieldwork 
more frequently from a Mother-Multiple ontological position than in other situations, 
as I will discuss in the sections four and five. Therefore, even if each of the two 
terms can be conceived of and enacted separately, for me it was the case that I 
                                            
13 The philosopher Peta Bowden argues that: ‘mothering frequently carries the full weight of 
ideological constructions of caring. The very nature of caring seems to be produced in the 
connection between the apparently ultimate vulnerability of early childhood and the potentially 
perfect responsiveness of mothers’ (1997: 21). 
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learnt about each, from the other. I try to replicate this relationship of shading light 
upon each other in the structure of this rather lengthy chapter.  
The video appendix of this dissertation, titled Mum’s Cup, has the scope to 
accompany this chapter and to provide a visual ethnographic lever for endorsing 
the concept of the Mother-Multiple ontology. In the second part of the chapter I 
discuss examples that appear in the video appendix, and the reader might find it 
useful, if time permitting, to watch the video before continuing with reading this 
chapter. However, the video product tells a story that is only linked, and not 
overlapping, with the textual content discussed here. After the second part of the 
chapter, where the connections between the two products are manifest, the rest of 
the chapter discusses ethnographic material that is not reflected in the film.  
In the next part, I situate the concept of the Mother-Multiple ontology in relation to 
existent literature calling towards an ontological turn in anthropology (Henare et al. 
2007), and to the analytical framework developed by Strathern (1988) to look at 
persons as being conceived both individually and ‘dividually’. I discuss ethnographic 
examples that contributed to my arrival at this concept and I explain my choice of its 
naming. This section also engages with literature in the field of the anthropology of 
Britain concerning individual preoccupations with knowing other people well, or 
knowing their true character (Cohen 1987, Edwards 2000, Rapport 1994, Reed 
2011). Finally, I reflect upon a form of knowledge that Luhrmann (1989) calls 
‘knowing of’ and which I argue can be seen as a similarity between the process of 
doing long-term fieldwork and the action of stepping into the Mother-Multiple 
ontological position.  
The third section looks at anticipation as a time mode, focusing on one type of 
anticipation, which is ‘looking forward to’. I employ ethnographic examples in order 
to express this type of anticipation and I discuss the forms of agency engendered 
by anticipation. 
In the fourth part I discuss, departing from ethnographic examples, the other type of 
anticipation that I identified during my fieldwork, which is short-term anticipation. 
Following the work of Luhrmann (1989, 2002) I describe a set of possible 
techniques of imagination that are used when people enact anticipation and I 
propose to regard short-term anticipation as a form of visual rehearsal and looking 
forward to as a form of ‘non-guided’ imagery.  
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The fifth section shows in more detail how the Mother-Multiple operates, focusing 
on a case study of doing the laundry and discussing the various actions of 
anticipation that are employed in this operation. 
 In the sixth part I show the ways in which the Mother-Multiple is enacted in 
activities of anticipation of the time of the domestic others, which involve the use of 
digital media devices for scheduling, coordinating and reminding. 
I conclude in the seventh part.    
 
2. The ontology of the Mother-Multiple 
 
When Henare et al. (2007) called for an ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology they 
referred to a theoretical and methodological approach that, rather than measure 
ethnographic knowledge against existent theoretical frameworks, would start from 
what has been encountered in the field, allowing these things ‘to serve as a 
heuristic with which a particular field of phenomena can be identified, which only 
then engender theory’ (Henare et al. 2007: 5). This approach would not assume 
that the ‘things’ encountered in the field ‘signify, represent, or stand for something 
else’ (ibid. p. 2) but would allow these things to ‘dictate the terms of their own 
analysis’ (ibid. p. 4). Things, such as material objects, are argued here to be also 
concepts, one of the main aims of the publication being to develop an ‘artefact-
oriented anthropology’ that is not about material culture (ibid. p. 1). Henare et al 
(2007) argue that because of the Cartesian-Kantian dualism of mind and matter – 
or culture and nature – that represents the ontology of modern Euro-Americans, 
social scientists coming from this tradition are used to assuming that there is just 
one reality – defined by matter or nature – and multiple representations of it as 
worldviews created by the minds – or cultures – of different groups of people. An 
ontological approach, however, acknowledges the existence of multiple realities 
and worlds – and not only worldviews – that operate independently while being 
nevertheless entangled with one another (Strathern 2004a). Viveiros de Castro et al. 
(2014) argue that the ontological turn in anthropology can be regarded as ‘a political 
end in its own right’ (2014), as it is concerned with making the ‘otherwise’ (Povinelli 
2012) – how things could be – visible ‘by experimenting with the conceptual 
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affordances present in a given body of ethnographic material’ (Viveiros de Castro et 
al 2014).  
While the anthropological literature that situated itself as following and advancing 
an ontological approach looked, mainly, at indigenous populations that did not 
operate a nature vs. culture dualism, especially in Latin America (Blaser 2013, 
Descola 1994, Kohn 2013, Viveiros de Castro 1998), a different body of work, of a 
Latourian inspiration, concerned with the multiplicity of ontology in Euro-American 
scientific practices, was developed in science and technology studies (STS). For 
example, Mol (2002), in looking at medical practices of diagnosing atherosclerosis 
in a Dutch hospital, argues that atherosclerosis is multiple as it is enacted through 
various techniques of diagnoses – whose results do not fit easily with each other 
but are sometimes contradictory. The ontological multiplicity of atherosclerosis is, 
here, practical, as it comes from different enactments. However, the multiplicities of 
ontology are partially connected (Strathern 2004a) and the process of coordinating 
them together into singularity is an important part in the medical practices studied 
by Mol.   
The way in which I relate to these approaches, which emphasize the ontological 
rather than the epistemological as a field of radical difference, is by keeping Mol’s 
(2002) preoccupation with the practical rather than following the interest with ‘things’ 
promoted by Henare et al (2007). This is because my dissertation is concerned with 
human action and with ways of looking at agency, rather than with material objects. 
Following this focus on the practical, I argue that the Mother-Multiple is enacted 
through activities of caregiving and through anticipation. At the same time, I retain 
from the work of Henare et al (2007) the heuristic approach of letting what has been 
encountered in the field to dictate the terms of its own analysis rather than being 
preoccupied with explaining and categorizing the phenomena encountered within 
existent theoretical frameworks.  
In this chapter I propose the concept of the Mother-Multiple to define the distinct 
ontological position that one could inhabit when one acts as the caregiver of one’s 
domestic others, such as family members, pets, or the home itself as an entity. 
While all family members can step in and out this ontological position at any time 
when they engage in activities of care, the name of this concept contains the word 
‘mother’ for two reasons. First, I want to acknowledge the fact that caring and 
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mothering have been constructed as closely associated in Euro-American contexts 
(Bowden 1997). Moreover, as it is a concept developed from ethnographic work 
with and for the purposes of looking analytically at English middle-class families, I 
retained the figure of the mother as traditionally associated with a series of duties of 
domestic improvement – of one’s children and of one’s domestic space – as this 
idea emerged with the appearance and with the development of the middle classes 
in the UK in the nineteenth century (Strathern 1992: 104). One of the ways in which 
the expectation for a mother’s preoccupation with the wellbeing of her domestic 
others continues to be expressed nowadays in this context is through the 
expressions ‘being mother’ or ‘doing the mother’ that refer to the act of serving food 
or serving tea from a teapot to the others. Just as anybody at the table could 
provisionally ‘be’ the mother, I argue that any family member can, and does, inhabit 
the ontological position of the Mother-Multiple in specific situations and at different 
moments of the day. The second reason for using the term ‘mother’ in the definition 
of this concept is in order to reify the fact that I refer to care given within kinship 
structures and not to other forms of care, such as professional care. The Mother-
Multiple position involves an irreversible connection – such as kinship relations in 
an English middle-class context are considered to be (Strathern 1992) – that finds a 
suggestive expression in the quote below: 
 ‘I thought oh God: I’ve got her till I die – it was this attitude – even when she’s away 
married and all the rest of it I’ll still worry about her’ (Oakley 1979: 143). The vivid 
realization of this irreversible kinship connection belongs to one of the participants 
in Oakley’s (1979) study of first-time motherhood. What the participant expresses 
here is the realization that from now on and until the end of her life she would not 
be able to be anymore without carrying the thought of her daughter’s existence in 
her mind. The participant suddenly finds herself in a different ontology than the one 
she occupied before her daughter’s birth and the one her childless friends might still 
occupy. The way in which the Mother-Multiple is employed in English middle-class 
kinship relations refers to incorporating one’s domestic others. For example, when 
occupying the position of the Mother-Multiple, the thoughts that one has of the 
existence, of the character, habits, needs, preferences and dislikes of the others 
become part of one’s everyday actions in a way that makes it hard to disentangle 
oneself from the individual others; as Oakley’s participant sees herself, from now on, 
as being preoccupied with her daughter at the same time as with herself. It is 
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possible for the actions of caregiving that bring up the Mother-Multiple ontology to 
take place when the others are present – such as serving the food – or when they 
are absent – such as doing the laundry, or texting the others to remind them about 
appointments and tasks.  
The video material in the appendix starts with showing instances when mothers 
inhabit the Mother-Multiple ontological position while the other family members are 
not at home. In the first clip Joyce comes to the garden, where the recently washed 
laundry is hanging out to dry; she starts by talking about herself, explaining the 
reasons for having a specific favourite spot where she sits in the garden and, with 
no noticeable transition, moves to talking about her daughter and about the ways in 
which she uses the garden. In her chat, accompanied by movement from her 
favourite spot towards the slide and the trampoline where her daughter plays in the 
weekends, one does not feel that we move from talking about one individual to 
talking about another one. Joyce describes the ways in which her daughter is 
changing and her new preferences as if she is talking about herself. Discovering 
laundry items belonging to their domestic others, Cynthia and Elaine refer to the 
items by using personal names. ‘Andy – roll his sleeves down, make sure the 
buttons are undone’, says Elaine when finding her husband’s shirt in the laundry 
pile and preparing it for going into the washing machine. The appearance of the 
shirt makes Elaine to incorporate the habits of her husband to roll up his sleeves 
and to leave some buttons done; her actions of preparing the shirt for washing 
appear through accessing the knowledge of these habits, as is the action of 
checking the pockets of her son’s trousers. Cynthia encounters her domestic others 
in the laundry basket, in the shape of socks; she selects socks and names them, 
amused by their variety and by the very small differences between the black socks 
her family possess. By occupying the ontological position of the Mother-Multiple, 
Cynthia has access to a specific epistemology: she is able to link pairs of socks with 
personal names. She is the only family member who can recognize and distribute 
all the socks, because it is her who usually leads the laundry process in her family, 
while other family members step into the Mother-Multiple position in relation to other 
activities, such as cooking and washing up the dishes.     
The ontology of the Mother-Multiple can be described as the state of being by and 
through a set of relations/connections while the ontological position of the individual, 
in an English middle-class context, can be regarded as being by its own/in itself. I 
105 
 
build this distinction by drawing upon Strathern’s (1992) argument that in middle-
class English kinship the individuality of persons is prior to the relations that bring 
them together. This observation emerges in relation to Strathern’s previous 
experience of carrying out long-term ethnographic research in the islands of 
Melanesia and of her development of an analytical framework for regarding persons 
as being conceived both individually and dividually. The Melanesian notions of 
personhood differ from Western ones in their focus on a relationally composition: 
Melanesian persons are made up of multiple beings refracted through multiple 
relationships developed over time and starting from their procreation (Strathern 
1988). In relation to gender, which is one of the main focuses of Strathern’s (1988) 
publication, it is shown that, as deriving from different-sex parents, the child 
combines within itself both female and male elements. Therefore, in the Melanesian 
context gender is not employed in order to express the identity of whole persons – 
as in Western contexts – but gender differentiates types of sociality, like same-sex 
bonds from cross-sex bonds (Strathern 1988: 324). Dividuals are, thus, persons 
that are constructed ‘as the plural and composite site of the relationships that 
produced them’ (Strathern 1988: 13) and that change over time by developing more 
relationships, while individuals in middle-class English kinship are conceived as 
existent – and finite – persons that are prior to relationships.  
In this chapter, the Mother-Multiple is neither a dividual, nor an individual, as it is 
not a person. By defining this concept as an ontological position I argue that the 
Mother-Multiple is a state of being that is accessible to individuals and that 
essentially provides them with a change of perspective: this is the perspective of 
the multiple relationships with their domestic others, rather than the perspective of 
one individual or another. The Mother-Multiple is a knot where different kinship 
relationships intersect; it manifests the agency of this intersection of relationships 
rather than the agency of one, or more, individuals. A good visual representation of 
the Mother-Multiple as a knot of relationships is Cynthia’s basket of socks. As a 
representation of the Mother-Multiple, the basket contains all the family members 
and the relationships between them. Whoever takes the basket in order to engage 
with its content is stepping into the Mother-Multiple ontological position: they 
momentarily stop operating through a set of individual lenses – such as the wish to 
not know which socks are whose in order to retain more important information in 
one’s mind – and they operate through the perspective of a knot of relationships.   
106 
 
The way in which in constructing the Mother-Multiple concept I draw upon the 
distinction between the individual and the dividual proposed by Strathern (1988) is 
by suggesting that while in middle-class English kinship the main principle in 
constructing personhood is individuality, a relational and multiple perspective, 
similar to what in a Melanesian context is the dividual, is still accessible and it can 
be momentarily inhabited by individuals when engaged in actions of caregiving. The 
way in which I employ the notion of ‘dividuality’ here is as a conceptual tool that can 
be used in order to shade light upon a specific process in Euro-American contexts, 
as Simpson (1998) did in his work on divorce in the UK. The anthropologist Bob 
Simpson (1998) suggests that situations of divorce can make visible an approach to 
children as dividuals. When partners live separately, with children shifting between 
the two places, the influence of the ex and of their new family, or of their existent 
extended family upon the children’s upbringing becomes an issue that is detectable 
and that can be upsetting, even if it is considered inevitable. In these situations, 
therefore, children are regarded as dividuals – composite persons made of parts 
that correspond to the different relationships that they are engaged in – rather than 
as individuals. 
One of the reasons why people enjoy stepping in the Mother-Multiple position from 
time to time is, I argue, an interest with knowing other people very well. This 
ontological position provides an epistemology consisting in special knowledge of 
the character, habits, needs, preferences and dislikes of one’s domestic others, as 
well as of the relationships between multiple domestic others and between 
domestic others and oneself. Moreover, with this epistemology it also provides the 
opportunity for one to enact it, to express it, enactment which generates agency. By 
showing that they know the others very well, people are also expressing something 
about themselves: they prove their capacity to tell how the others really are, 
capacity which can involve multiple strategies and a long-term training, as Rapport 
(1994) argues. 
Several anthropologists doing fieldwork in various parts of Britain have identified the 
interest with having profound knowledge of other people as being an important 
preoccupation of their research participants in numerous contexts. Cohen (1987: 70) 
compares what knowing someone means in an urban setting (to be acquainted with 
someone) with what it means in Whalsay, a small town in the Shetland Islands. In 
Whalsay, where everybody is already acquainted, to know someone means to 
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know of their connections through, for example, families, boats, and houses. 
Edwards (2000) cites Cohen’s comparison in her work on kinship and new 
reproductive technologies in a Lancashire town when she analyses the statement of 
a participant who outlines that she could never ‘fully know’ her two step-
grandchildren as she does not know their father’s family. Edwards outlines that ‘[t]o 
know her grandchildren fully Mrs Watson suggested, required a knowledge of those 
to whom they were connected. This is what it means to be close’ (Edwards 2000: 
245). In this case, even if she would have had the capacity to do so, the possibility 
for knowing her grandchildren fully is denied to Mrs Watson by the circumstances.  
In the case presented by Rapport (1994), the capacity to tell the real character of 
others is necessary in Wanet, a small Cumbrian village, in relation to the changes 
brought by the appearance of the offcomers who express worldviews foreign to 
Wanet, coming from an intellectual system of knowledge – based upon words and 
imagination – rather than from the practical knowledge of working the land and of 
making a living, which is specific to the village. In order to know people for what 
they truly are a series of clues are brought together: their horoscope signs, the 
biology of their parentage, details of family history, knowledge of their behavioural 
patterns over the years, and their body language (Rapport 1994: 232-236). This 
complicated series of interpretative acts need to be performed because it is 
believed that there is a difference between how people appear and how they truly 
are, between words and ‘a deeper reality’ (Rapport 1994: 225), or, in the novelist’s 
E.M. Forster words, employed by Rapport, between the ‘two kinds of human 
personality which an individual possesses’ (Rapport 1994: 220): a public personality 
and a private, lower and deeper, personality, a part which transcends the everyday. 
The ideal of being able to profoundly know someone other than oneself is described 
by Reed (2011) in his ethnography of fiction reading with the members of the Henry 
Williamson Society. For Reed’s participants, reading Williamson’s captivating 
novels brings no less than the experience of being embodied by the writer’s 
consciousness: ‘[f]or the first time, Williamson readers claim to experience a person 
from the inside out, to live, as opposed to guess or interpret, alien character and 
intentionality. What they believe they achieve is an extraordinary, previously 
undreamed sense of intimacy with another subjective mind; readers know Henry in 
a way they cannot possibly know anyone else’ (Reed 2011: 10). Achieving this form 
of intimacy with other person’s mind is valued by Williamson’s readers as this is not 
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an ordinary experience and it cannot be replicated even with one’s closest others. 
In order to continue and maintain this intimacy, readers collect Williamson’s novels 
as every book means a new encounter with what for them is a well-known 
consciousness. As Rapport, drawing upon the work of E.M. Forster, suggests, ‘[i]t is 
from Literature that one receives hope of knowing others as one knows oneself’ 
(Rapport 1994: 244).   
While this hope might indeed come from reading fiction, the preoccupation with 
knowing others as one knows oneself is frequently expressed in everyday domestic 
situations between kin. Besides the activities related to doing the laundry, which I 
have exemplified at the beginning of this section, another domain where this 
preoccupation is visible, is cooking. Joyce is vegetarian and she enjoys cooking 
from scratch for herself while also hoping to convince her daughter to adopt some 
of her favourite dishes and to give up the semi-prepared food that she prefers, like 
fish fingers and chicken teddies. Joyce knows that this transition would only happen 
in time and she is patient for it to emerge, paying attention to any new changes in 
her daughter’s taste and supporting them. While I film her cooking carrot and lentil 
soup, for a video recording of practices conducted for the LEEDR research, Joyce 
tells me with excitement that last time she cooked this soup her daughter liked it 
and ate it, for the first time. She is now trying to replicate the exact way in which she 
prepared the recipe last time – which involves cooking the ingredients separately 
and not adding spices – so that her daughter would like it again. However, as 
knowing her very well, Joyce can tell that liking and not liking specific types of food 
also depends on the frequency of having them. Once ready, she would divide the 
large quantity of soup into portions and freeze them, so that she could subsequently 
serve the soup to her daughter no more often than twice a week during the 
following weeks. When trying the soup, Joyce can tell how it tastes for her; but at 
the same time she is also imagining how it would taste for her daughter. By 
inhabiting the Mother-Multiple position, Joyce tries to access her daughter’s 
sensorium: she attempts to incorporate the ways in which her daughter sees and 
senses the world. The actions of cooking express the relationship between them, 
between the mother’s individuality and the daughter’s individuality who come 
together in this practice in a distinct way: the enactment of the cooking activities is 
done by the mother but the sensorium that is (imaginatively) engaged is the 
daughter’s. This mixture emerges from Joyce’s interest with knowing her daughter 
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very well – in order to help her improve her diet – which she pursues by stepping 
into the Mother-Multiple ontology. 
The intensity of (positive and negative) feelings that people might develop for each 
other when they live together in a family-style lifestyle for long term is something 
that needs to be accounted for when looking at forms of domestic sociality and 
domestic actions. As I have found out during my fieldwork, the action of washing 
dishes feels very different when it is performed in a family-style setting than in a 
commercial/professional setting. When attending a music festival in Wales during 
the year of my fieldwork I volunteered to work in a cafe in order to get free entrance 
and one of the tasks that I accomplished was to wash dishes for several hours in a 
row. I did the task with not much attention to my actions, handling the piles of 
anonymous plates absently while chatting with another volunteer. By contrast, in a 
family-style lifestyle setting washing dishes represents for me an encounter with the 
plates used by people I care for; I am able to tell which plate was used by whom, as 
I know their food preferences and as we had the meal together; olive stones on 
these plates are different from olive stones one might see randomly on the street by 
a garbage bin – this might not be the best example: they are the stones left by 
people I deeply know. 
By suggesting that in domestic settings actions of caregiving come with nothing less 
than the opportunity to inhabit a distinct ontological position, I attempt to preserve 
and express the affective complexity of domestic universes that I encountered 
during my fieldwork. Surely, a different eye could look at my ethnographic material 
from the perspective of existent sociological concepts in the field of family studies, 
for example. By following an anthropological endeavour of ontological orientation 
(Henare et al 2007), however, my analytical focus is not upon ‘explaining’ empirical 
data by using existent theoretical frameworks but upon the possibility of creating 
new theory from ethnographic insights, which necessitates a work of assertion, 
insistence and imagination.  
In writing this chapter, more than in writing the other chapters of my dissertation, I 
counted upon a distinct form of knowledge that I arrived at as an ethnographer. In 
her work on neo-paganism and witchcraft in the UK, Luhrmann (1989) calls this 
type of knowledge ‘knowing of’ and she defines it as the intuitive knowledge of just 
‘grasping’ meanings, whose key feature is an ‘imaginative absorption with a 
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different person or world view’ (Luhrmann 1989: 203). This type of knowledge 
complements the traditional distinction drawn by Ryle (1949) between ‘knowing that’ 
(propositional knowledge) and ‘knowing how’ (embodied knowledge). As opposed 
to propositional knowledge, which is achieved in all social sciences disciplines 
through the method of interviewing, ‘knowing of’ is one of the main types of 
knowledge that the ethnographer gains by doing long-term fieldwork.  
From the relationships that I developed with my participants during my ethnography, 
the relations with the female adult participants, reflected also in the video appendix, 
played a special role in the way I arrived to look at my findings. This was not only 
because of similarities in terms of gender and age that made it easier for us to get 
closer, but also because of one main difference and my interest in describing it. My 
participants were mothers, which I was not. Some of them were homemakers, 
some of them worked part-time or full-time outside the home, but regardless of this 
differences they all engaged in child-related ‘duties’: a set of practices and activities 
that I was not familiar with as an adult, even if I was able to remember that when a 
child I was frequently a child-minder for my younger brother. As an adult in my late 
twenties-early thirties, equipped with critical thinking and having had engaged with 
feminist literatures and artistic products, in trying to understand the lives of my 
female adult participants there was also a personal scope. I was hoping that the 
knowledge gained from these relationships will make me able to tell if ‘it would be 
worth it’ for myself: if I wanted to become a mum someday and if I was equipped 
with the necessary traits that would make this a positive experience for all those 
potentially involved. This personal concern might have made the exercise of 
reaching an ‘imaginative absorption’ with the lives and worldviews of my 
participants who were mothers a more accomplished endeavour than the acts of 
imagining the lives and the viewpoints of the male adult and of the children 
participants.   
Besides being a form of knowledge that is specific to ethnographic ways of learning, 
‘knowing of’ – as involving imagination, intuition and an interest with knowing 
someone very well – is a type of knowledge that people employ in everyday life in 
relation to their domestic others. ‘Knowing of’ is one of the forms of knowledge that 
can be accessed when one steps in the Mother-Multiple ontological position, 
together with propositional and tacit knowledge. In the example of Joyce cooking 
soup for her daughter, she employs all these forms of knowledge: propositional 
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knowledge in explaining her strategies of dividing the soup into portions and 
freezing them so that she could alternate her daughter’s food menu – which is 
originally a technique explained in books and leaflets teaching mothers how to 
diversify the alimentation of their babies; tacit knowledge in relation to the activities 
of cooking that she performs ‘skilfully’ (Grasseni 2007)  because her body knows 
them as it would know the steps of a dance; and ‘knowing of’ when she imagines 
and accesses her daughter’s sensorium.  
 
3. Anticipation: looking forward to and the agency of imagining 
possibilities 
 
After discussing my conceptualization of the Mother-Multiple I will now move to the 
second concept developed in this chapter – and which, as I mentioned, stands in a 
relationship of mutual reinforcement with the first one – the concept of anticipation. 
In this section I will discuss anticipation as a time mode, addressing the ways in 
which ‘knowing of’ is accessed through anticipation and the forms of agency 
engendered in this process. 
In creating a counterdiscourse of time by blending the present and the future, the 
time mode of anticipation covers the present in the imagination of the future, in 
order to make the future present. As part of everyday life, anticipation takes two 
forms: looking forward to and short-term anticipation. As I will further show, these 
forms of anticipation are employed in various situations, which are sometimes 
related to stepping into the Mother-Multiple ontological position, and other times not. 
In this section I will focus on looking forward to as a form of anticipation of one’s 
future agentic engagement with the world, while I will discuss short-term 
anticipation in the next section. 
Looking forward to involves the anticipation of an event – such as Christmas, one’s 
birthday celebration, or a holiday – or of a cyclical recreational or hobby-related 
activity, such as a sports or arts class. In the Mum’s Cup video appendix, while she 
is video recording the preparation of a cup of tea on a Monday morning, Sam 
responds to the question of the day about sharing something that she wishes for in 
that moment. She says: ‘I wish it was the end of the week’, because at the end of 
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the week they will go on holiday; as the weather on Monday morning looks grim, 
Sam is looking forward to going somewhere nice and warm and she wants the 
week to go quickly. During a different encounter with Sam at the end of the month 
of November, while discussing Christmas, she told me that they always decorate 
the Christmas tree on the 1st of December because they like to keep the tree for a 
whole month: they actually prefer ‘building up to Christmas’ to Christmas itself. The 
period when you prepare for it to happen, wait for it, and think about it is more 
valuable because ‘when Christmas comes and it’s there, next thing it’s gone and it’s 
nothing else left to expect’ (extract from my field notes). From the 1st of December 
until Christmas: 24 days of anticipation. This is different from the first example 
where Sam wanted the week to go quickly in order to reach the moment of going on 
holiday sooner: the days of December leading to Christmas are seen as an 
important part of the event. ‘Building up’ – a liminal time of imagination and of 
‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1991) that one reaches by placing oneself in the 
cyclical form of temporality associated with a traditional, stable, annual event – is 
regarded as being more enjoyable than the event itself.  
Having something to look forward to is a concept that is also understood outside the 
domain of domestic life. While taking part, together with my Morris side, in an Area 
Community Forum event regarding the selection of a set of community projects to 
receive public funding, I encountered a different way of using the notion of looking 
forward to. As part of this event, the community projects competing for the bid were 
presented by their proponents to an audience made of council representatives and 
local residents. When the president of a community association presented their 
project for ‘fit bodies and minds’ – that involved organizing sport activities and quiz 
shows for the residents in their council estate – she described what everyday life 
can be like for her neighbours, living in poverty and/or with disabilities. Their 
proposed activities would make everyday life more bearable because they would 
provide the residents with ‘something to look forward to’. ‘We all need something to 
look forward to’ she said at the end of her presentation, while the audience nodded 
in silence, understanding and agreeing. 
In writing about time, the sociologist Barbara Adam (1995) outlines that we are 
always engaged with a multitude of times and temporalities, such as clock and 
calendar time, the time of the body/ biological rhythms, the cyclical time of nature 
and seasons, a past time that we access through memories, and an imagined 
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(hoped for or feared) future. All these times and many others coexist and very often 
people employ them simultaneously to make sense of their experiences. Waking up 
in the morning in pain and in a cold house that one cannot afford to heat and 
knowing that nothing is due to happen on that day is different from waking up in the 
morning with the anticipation of an afternoon meeting and a quiz at the community 
centre. Having something to look forward to is not just about a joy that will come in 
the future. Having something to look forward to also changes the present. Involving 
hope and imagination, looking forward to as a form of anticipation can link one with 
one’s future self and open up new possibilities, as I will show in the next example. 
While filming and talking with Lara about how she uses her smartphone, she 
enthusiastically anticipates her and her husband’s, Dominic, transformations into 
home blackberry whiskey makers, transformations which are facilitated by her 
phone. 
Roxana: So when would you normally use it [the phone]? 
Lara: It’s just around all the time. We saw yesterday loads of blackberries around 
in one of the fields – absolute loads and loads of blackberries. And Dominic’s 
sister was talking about making blackberry whiskey. So the first thing I did was 
pick it up, and then go in, and look for blackberry whiskey. So I just go into 
‘Search’, type in ‘blackberry whiskey’, and it tells me how to make blackberry 
whiskey. And then I just put it back down. So it’s around. 
Roxana: So did you check it when you were in the field? 
Lara: No, when we came home. When we were around we had this conversation 
that we had a chat with his sister about making blackberry whiskey. So I said ‘right, 
let’s have a look’. Oh, and I’ve also texted her and said ‘can you send me your 
recipe?’ So she then emailed it to me. So I was then able to check my emails [by 
phone] and there was the blackberry recipe!  
(transcription from video recording with Lara) 
In this ‘polymedious’ (Madianou & Miller 2013) way of using her phone, what Lara is 
dwelling on is the possibility of blackberry whiskey. This was not even a hypothesis 
one day before. But with loads of blackberry hedges appearing/ being discovered 
all of a sudden in the field and with the easiness of a variety of recipes arriving on 
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her phone from different sources (from Google and from her sister-in-law), making 
blackberry whiskey by themselves – which is something Lara and Dominic have 
never done before – becomes possible. After finding the berry hedges by chance, 
and the whiskey recipes thanks to her smartphone literacy, Lara is in a position 
where she can imagine herself as a future blackberry whiskey maker. This 
imagined potentiality, which makes her feel enthusiastic, represents one way in 
which Lara ‘knows of’ her future self: she is imaginatively absorbed with the 
worldview of her future self, a home-whiskey-maker Lara. The anticipation of this 
transformation engenders agency. 
In his book on modernity and globalization, Arjun Appadurai outlines that 
‘imagination is today a staging ground for action, and not only for escape’ 
(Appadurai 1996: 7). I take his view in the interpretation of the examples of 
anticipatory actions that I described so far. The reason why life with something to 
look forward to is different from life with nothing to look forward to is not because it 
provides a route to imaginatively escape the struggles and the non-eventfulness of 
the everyday, but because it promises a future state of agentic engagement with 
other people. When attending the quiz night at the community centre, one would 
perform a series of actions together with others: they would work in groups, have a 
laugh, and maybe give some good answers for which they would be acknowledged. 
Similarly, Christmas is the most celebrated opportunity for family members to 
exchange gifts, and, in doing so, to acknowledge and to be acknowledged by the 
others. Anticipating Christmas is anticipating a day of action when one would act on 
the other family members through the gifts one makes that show one’s knowledge 
of the others and one’s expectations and wishes of how the others should be (see 
also Miller 1998). 
The anthropologist Carol Greenhouse (1996), whose work I discuss in more detail 
in the first chapter, suggests that we should open up our definitions of agency to 
regard it as referring to ‘people’s goals, together with their broader sense of what is 
possible and of what relevance is about, even if their understanding of relevance 
excludes their own experiences from the story of the world’ (Greenhouse 1996: 
234). The agency engendered in acts of anticipation, and in accessing a ‘knowing 
of’ type of information, is not about what one does but about what one could do. A 
future state of agentic engagement with the world is made present just by the fact 
that is possible: people are able to talk about it and to imagine it even if they have 
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not lived it yet. In the end, it is not important if the possibility is acted out or not, as 
long as people are able to extract agentic resources just from the promise of the 
possibility and as long as they do so with all the possibilities that come their way; 
from an infinite number of possibilities encountered daily, only a few would be acted 
upon. Lara is enthusiastic today because she discovered that she could make 
blackberry whiskey if only she would want to. The presence of an anticipated future 
agentic engagement with the world is, in itself, a form of agency, as it extends 
people’s sense of what is possible: the future happens only because we first 
anticipate it; the world changes only because we first imagine and come to ‘know of’ 
the ways in which it could change. 
  
 
Figure 3 Two jars of blackberry whiskey on Lara and Dominic’s kitchen table. 
 
When I visit Lara and Dominic again a few weeks later for an interview about their 
childhood and teenage memories of ICT domestic usage I ask them how the plan of 
making blackberry whiskey unfolded. Lara is proud to take out from the cupboard 
and to show me two jars containing the beverage they made. They are planning to 
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use the small jar this year for Christmas and they will keep the big one for Lara’s 
older daughter’s 21st birthday celebration next year, when they will serve it mixed 
with champagne at the birthday cake moment. Lara and Dominic will not use the 
product for ordinary consumption, but they are saving it for the next two important 
events. Through this planning they anticipate how their newly acquired ability of 
whiskey-making will be shared, celebrated with, and acknowledged by, a 
considerable number of kin and friends.   
 
4. Short-term anticipation and techniques of imagination 
 
While looking forward to involves hope and imagination, short-term anticipation 
comes from through knowledge (based on previous experience) of how someone or 
something is likely to act. 
During a video tour of the house with Cynthia, she tells me that ‘the hall light only 
goes on if somebody’s out and we’re expecting them back’. As the light switch in 
the hall is not nearby the door but on the opposite wall, the family member who 
went out and is due to return later – usually Kelly, the oldest daughter, in her early 
twenties – would need to step in a dark environment and find her way to the 
opposite wall in order to switch the light on. This might be an even more difficult 
action when one is returning after a night out. Cynthia says that they would leave 
the light on until Kelly returns ‘for accident prevention: it’s a lot safer to come to a lit 
space than to a dark one’ but also because ‘it’s a welcoming thing I suppose: “we’re 
all expecting you back, don’t disappear!”’ Cynthia leaves the hall light on in 
anticipation of her daughter’s return: the light is not only a sign for Kelly that she is 
expected back but also a means for Cynthia to tell herself that Kelly is due to return. 
The light makes the mother’s anticipation visible. It also shows Cynthia’s embodied 
knowledge of her home and of the material dispositions of walls and light switches, 
which might be based on previous experiences of being the first one to arrive home 
and to find the hall dark. 
This type of anticipation based on tacit, embodied, practical knowledge appears 
very often when people are engaged in complex activities that involve multiple 
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appliances and material objects, such as in the process of cooking. In this case, 
ovens and kettles, for example, are switched on well before they are needed, as 
people know they will use them at some point in the process of cooking and they 
prefer to have them ready rather than wait for them to warm up at the last minute. 
‘Let me put the kettle on’ was how some of my key-participants welcomed me 
several times, towards the end of my fieldwork. And with this line we would 
anticipate together a nice catch-up over a cup of tea before I would go on with the 
interview or with explaining the task that I was proposing that time.  
Short-term anticipation is also expressed in activities of setting-up the environment, 
like leaving the light on after preparing the dining table in anticipation of people to 
gather and dinner to be served, or switching the radio on in order to prepare the 
kitchen – and oneself – for starting to cook. During an interview about digital media 
and domestic time, Sam mentions that she and her family like to listen to music 
while they are having dinner and she describes how her husband and daughter 
would pick the music CDs to be played at dinnertime. 
Or when we’re all around the table he would perhaps say: ‘Right, what kind of 
music would you like?’ And then he and July usually tend, between them, to 
choose, right before we sit down. So, yeah, it’s kind of home when the meal is 
served up and he starts picking the music. (interview Sam) 
In this example, picking the music anticipates the experience of having a nice family 
meal. For Sam their house starts to feel like home before they sit down, when her 
husband starts to pick the music. Thus, it is not only the family dinner as event, but 
also the short-term anticipation of the dinner, which covers and extends the event, 
that triggers the feeling of home for Sam. 
In these examples, by expressing the expectation of a series of actions that will 
follow a specific moment – such as using kettle-boiled water in the process of 
cooking, or knowing that everybody will take a seat around the table once the music 
starts playing – the participants show their knowledge of their domestic 
environments, which are populated by domestic others and which are defined by 
specific ways of performing everyday practices. When revealing themselves as 
experts in the domain constituted by their own domestic environments and when 
enacting the exact activities that need to occur at a specific point in the progress of 
practices so that to keep the flow going, people manifest agency. 
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In performing short-term anticipation, as well as in the activity of looking forward to, 
a series of techniques of imagination are employed. I will define these techniques in 
relation to the anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann’s work on neo-paganism and 
witchcraft in London in the 1980s. Luhrmann (1989; 2002) identifies two main 
techniques that magical practitioners were using to train their capacity for 
‘dissociation’ (2002) and to access the ‘otherworld’: meditation and visualization. 
Meditation is a concentration technique that is widespread in various spiritual 
traditions – see Cook (2010) for an ethnographic account of Buddhist meditation – 
and that has been recently researched and reintroduced to Western practitioners 
under the name of mindfulness meditation, through self-help programmes such as 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn 1994) and mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (Williams and Penman 2011). Visualization is a technique of 
imagination of a still mental-image or of ‘pathworkings’ – which are guided 
exercises of visualization of a fantastic journey taken by the practitioner, often 
conducted in groups, with one person leading by talking the others through the 
stages of the journey. As Luhrmann (2002) remarks, the capacity for visualization 
can be trained and it recently started to be used particularly in performance sports 
training, with techniques called ‘guided imagery’ and ‘visual rehearsal’ (Ungerleider 
1996). While guided imagery is oriented towards achieving an internal visual 
representation of the sensory experience of performing a sport – so that athletes 
would become even more intimately familiar with their sport by creating a personal 
‘image bank’ that one could access anytime – visual rehearsal is focused on a 
specific task like the preparation for competition, with the athlete imagining in detail 
and in slow-motion her or his body movements for a successful performance. Visual 
rehearsal can also be used during the game, just before an important moment, like 
a decisive kick.  
If imagination techniques are used self-consciously as tools to improve 
performance in sports training, their everyday employments are often dismissed or 
downplayed because, as Ehn and Löfgren (2010) show in their work on ‘non-events’ 
– activities of waiting, routines and daydreaming – they might be considered ‘either 
too ordinary or too insignificant’ (Ehn and Löfgren 2010: 4). At the same time, they 
are part of a dimension of inner life or interiority whose accessing has not been a 
traditional preoccupation of social sciences (Irving 2011). Ehn and Löfgren argue 
that inner life, or what they call the ‘secret world’, is shaped by social life as much 
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as any other human experiences and actions: ‘[e]vents we believe we have 
invented, rules we believe we have created (…) all turn out to be shared with others 
– but in secret’ (Ehn and Löfgren 2010: 3). Even if techniques of imagination similar 
to the ones used in sports training to improve performance are employed in 
everyday life in relation to domestic activities, their application is not necessarily 
conscious; they are not identified and explained as techniques of imagination, but 
this does not mean that their application is less significant than in sports or in 
spiritual training. 
By following the typology of techniques of imagination described by Luhrmann 
(2002), I suggest that short-term anticipation can be regarded as a form of visual 
rehearsal: the act of putting the kettle on entails the imagination of the series of 
actions that would follow. Similarly, ‘non-guided’ imagery is employed when one is 
looking forward to a future event, like Christmas or the quiz night, as through 
imagination the event is internally accommodated and domesticated: one has the 
opportunity to get used to the idea of Christmas before the event takes place. 
 
5. The Mother-Multiple and anticipation  
 
In this section I will show that actions of anticipation – both looking forward to and 
short-term anticipation – are very often involved when one steps into the Mother-
Multiple ontological position and acts as the caregiver of the domestic others. 
As I have mentioned in the first section, the process of selecting and doing the 
laundry is, for Cynthia, one of the regular situations when she steps into the Mother-
Multiple ontology. Laundry is usually a weekend task that starts with Cynthia 
gathering from the floor in the living room and bathroom clothing items and towels 
that the other family members abandoned as they considered them in need of being 
washed. She then brings the individual laundry baskets from the bedrooms of her 
three children into her bedroom and, by taking out clothing items one by one, she 
makes four piles on the marital bed: whites, blacks, light colours, and bright colours. 
However, colour is not the only criterion that she uses in organizing the laundry. 
While discovering what items are to be found this time inside the laundry baskets, 
Cynthia is also concerned with the items that are missing and that she anticipates 
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finding as she knows they need washing, such as school uniforms and PE kits, 
which are usually prioritised and washed in the first two loads of the day. In case of 
missing items, she would go and ask or look for them in the related bedroom or 
inside the bags where she knows that they are normally kept. Sorting the laundry is, 
thus, not only a process of selection but also of reviewing, of checking if the right 
items are in place. At the same time, for every item that she picks, Cynthia instantly 
knows the specific washing instructions. According to the washing instructions, she 
subsequently regroups a laundry pile into two or more different loads. Moreover, by 
knowing who each item belongs to, and what sorts of preferences or allergies her 
domestic others have, she can plan the loads according to the type of washing 
liquid she will use. Thus, in sorting the laundry, Cynthia manages and enacts her 
complex knowledge about three domains: her family members and their 
preferences, sensibilities and allergies; the list of clothing that exists and the sub-list 
of clothes that are used more often or in ‘public’ situations, such as at school or 
work; the material texture of each item and their individual washing instructions.  
Anticipation is embedded in this process, in many ways. When taking out the 
contents of individual laundry baskets, Cynthia expects to find specific items, such 
as school uniforms; finding these items is part of accomplishing a successful 
laundry process and she would not continue with the next activity – loading the 
washing machine – before finding the missing items that need to be prioritised. With 
this short-term anticipation, there emerges as well a ‘looking forward to’ type of 
anticipation in the imagination of the following week when all the family members 
will wear at school and at work the clothes that Cynthia would have washed and 
prepared for them. Further, every textile appearance makes her rethink her piles 
and anticipate the moment when she will load the items in the washing machine 
and choose the program and the water temperature. At the same time, every 
clothing item is a person and it is given the name of one of Cynthia’s domestic 
others – as I discussed in the first section – as well as being attributed a specific set 
of preferences and sensibilities. According to the preferences – sometimes 
contradictory – expressed by different piles, Cynthia anticipates the moment when 
she will need to pick the type of washing liquid that would serve as the best solution 
for each pile without creating irretrievable conflicts inside the piles. 
Cynthia says that once she has checked the washing instructions of any new 
clothing item and followed them, she remembers them every time she sees the item 
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emerging out again from a laundry basket. She does not like the fact that her brain 
retains this information, as she considers it rather unimportant, not worthy of being 
remembered. She would prefer to occupy her mind with other things rather than a 
list of all the clothing owned by her family and their related washing instructions. But 
she cannot help it. Once read, the information from the label stays there, stored in 
her mind.  
Sadly, I tend to remember once I’ve checked it once. [laughing] My brain would be 
so useful if it didn’t keep information like that in it. This is why you can study when 
you’re young like you and you don’t have to retain all this information. 
(transcription from video recording with Cynthia) 
In the video appendix Cynthia refers back to this conversation while showing me 
the socks of her domestic others and saying: ‘Again, sadly, my brain knows exactly 
which socks are whose, so I can do that’. By stepping into the Mother-Multiple, 
Cynthia becomes unable to oppose knowing a set of information that, as an 
individual, she would not choose to know. When she says that I can study as I am 
young, Cynthia means by ‘young’ a state previous to marriage and previous to 
having children – as my status was during my fieldwork. Once one starts a family, 
one’s mind does not exclusively belong to her or him anymore, as it needs to 
accommodate whole new levels of information about other people than oneself, and 
about other domains than the academic. This is what stepping into the Mother-
Multiple ontology entails: letting oneself be embodied by one’s domestic others and 
accessing a consistent corpus of knowledge – about the character, habits, needs, 
preferences and dislikes of the domestic others – that can feel overwhelming at 
times. This corpus of knowledge is tacitly employed in actions of anticipation.  
Another domain where my participants combine anticipation with stepping into the 
Mother-Multiple is in keeping family calendars, which involves actions of reminding 
and coordination. 
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6. Calendars and text messages as instruments for anticipation 
 
I will now discuss some ways in which the Mother-Multiple is enacted through 
activities of anticipation of the time of the domestic others, such as by keeping 
family calendars and by using text messaging to send reminders to the others. 
Very often, what makes anticipation possible are scheduling and routine. ‘I check 
the calendar all the time, so I know what’s coming’ is how Brett formulates his 
relation with the future that is mediated by his calendar. When I asked my 
participants how they use digital media to organise their schedules I was told about 
a complexity of techniques from computer calendars synchronised with 
smartphones, to phone alarms or text messages as reminders. However, there 
were two main types of calendars that most of my participants used: a personal 
calendar for work – usually a computer calendar, but in some cases a paper diary 
was preferred – and a family calendar for activities and appointments that were not 
related to work, such as evening social activities, parents’ evenings, doctors’ 
appointments, birthdays, children’s activities that were out of routine, and visits from 
researchers working on the LEEDR project.  
The family calendar was in most cases a paper calendar living on a wall in the 
kitchen, and the family member who usually filled it in and kept track of the entries 
was the female adult. Mothers were in charge of this collective time from the 
beginning of the year when they filled in the new calendar with birthdays of kin and 
friends by copying them from the old calendar. All family members were 
encouraged to write down in the calendar their planned activities that were due to 
take place during what was considered ‘family time’: weekday evenings and 
weekends. Male adults mentioned that sometimes they found themselves in trouble 
when they did not filled in the calendar with the evening out they were planning and 
then the date would conflict with a parents’ evening. Eva, who is a homemaker and 
a mother of two, says about the situations when her husband forgets to fill in the 
calendar: ‘if it’s not in my paper calendar it doesn’t happen, that’s my golden rule if 
he wants to go out’. It is the spouse who fills the family calendar first who is able to 
take the evening off. This situation is similar to a model of social organization 
identified by Burman (1981) in her fieldwork on Solomon Islands – and discussed 
by Munn (1992) in her essay on the cultural anthropology of time – where the 
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‘keeper of the calendar’ and the descent group he was part of was able to control 
the temporal dimension of the everyday lives of all the islanders by being able to 
regulate ‘the very motion of time’ (Burman 1981: 259). Munn (1992) argues that 
having control over time is a form of political power. 
Here, however, keeping the calendar is a way of enacting the Mother-Multiple. 
Depending on the format of the calendar, my participants used to live with the 
current month on the wall, sometimes taking a look at the month ahead to see what 
was coming. The kitchen calendar allows the person temporarily occupying the 
Mother-Multiple position to anticipate in one glance a whole month or more in the 
life of their domestic others. The calendar is, thus, a material and visible portal to 
everyday actions of imagination of future events not only for oneself, but also future 
events in the lives of domestic others. With one exception of a male adult who 
travels very often and keeps an iMac family calendar updated as he wants to make 
sure that there are no nights when both he and his wife, who also has a busy 
working schedule, would be away, usually the female participants considered 
themselves in charge of the family calendar. In such situations, they step into the 
Mother-Multiple in order to keep track of what the others are doing and, very often, 
to remind them about their calendar entries. The reminding is usually done through 
digital media devices – such as phone texting or email – which are regarded as the 
male preference. Eva does this by updating the iMac calendar with the entries from 
the kitchen calendar, and then telling her husband to synchronize his phone, as she 
knows that he finds it easier to check the iMac calendar through his phone than to 
take a look at the kitchen calendar. 
Iris, who is an artist working from home in her shed-studio in the garden and who 
also talks about herself as being in charge of the house, keeps a paper diary as a 
family calendar in the study on the ground floor where everybody can check it.  
Everything else that’s been done by telephone or birthdays and things would be 
put in the diary, so we can all check it but it’s only me really who reads it 
[laughing]. (interview Iris and Steve) 
From this spot in front of the diary, as a base where collective information about the 
future is to be found, Iris writes and sends text messages to her domestic others to 
remind them about the appointments they have on that day. If the events are taking 
place in the distant future, Iris’s husband, Steve, prefers to be reminded by email. 
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My phone is my work phone. So I don’t have a personal phone, it’s that way 
around. I might put home events on that calendar, at work – things like tonight that 
I’ve forgotten completely about [laughing]. But if kids have parents’ evening, I say 
to Iris all the time: ‘tell me, email me’. (interview Iris and Steve) 
Steve has a senior position at a multinational company working constantly with 
partners in China and Singapore, so he often stays late at the office or even wakes 
up in the night to check his email and to write replies, in order to overcome the time 
zone differences and to keep the business discussion going. He spends most of his 
time at work and the way he deals with any kind of appointment is through his work 
calendar; he needs to be emailed about any new appointments, such as parents’ 
evenings, in order to be able to acknowledge them. For him, Iris mediates between 
the realms of family life and of work by emailing a diary entry that will be 
transformed into a work calendar appointment. Steve admits that he needs 
someone to do this mediation in order for him to be able to keep track of his non-
work life.14 
In other situations, domestic others might not assert that they need reminding about 
their appointments but female adults occupying the Mother-Multiple ontology think 
they might do and they communicate the reminder in a rather covert form. This is 
the case of Cynthia who leaves for work before her daughter, Kelly, wakes up, and 
so she uses text messages to communicate what she would have told her face to 
face in the morning should she have been awake. 
Kelly: And I’ll have a text saying: ‘Don’t forget to go to your interview’. 
Cynthia [laughing]: Oh, no, I tend to do it more subtle, don’t I? ‘Good luck with 
your interview’ [laughing]. Yeah, I tend to be subtle where I can, don’t I, Kelly? 
She never told me off [laughing]. (interview Cynthia and Kelly) 
There are times when Cynthia prefers to leave her daughter a note by the kettle 
instead of texting her. The kettle is where Kelly would afterwards leave a note in 
response to her mum as well, ‘because everybody knows that’s where I go first 
when I’m walking in the door’, says Cynthia. This remark shows that Kelly and the 
other family members also step in the Mother-Multiple ontology when they imagine 
                                            
14 Using a social practice theoretical framework, Christensen and Røpke (2010) identify the practice 
of what they call ‘holding things together’ as a form of everyday planning and coordination for Danish 
families. 
125 
 
what the first thing that Cynthia does when she enters the house is, so that they 
would know where to leave her a note.  
The notes that Cynthia leaves are for things that Kelly needs to find out before her 
mum, who works as a primary school teacher, has the chance to text her during 
playtime. Cynthia would not text her daughter in the morning because she knows 
that she keeps her phone always on so the text would wake her up and, as a 
consequence, she might not get the best possible response. 
Cynthia: She could also turn over and get back to sleep and try to ignore it. She 
wouldn’t appreciate if I sent her a text at 7 o’clock in the morning to say: ‘By the 
way, can you do a load of washing up for me today before you go to work?’ It 
wouldn’t work. And then she would text me and say: ‘No! You woke me up so I’ve 
not done it’. (interview Cynthia and Kelly) 
It seems that when she is choosing what media to use to communicate her 
daughter a message – mobile phone text or a hand written note by the kettle – 
Cynthia anticipates what response each of these media might generate. She also 
performs an exercise of imagination of what it would be like to be in her daughter’s 
place. She imagines that the sound of receiving the text would wake her up and that 
she would be curious to check it, which would wake her even more – so receiving a 
text early in the morning could provoke two reactions: either going back to sleep 
straight away and forgetting the text ever existed, or sending an angry reply. By 
stepping into the Mother-Multiple and accessing knowledge on the character, habits, 
dislikes and ways of reacting of her daughter, Cynthia is capable of anticipating the 
response she might get when using one media over another. 
Text messaging is also used when people want to attune their individual times and 
reach a ‘common time’, which is very often the time of picking up, for the situations 
when they pick their children up from school or from after-school clubs. During my 
interview with Marilyn, she receives a text from her younger daughter who is on a 
school trip to a museum in a nearby city.  
So Helena’s just texted me to say they haven’t left the museum yet, so she’s 
probably thinking she’s going to be late. I normally was supposed to pick her up at 
4.45, so I’d probably text her at 4.30 to say: ‘Where are you on the motorway?’, so 
I knew what time to set off. (interview Marilyn) 
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While in an interview situation with me, Marilyn knows what she will do when we 
finish. When the text appears, Marilyn stops being an interviewee for a moment in 
order to step in the Mother-Multiple ontology: through imagination she ‘knows of’ 
what her daughter is thinking and she can anticipate in detail the next series of 
actions she will perform in order to reach the state of being attuned, or in 
coordination, with the time of her daughter returning from the trip.15 
When stepping in the Mother-Multiple in order to send texts as reminders, mothers 
access and enact knowledge of the daily schedules of their domestic others. Very 
often, just before texting, they imagine at what point in their everyday schedule the 
other is and they choose to send the text at the moment that would best suit the 
‘time of the other’ (Fabian 1983) rather than their own time. This often happens 
when female adults remind their partners to do something after work and they try to 
make sure that they send the text shortly before their partners would finish work, 
when they are in a temporal area where ideas about the after-work life start to come 
in and to mix with the actions of completing the work day. These calculated actions 
of anticipating the time of the other in order to find the right moment when to send a 
reminder involve putting oneself in the other’s shoes, or letting oneself be embodied 
by the other. One such example comes from an interview with Sam. 
Roxana: When would you send the text message to remind him? Is it when you 
remember yourself? 
Sam: Yeah, either when I remember – I think ‘Gosh, I got no milk’, or something. 
Or sometimes I just think I’d better just remind him in case he has forgotten. 
‘Cause he might say ‘I’ll get some chicken food on the way home’ and then I text 
him about an hour before he finishes just to say: ‘Don’t forget the chicken food’ 
[laughing].  
Roxana: So you’ll text him just before his finishing work? 
Sam: Yes, an hour, a half an hour. Yes, exactly. If I told him in the morning he 
might have forgotten till lunch time. (interview Sam) 
Knowing someone so well that one could anticipate what he or she is doing when 
away is something to be proud of. It shows that the relationship between the two is 
                                            
15 From a different theoretical approach, the sociologist Rich Ling (2004) would regard this situation 
as an example of ‘microcoordination’ that is made possible through the use of mobile phones.  
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strong and that they know what the right way to reach the other is when the other is 
not there. In an interview with Iris we talk about her texting her husband when he is 
doing the shopping if she realizes that she needs a specific item. 
Iris: Steve does the food shopping and I’ll text him if I forget something. Because 
normally he would have his iPod on so he won’t hear me if I ring, so I try and text 
and see if he’d actually look at his phone. He listens to music when he’s doing the 
shopping, when he’s walking the dog, when he’s in the house. It’s constant music 
in his ears. 
Roxana: And if you text him then the phone would vibrate in his pocket? 
Iris: Yeah, it should do! Sometimes he’s really good at not hearing it. When he 
changed it to a Blackberry, the Blackberry wasn’t as loud as the other phone, or 
because it’s in a case it doesn’t vibrate as much. So he’s a little bit better at 
ignoring that [laughing]. (interview Iris) 
Later that evening, when Steve arrives from work, he joins us for the interview and I 
take him through the same list of questions while Iris informs him about what she 
already told me. 
Iris: And I was saying that if we’ve gone to shopping as well we might text each 
other to say: ‘Remember to get so and so’. 
Steve: Yeah, even if I don’t hear it on my phone because I’m with my headphones 
on. 
Iris [laughing]: That’s what I’ve said! That’s exactly what I’ve said! 
Steve: But I always look at my phone before I’ve checked out, just in case. 
(interview Iris and Steve) 
In this example there is reciprocity in anticipating each other’s actions and in 
enacting the Mother-Multiple. By incorporating her husband’s habits of listening to 
music, Iris knows that it is better to text him instead of calling in order for her 
message to reach destination. By incorporating his wife’s habit to send him a text 
when he is doing the shopping, Steve knows to check his phone before heading to 
the cashier. The reciprocal anticipation of each other’s actions makes their 
communication successful and shows a mutual deployment of the Mother-Multiple: 
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a mutual interest with knowing each other very well and with finding the way to act 
that would best suit the other. The success does not only lie in the right item being 
bought from the supermarket but in the fact that their relationship is being confirmed 
and reiterated. Iris jumps with joy and blushes when Steve confirms the story that 
she told me before he arrived home: suddenly it is as if they are not taking part in 
an interview about digital media and time anymore, but in a show that tests couples’ 
knowledge of each other. 
When people converse through text messages what happens is not just an 
exchange of words, but also of thoughts. During an interview with Vic and Gail, Vic 
mentions that when their daughter, who is in her early teens, goes out, he is the 
one who, from home, would normally converse through texts with her. 
Roxana: So is it just to know where she is? 
Vic: It’s knowing where she is, it’s knowing how she is, it’s knowing what she’s 
doing. (interview Vic and Gail) 
Such a holistic knowledge about what and how his daughter is doing in that very 
moment could not come just from the content of a text. In the action of conversing 
through texts, Vic and his daughter would probably be thinking about each other 
while typing the messages and while waiting for the reply. In this way, there is an 
invisible connection that is established between them and that is at least as 
important as the words per se that are exchanged. As he waits for and receives the 
texts, Vic steps into the Mother-Multiple ontological position and ‘knows of’ how his 
daughter is, by imagining her texting. 
The examples discussed in this section show some ways in which the Mother-
Multiple is enacted in activities of anticipation. By keeping the family calendar, by 
accessing information about the future appointments and events in the lives of the 
domestic others and by sending reminders to the others about what they need to do 
in the near future, one shows a capacity of imagination that does not only concerns 
oneself, but it is extended upon the domestic others. In sending text messages for 
coordination, it is the time of the other that is firstly anticipated, before the time of 
oneself. Through the activities discussed here, the Mother-Multiple is enacted 
quietly, non-consciously, as a ‘natural’ feature of everyday domestic life.    
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The domain of scheduling and coordination, with its related practices, is a site that 
generally privileges, encourages, and necessitates anticipation. In this section I 
focused on the ways in which this domain is played out inside domestic settings 
through the use of specific digital technologies and with the interest of knowing 
one’s domestic others well as a guiding principle.     
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I developed the concept of Mother-Multiple ontology and I discussed 
the time-mode of anticipation as an approach to time that can be regarded as 
specific to situations of stepping into the Mother-Multiple position. I situated 
anticipation in relation to a series of techniques of imagination, such as visual 
rehearsal and non-guided imagery and I described the forms of agency engendered 
by anticipation. In the ethnographic sections I focused, specifically, on the 
anticipation employed when one steps into the Mother-Multiple in relation to 
activities such as doing the laundry and making use of calendars and text 
messages to attend to the time of the domestic others. 
The examples discussed in this chapter show that a specific form of ‘ethical 
imagination’ (Moore 2011) is expressed when people step into the Mother-Multiple. 
The way in which this form of ethical imagination operates can be defined as 
monistic, as it does not make an analytical distinction between one and one’s 
domestic others, but it expresses the perspective of a nodal point where all the 
relationships between the domestic others and between oneself and one’s domestic 
others intersect. The ethical imagination of the Mother-Multiple expresses a 
common good, a goal similar to what Christensen and Røpke (2010) call the 
practice of ‘holding things together’: the goal of keeping the boat floating in a 
direction and at a speed that no domestic other would strongly disagree with. In his 
work on grocery shopping in North London, Miller (1998) finds that people often 
carry out the act of shopping on behalf of the household, following the normative 
ethos of thrift, and understanding the general notion of household, or ‘the house’ as 
a means of transcendence.  
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However, while the Mother-Multiple provides a means of ‘transcending’ individuality, 
the focus of the ethical imagination developed in this ontological position is not 
necessarily limited by the domestic domain. In the last clip from the video appendix, 
Elaine would like to extend a monistic ethical imagination to the big large world: she 
says that she would like to get rid of greed, which makes people only think about 
themselves. The form of ethical imagination that she employs from the Mother-
Multiple position when she shifts her plans for the day from an individualistic 
preoccupation – going to do clothes shopping for herself – to a task that responds 
to an actual unexpected domestic situation and to a set of newly-arisen needs of 
her domestic others – sorting out the Christmas lights so that she and her family 
could continue with preparing the Christmas tree and the Christmas window – 
differs from the ethical imagination of other people, such as bankers and 
businessmen who are only interested in profit, and Elaine knows that. The way she 
approaches this difference is not by assuming a private vs. public dualism, but by 
wishing that the ethical imagination of the Mother-Multiple would be, one day, 
employed by all people in relation to all the others, and not just the domestic others. 
Her hope is not utopic. By stepping into the Mother-Multiple and by engaging in 
ethical practices (Foucault 1990) both individually and from the Mother-Multiple 
ontological position, Elaine enacts this hope and makes it happen, little by little, 
every day. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Family time’ and domestic sociality: forms of 
togetherness and independence with digital media 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the time mode of ‘family time’ and the forms of agency 
engendered through its enactment. Specifically, I will focus on two types of 
domestic sociality that make up specific forms of family time, such as spontaneous 
‘quality moments’ (Kremer-Sadlik & Paugh 2007) and evening times ‘family time’. 
These forms of domestic sociality are related to the use of digital media at home by 
all family members, collectively and/ or individually; I call them ‘elusive togetherness’ 
and ‘physical togetherness and digital independence’. A focus on digital media 
comes from the way in which the overall LEEDR project was initially formulated, as 
looking at opportunities to reduce domestic energy demand through digital 
innovative interventions.16 While the attention to digital media was immediately 
understood by research participants as an important focus in understanding 
domestic everyday life and energy consumption, for my ethnographic research it 
also provided a lateral entry point into family life, family practices (Morgan 1996) 
and domestic time, as other researchers looking at ICT usage practices in families 
have argued before (Moores 1993, Morley 1986, Silverstone & Hirsch 1992).  
The focus on digital media, or ICT, is also expressed and reinforced by the 
particular research methods that made ‘family time’ possible to approach. These 
are the Tactile Time collage and the Evening Times self-video recording activity, 
which both place the domestic usages of digital media in the centre, and which are 
discussed in more detail in the methodological chapter. In this chapter, the 
knowledge produced through the use of these methods is expressed in visually 
specific ways. Scan copies of some collages, which I anonymised by using an 
image editing software, appear in the ethnographic sections of this chapter in order 
to illustrate aspects of family evening time that were only expressed in the collages, 
such as the individual experiences of time represented through textile choices. The 
videos recorded as part of the Evening Times activity do not appear in this chapter 
                                            
16 http://www.leedr-project.co.uk/ 
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in visual ethnographic form, although a small selection of clips are used in the 
Mum’s Cup video project. However, the way in which I employ here the knowledge 
gained from these videos is by way of transforming the content of some clips into 
short narrations. These narrations, whose aims are to illustrate the perspectives 
that my participants provided over their family time while family time was happening, 
appear in the fourth section and they are differentiated from the rest of the text 
through the use of blue font. 
The concept of ‘family time’, ‘quality time’ or ‘time together’ emerged during an early 
stage of my fieldwork when it was described as one of the most important aspects 
of domestic life. During the first set of semi-structured interviews that I carried out, 
my participants emphasized the idea that home feels ‘most homely when everybody 
is at home’, as Cynthia puts it. This early discovery enabled me to develop the set 
of methodological tools described above in order to explore the meanings, 
experiences and activities that are part of what is called ‘family time’. Unlike 
spontaneity and anticipation – which can be employed in one-to-one interactions, or 
in solitude – ‘family time’ requires all family members to be at home and to be 
aware of each other presences. In linear temporal terms, ‘family time’ is generally 
defined as taking place in the evenings and during weekends. In experiential terms, 
as I will show, for my research participants it is a time of relaxation, celebration, and 
of digital, material and alimentary abundance. In relation to domestic rhythms, it can 
be seen as a set routine that tends to take place every evening, even if its content 
might vary. By using the time modes of spontaneity and anticipation that were 
conceptualized in the previous chapters, ‘family time’ can be regarded as an 
anticipated time of spontaneous indulgence. ‘Family time’ can be anticipated, as 
Christmas is, because it is a routine expected to happen every evening: its 
anticipation accompanies one throughout the working day, promising a reward at 
the end of it. At the same time, what people do during ‘family time’ varies daily, and, 
in this sense, it is spontaneous: people cannot predict what will capture their 
interest the next evening, what would be the topic of the next friendly argument, and 
who would win it. The unpredictable character of the evening, as opposed to a 
general predictability of the working day, is important in defining evening ‘family 
time’ as a special experience. My participants often emphasized the variety of 
technologies and other media that they could choose from, or combine in new and 
creative ways, every evening; the results of unexpected findings and of new 
133 
 
assemblages would often bring new experiences: learning how to play a new game, 
finding a new way of planning trips by using a recently developed app, hearing 
news from a friend who lives across the ocean, having an interesting chat with the 
other family members, trying a new type of snack, discovering a new way of 
streaming music, or of watching iPlayer through the Wii. 
At the same time, ‘family time’ can be regarded as a normative social construction, 
and this is the reason why I use this concept between inverted commas throughout 
this chapter. In Gillis’ (1996) terms, ‘family time’ is ‘an ideologically constituted form 
of prescription’(1996: 17) that has the power to convince family members that 
togetherness is desirable and pleasant even if their everyday experiences of it 
might contradict this belief. The idea of ‘family time’ cannot be disentangled from 
the ways in which the concept of family, or, more specifically, middle-class family 
(Strathern 1992), as an ideological unit, has been constituted and expressed in 
Euro-American contexts (Collier et al. 1982), as a concept ‘that imposes mythical 
homogeneity on the diverse means by which people organise their intimate 
relationships’ (Stacey 1990: 269) and that is extensively politicized. For the case of 
the UK, Strathern (1992) looks at how the concept of middle-class family was 
redefined in the Thatcher government, while Silva and Smart (1999) analyse the 
appeal to family as a ‘pillar of supposed stability’ (Silva and Smart 1999: 2-3) in the 
political rhetoric of the former prime minister Tony Blair, showing that the concept of 
family can be approached as a tool of governance from both sides of the political 
spectrum in the UK, through the assumption that most families operate in similar 
ways (Finch 1997). 
In relation to existent literature on English kinship, I suggest that ‘family time’ is a 
concept used to ‘measure’ the quality of home life in ‘family-style lifestyle’ (Strathern 
1992) settings. Moreover, from a slightly different perspective, making family time, 
as an active process that involves ordinary actions and routines, can be regarded 
as an everyday practice of creating relatedness (Carsten 2000a). While my 
approach pays attention to people’s agency in making and maintaining this time of 
togetherness, I acknowledge the coexistence of the cultural imaginary of the ideal 
family operating though social prescriptions that link having a family with having 
‘family time’. I approach the tensions between a social constructivist perspective on 
the notions of family and ‘family time’ and a focus on people’s agency in developing 
a process of relationality (Gabb 2010), of constituting trust reflexively through 
134 
 
everyday acts of care and intimacy (Williams 2004), as a way of ‘doing’ family 
(Morgan 1996), through the lens provided by Strathern (1992) in her discussion of 
the relationships between convention and choice in English middle-class kinship. 
Thus, I argue that by keeping ‘family time’ and by emphasizing its importance over 
other dimensions and qualities of the home, people ‘do’ convention and show their 
capacity for morality. However, what people do during ‘family time’ is a matter of 
choice that reflects individuality and diversity – which are regarded as twin concepts 
and the first two facts of English kinship (Strathern 1992) –: the individuality of the 
family and of each of its members. Having and talking about having ‘family time’ 
shows my participants’ ‘normality’ – their following of a social norm –; talking about 
the creativity and eccentricity of the assemblages that they develop during this time 
shows their difference and their capacity to transgress this social norm while 
keeping it. These transgressions are ordinary events, such as having a desert 
dinner instead of a ‘proper’ hot meal17 or keeping the curtains closed for a whole 
day, but their existence – or even their necessity – shows both the rigidity of social 
norms regarding family life and people’s awareness of this rigidity, as well as their 
agency in challenging it. 
In the next section, I will develop this argument by discussing in more detail 
Strathern’s (1992) work on English middle-class kinship, which constitutes the main 
theoretical pillar of this chapter. In the third section, I will shortly present a 
theoretical and empirical dialogue for framing the concept of ‘family time’. In the 
fourth part, I will discuss empirical material that illustrates a specific form of 
domestic sociality, which I call elusive togetherness, and which is articulated in 
spontaneous ‘quality moments’ (Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh 2007) when family 
members who occupy different rooms, and, very often, different floors of the home, 
come together through ad hoc creative employments of digital media. In the fifth 
section, I will describe what ‘family time’ is during evenings and weekends, and I 
will discuss the ways in which a form of domestic sociality that can be defined as 
‘physical togetherness and digital independence’ is articulated and experienced 
during these times. I will conclude this chapter in the sixth section. 
 
                                            
17 For more information about the ‘conventional’ structure of British meals see (Douglas & Nicod 
1974). 
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2. English kinship 
 
Contemporary studies of kinship in Britain have focused on topics as various as 
new reproductive technologies (Edwards 2004, 2008; Edwards & Strathern 2000, 
Edwards et al. 1993), place-making, identity and belonging in relation to kinship 
thinking (Edwards 2000, Strathern 1981), adoption reunions (Carsten 2000b, 2004) 
and divorce and separation (Simpson 1997, 1998). The recent theoretical advances 
in this field, such as Carsten’s (2000a) development of the concept of ‘relatedness’ 
as an alternative to kinship that conveys ‘a move away from a pre-given analytic 
opposition between the biological and the social’ (2000a: 4) that framed the first 
wave of anthropological studies of kinship, are based on the initial denouncement of 
this opposition (Schneider 1968, 1984; Strathern 1992), which influenced all the 
subsequent approaches to kinship. Below, I will summarize this denunciation as 
part of Strathern’s (1992) seminal analysis of the English middle-class kinship as a 
system of thought, which represents the theoretical backbone for this chapter. 
In her work on kinship thinking of English middle-classes, Marilyn Strathern (1992) 
uses Victorian middle-class kin constructs and British anthropological kinship theory 
– that was one of the main theoretical directions that British social anthropologists 
were concerned with in the first half of the 20th century – as ‘mutual perspectives on 
each other’s modernisms’ (Strathern 1992: 8). Her endeavour is inspired by the 
work of the American anthropologist David Schneider (1968; 1984). In his analysis 
of American kinship (1968), Schneider argues that this kin system is essentially 
defined by the two orders of nature and law – or sexual reproduction and, 
respectively, marriage – where the role of the ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ is substantial. 
In a further publication, Schneider (1984) demonstrates that the ‘biological’ 
predicament – sexual reproduction – was a Western ethnocentric assumption that 
has been brought into the anthropological analysis of non-Western kinship systems. 
Strathern takes this idea further, arguing that ‘the unthinking manner in which 
generations of anthropologists have taken kinship to be the social or cultural 
construction of natural facts’ (Strathern 1992: 45) was the pivotal stone in the 
construction of ‘kinship’ as a domain of anthropological inquiry. At the same time, 
Strathern remarks that if kinship used to be a domain that connected the realms of 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in the Western world, in the late-twentieth-century Britain, with 
the appearance of new reproductive technologies, and in a post- Thatcherite 
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neoliberal socio-political climate, this situation has been changing. Thus, ‘nature’ 
can no longer be seen as an underlying predicament for kinship.  
Strathern argues that in post-Thatcherite Britain, ‘family’ means a specific type of 
lifestyle that one can opt for: ‘The family as a natural consociation vanishes in the 
promotion of family-living as an experience’ (Strathern 1992: 147). Furthermore, if 
the emphasis is placed upon the experience that a family-style lifestyle could 
provide, then ‘[t]he family as a set of kin relationships disappears in the idea that 
the quality of home life has an independent measure’ (ibid p. 149). I argue that one 
way of expressing the experience of family-style living, and of ‘measuring’ the 
quality of home life, was enacted by my participants through the use of the concept 
of, and by actively making, ‘family time’. I will come back to, and develop, this point 
in the next section. 
In this context, where family is seen as a type of life-style that anybody could 
embrace, if only one would choose to, Strathern argues that a consistent emphasis 
is placed upon choice. ‘Choice’, here, comes to mean ‘individuality’, while all the 
other possible ways of defining an individual are minimalized. Strathern calls this 
type of individualism ‘prescriptive individualism’: 
In the late twentieth century it is possible to think that morality is a question of 
choice. Prescriptive individualism: choice requires no external regulation. As a 
consequence, the individual is judged by no measure outside itself. It is not to be 
related to either nature or society (vice national culture). It is not analogous to 
anything (ibid p. 152, original italics). 
Furthermore, Strathern identifies a complex relationship between choice and 
convention, which is a point that I build upon in this chapter. Strathern argues that 
in ‘the modern epoch’ (1992: 154) ‘convention’ was a concept that regulated social 
life, considered to be ‘the cultural counterpart of natural law’, and ‘embodying the 
order necessary for sustaining a complex (and civilised) life’ (ibid p. 157). Thus, 
convention defined general social norms of good conduct. However, in a post-
Thatcherite Britain – where individual persons and families take the place of society 
– convention is no longer understood as external, but it takes an expressive 
function and it is ‘internalised as personal style’ (ibid p. 158). When convention is 
not external to the individual, but internal, as choice used to be, one could opt to 
display convention as right acting. ‘But the consequence is that’, Strathern argues, 
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‘the individual person comes to contain within him or herself the knowledge for right 
acting, and thus becomes his or her own source of morality’ (idem). Thus, in the 
Thatcherite approach, the fact that ‘the people will know what is right is taken for 
granted’ (ibid. p. 159), while an analogy between the individual and the family is 
created. 
Following this analogy, if the individual person is his or her own reference point, the 
middle-class family, too, is assumed to contain within itself the knowledge for right 
acting and it can be seen as its own reference point. Families appear, thus, as 
distinct universes regulated by internal self-imposed norms and judged by an 
internal measure.18 This embedded set of criteria that white middle-class nuclear 
heterosexual families follow in order to legitimise and to ‘measure’ themselves, 
takes into consideration the quality of home life, and it can often provide a personal 
internal scale: how our life as a family was before, and how it is after we had the 
third child; how it was before we built the extension, and how it is now; how we 
experience our evenings together in the living room, now that we have smartphones 
and tablets. My research participants compared their experience of home life to 
itself – to how it used to be before a specific domestic event, or a new purchase 
occurred – and not to other people’s experiences of home life or to a general 
accepted idea of how home life ‘should be’.19  
If people ‘do’ convention by choosing a family-style lifestyle, and this deliberate act 
is enough to show their capacity for morality, then the way they would carry out 
their home life could be as ‘unconventional’ as they wish, where ‘unconventional’ 
means, for example, having a dessert tea instead of a ‘proper’ hot meal, or 
spending a whole day with the curtains closed. In my ethnography, the ways in 
which different types of everyday ‘eccentricities’ were performed and displayed 
marked the individuality and diversity of families. One interesting example of such 
everyday ‘eccentricity’ was described by Vic and Gail, when I asked them whether 
they would ever use a moment in a TV programme to coordinate activities inside 
the home. 
                                            
18 My affirmation is not intended to dismiss the existent sets of criteria that ‘external’ individual 
agents and institutions sometimes follow in ‘evaluating’ families – as well as local government 
interventions into the lives of families that they have identified as prone to ‘trouble’-making – but just 
to express the strength of the idea that ‘every family is unique’, which I encountered very often 
during my fieldwork. 
19 Occasionally, they compared their actual experience of family life to the experience they 
remembered from their childhood, and very often this was in order to prove the superiority of the 
former above the latter. 
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Vic: There is one I can think of.  
Gail: Oh, for goodness sake!  
Vic: We have a family joke. There is one particular programme, called New Tricks. 
It’s not a particularly good programme, but it’s got this singing tune. Everybody 
has to sit down when the theme tune’s on, and go like this [he shakes his arms up 
and down, singing along ‘It’s all right’]. So, you’ve got all of them singing here 
around. So, that’s the only one I can think of. It’s a family joke, really, more than 
anything. 
Gail: Everybody comes in here [in the living room] and does it. Even my mother 
did it. 
Vic: Even to the extent of stopping what they’re doing. They come here, and do it, 
and, then, go out when the programme’s on. Gail’s come in from the kitchen, sat 
down, done it, and gone back in the kitchen again. You have to do it here, in the 
room: either on the sofa, or in one of these two chairs. It used to be Friday nights; 
now it’s Mondays, I think. (interview Vic and Gail) 
This example of a family joke is a type of ‘family practice’ (Morgan 1996) through 
which people create their own family as ‘special’, as ‘different’, as a distinct 
universe. As I will show, the kind of families that my participants are doing are 
expressing individuality and diversity, while also being their own reference point, in 
Strathern’s (1992) words. 
 
3. Family time: making the everyday eventful 
 
In the previous sections I argued that one way in which my participants expressed 
the experience of family-style living, and ‘measured’ the quality of home life, was 
through the concept of ‘family time’. This idea first emerged as a response to one of 
my interview questions about the possibility of having various degrees of feeling 
homely in one’s home. The general response was that ‘it’s most homely when 
everybody is at home’, as Cynthia put it. This is how Sam expressed this idea, by 
linking it with her husband’s work shifts: 
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I suppose it’s a little bit more homely in the evening when everybody is back from 
school and work. Weekends are always quite homely because we’re all around – 
we’re in and out. Saturdays afternoons and Sundays are kind of family time as 
much as we can with Peter’s job, obviously. (interview Sam) 
My participants, sometimes, emphasized the importance of ‘family time’ over the 
spatial and sensorial qualities of their homes. For example, they said that they did 
not mind how their living room looked like or felt like, as long as they could spend 
time together there as a family; or they mentioned that they preferred to use their 
free time by spending it together with the other family members, rather than by 
cleaning the house.20    
From a social constructivist perspective, Gillis (1996) argues that ‘family time’, as a 
prescription, has nothing to do with the ways in which togetherness is experienced 
in everyday life. As he puts it, ‘family times tend to be anxiously anticipated and 
fondly remembered, but, as events, they are often experienced as stressful and 
frustrating, because it is when families are together physically they are furthest 
apart in terms of their generation and gender assignments’ (Gillis 1996: 16). He 
argues that the strength of the concept of ‘family time’ comes from its modern 
definition of ritualized time that can coexist with other forms of time, like the linear 
time of the capitalist market. Rituals are argued to have the capacity to suggest 
stability, and, in Giddens’ (1981) terms, they have an important emotional 
dimension as a source of ‘ontological security’; they also provide a sense of history 
and tradition. In the case of family life, as Gillis argues, ‘ritual provides not only 
those moments when families are actually with one another, but, more important, 
when they imagine themselves as families’ (Gillis 1996: 15). In other words, 
maintaining and enacting ‘family time’ as a ritual, means maintaining (the 
imagination of) the family.  
For Gillis (1996) ‘family time’ is, therefore, a cyclical ritual that coexists with the 
linear time of the capitalist market that promotes a logic of progress. However, in 
my research I regard ‘family time’ as one of the time modes of domesticity that 
constitutes itself as a counterdiscourse to linear time, by making the present future. 
Evening ‘family time’ is experienced as continuous, as I will show in the fifth section; 
it is not punctual, but a sequence that people actively extend, using various 
                                            
20 It is interesting to note that these two options were considered to be mutually exclusive. 
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strategies, such as closing the curtains early, having repetitive snacks and drinks, 
or making themselves stay up late. ‘Family time’ incorporates the short-term future 
– once started, nothing will stop it before bedtime – and it usually ignores the long-
term future: it is a form of seizing the day and not worrying about tomorrow. If it was 
to be regarded as a grammatical tense, ‘family time’ could be seen as the present 
perfect continuous: it is a present that goes on and that nobody really knows when 
it will transform into the future. However, the night provides a natural stop point to 
‘family time’. In order to add one more layer to the description of ‘family time’ one 
could correlate it with what the philosopher William James called the ‘specious 
present’ (1890). For James (1890) the concept of specious present suggests that 
the moment of now that we experience as present ‘is not punctuate, but rather 
includes a small but extended interval of time’ (Andersen and Grush 2009: 278). 
James (1890) argues that the specious present is most visible in the ways in which 
people perceive movement: as movement happens during an interval and not just 
in the moment of now, the fact that human beings can perceive movement means 
that we occupy the present as an interval rather than as a moment. One of the 
ways in which the present as an interval is particularly acknowledged and 
celebrated during ‘family time’, is through a specific form of domestic sociality, that I 
call ‘physical togetherness and digital independence’, and that I describe in the fifth 
section.  
The form of ‘ordinary agency’ that ‘family time’ engages is related, as I suggested in 
the introduction, to challenging the uniformity of a dominant social ideology of 
(middle-class) family, through the enactment of everyday eccentricities, family jokes, 
and ‘unconventional’ practices, habits, and actions. ‘Family time’ can, thus, be seen 
as an established time when families emerge as distinct universes that express 
diversity and individuality, and when they constitute themselves as different from 
other families, and from the uniform ideology of (middle-class) family. The form of 
agency engendered by the time mode of ‘family time’ is, therefore, related to 
creativity, and to the work of creating difference, which constitutes a tacit and 
ordinary form of resistance to social prescriptions. 
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4. Elusive presences and digital media 
 
In a publication drawing from a research project carried out in England about 
children’s understandings of time, Christensen (2002) outlines that, for children, the 
qualities of time are different and much more varied from what is usually called 
‘quality time’. Thus, instead of ‘quality time’ as a nominated block of time when all 
the family members do activities together, children have other views and 
preferences for their time at home, such as the situation of being in separate rooms 
and doing different individual activities, while knowing that the parent is available 
somewhere in the house, and could be called in case they are needed. This brings 
out the idea that ‘family time’ is not necessarily time together, but time when 
everybody is at, and around, home. In Sam’s words, quoted in the last section, 
‘weekends are always quite homely because we’re all around – we’re in and out’.  
This state of flexible togetherness is achieved when people are aware of what the 
other family members are doing, generally from sounds – of footsteps, music, or 
other forms of activities – or from the smells of cooking, without taking part in their 
activities as such. However, the sense of shared time, and the feeling of 
homeliness emerge from such situations as much as from more accentuated forms 
of ‘family time’. While making a Tactile Time collage about her son’s usage of the 
Wii (Figure 4), which is located in the spare bedroom, Sam chose a loose 
transparent fabric to express how that time feels for her, and she explained her 
choice by saying:  
Because he’s here, but he’s not here: you can hear him running, jumping about 
upstairs, but you can’t see him, or anything like that. (interview Sam) 
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Figure 4. Detail from Sam’s Tactile Time collage, showing her son’s usage of the Wii. 
 
Sam is, thus, aware of her son’s presence in the house, and she can tell what he is 
doing from the sounds he is making: she can imagine him performing the actions 
required by the Wii, like jumping and running. Even if he is not in the room, and she 
cannot see him – he is not physically co-present – Sam still considers her son to be 
‘here’. His presence is elusive; he is part of the world, part of the universe of the 
house, as the upstairs bedrooms are, and Sam does not need to see him, or the 
rooms, in order to accept that her experience of home is framed by these elusive 
presences. 
Another way of conceptualizing forms of contingent relatedness and everyday 
intimacy in families, is through the notion of ‘quality moments’, developed by 
Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh (2007). In their research on everyday life with American 
families, Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh (2007) propose the concept of ‘quality moments’ 
to complement the notion of ‘quality time’. Quality moments are ‘spontaneous, 
unstructured, everyday moments of shared social interaction between family 
members’ (Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh 2007: 288) that can appear ad-hoc during 
household chores or while waiting. The researchers were surprised by the 
frequency of these interactions during activities oriented towards other goals, and 
they emphasize that ‘quality moments’ are closer to the experience of everyday life, 
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while ‘quality time’ stands like a normative ideal model that is rarely fully achieved in 
practice.  
I will now discuss a series of situations where digital media are used inside the 
home in order to assert and make manifest the elusive presence of other family 
members. These interactions can be seen as spontaneous ‘quality moments’ 
(Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh 2007) when people create and reinforce relatedness – 
or, in Morgan’s (1996) conceptualization, they are doing family – through ad hoc 
creative employments of digital media. Besides the connection between family 
members, in the following examples digital devices also connect two essentially 
different parts of the home: the upstairs and the downstairs.  
The vast majority of English houses comprise of a ground floor and a first floor.21 
The ground floor is a communal, and, generally, daytime space, comprising the 
kitchen, the living room, and a front room that used to be called a parlour – 
functioning as an occasional dining room for guests – and that, nowadays, can be 
used as an office space, or as an extension of the living room22. The first floor, 
which consists of individual bedrooms, is, generally, a night-time realm, or the 
nominated area for voluntary, or imposed, solitude. The ground floor is the space 
for receiving visitors, while the first floor is considered more private, and is, 
generally, reserved for the members of the nuclear family. Children’s bedrooms, 
however, can be open to visitors – their friends – who might sometimes have a 
sleepover at the weekend. The main double bedroom, occupied by the cohabiting 
adult couple, is, usually, the most private room in the house.23 During my fieldwork 
visits, I was always invited into the kitchen, conservatory, or living room – social 
spaces equipped with tables that could hold cups of tea. The only times when I had 
access to the first floor, was during filming a video tour of the house or re-
enactments of practices, such as laundry and bathroom practices. The mono-
functionality of the bedroom as a room for sleep was very often emphasized when 
my participants described their children’s bedrooms, by saying that the kids ‘do not 
spend any time there at all’ (in the daytime) because they are normally downstairs. 
                                            
21 The exceptions are what are called bungalows – houses which only have a ground floor – and 
houses with a loft conversion, or with three or more storeys. However, from my sample of 18 families, 
only one had a loft conversion, while all the others followed the classical model of two-storey houses. 
22 See Attfield (1999) for a discussion about the ways in which the parlour has been incorporated 
into an open-plan living room. 
23 Gullestad (1984) makes a similar observation about the matrimonial bedrooms in Norwegian block 
of flats suburbs in her work with working-class young women in a Norwegian town. 
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Children tended to play and to do their homework downstairs, and they would 
usually rediscover the bedroom as a personal space in their teens. The ground floor 
of English houses is, therefore, typically, a communal space for cooking and eating, 
leisure, receiving guests, and for work, while the upstairs represent a space for rest, 
and for individual and couple pursuits. While at home – and, most often, during the 
weekends – people navigate between these two spaces, as they navigate between 
collective and individual activities. However, digital media are sometimes used to 
connect people on different floors, and to connect the realms of individuality and 
commonality. Sam talks about the ways in which her daughter, Julie, aged eleven, 
uses Skype at home. 
Sam: She just skypes me from upstairs, sometimes [laughing]. She’s got Skype 
on her iPod. So, I had the odd call on. And she skypes her friends on her iPod. 
She skypes quite a lot, actually. 
Roxana: So you were at the computer downstairs? 
Sam: Yes, I was. She doesn’t do it very often, but at odd times she might find it 
funny to sit upstairs and skype, rather than get up and come down, whatever. 
(interview Sam) 
Julie’s spontaneous use of Skype to get in touch with her mother downstairs, while 
she is in her bedroom, is a way of asserting her presence, while still keeping it 
elusive. It is not Julie’s body coming downstairs to talk with her mum, but just a 
visual and aural digital representation of Julie that breaks the time and space of 
individuality, in order to connect with Sam. Skyping keeps Julie both separate, and 
connected. In this example, Julie’s employment of Skype is seen as whimsical, part 
of a realm of improvisation, creativity, and play. However, this is not the only 
situation when digital devices are used between family members inside the house, 
in Sam’s family. She recalls that the only conflict they have over TV programmes is 
on Saturday evenings when she and the children want to watch The Magicians, 
while her husband wants to watch the football game that he recorded during dinner. 
Because the recording is stored on the V+ box that they have with the TV in the 
living room, Sam and the children would go upstairs to her and Peter’s bedroom 
(‘we are banished to the bedroom’), where they have a second TV. They would 
watch the programme snuggling in bed, while Peter is downstairs by himself; in this 
situation, the communal ground floor space is experienced by oneself, in isolation, 
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while the rest of the family is regrouped in a bedroom upstairs. However, Peter 
would not watch the whole game, but he would skip through it, watch it at double 
speed, and, in half an hour, he would finish and call the rest of the family back 
downstairs, by using the internal phone system. This type of exceptional situation, 
which happens only on Saturdays, is recalled by Sam twice: during the video tour of 
her house, and during one of my interviews, several months apart; this shows that 
the use of the internal phone system to reunite the family downstairs, even if playful, 
is not ‘out of the ordinary’, but part of the Saturday evening routine, and it can be 
seen as a family practice, in Morgan’s (1996) conceptualization.  
Other situations when family members use digital media between themselves, 
inside the home, are for various requests that might sound different – maybe less 
demanding – when asked through a digital platform, than when they are asked 
directly, or in a face-to-face form of interaction. This might happen at dinner time, 
when all family members are asked to stop their individual activities in order to take 
part in what is, usually, considered to be an important family ritual.24 Some of my 
participants recall that media, such as the TV, used to be a motive of discord at 
dinner time, when children wanted to finish watching their programmes, while 
parents wanted them to sit around the dinner table. Nowadays, when they have the 
possibility to digitally record and store programmes on their TV box, people can 
prevent these arguments. Cynthia explains that her family would use the record 
function spontaneously, in relation to contingencies or routines that might produce 
the situation of having overlapping activities: 
The recording is really good with the children, ‘cause you’re watching a 
programme, and it’s time for the meal, it’s time to do something – just record it, 
and do what you were supposed to do. Because, before we had that, there would 
be lots of arguments: ‘I just want to watch the end, the last ten minutes’. (interview 
Cynthia) 
Here, the capacity of recording is similar to an ability to multiply time: instead of 
choosing to spend the ten minutes doing just one activity – join the dinner table, or 
watch the end of the programme – people can do both, by pursuing the planned 
activity first, and getting back to watch the last ten minutes of the programme 
afterwards. Cynthia also discovered other ways of using digital media for easing the 
                                            
24 See (DeVault 1991, Valentine 1999) 
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transition between children’s individual activities, and dinner time. She mentions 
that she sometimes sends Facebook messages to call for dinner her teenage and 
young adult, children, when they are upstairs, in their bedrooms. 
Cynthia: If I know Kelley is online, and I’ve got my laptop on, and the dinner’s 
ready, than [I write] ‘dinner’s ready!’ Yeah, we use Facebook. 
Roxana: When Kelley’s in her bedroom and you are downstairs? 
Cynthia: Or Lee. But Lee’s not often on Facebook, though. Nine times out of ten, I 
just shout ‘Food!’ up the stairs. (interview Cynthia) 
By using Facebook, Cynthia displays her knowledge of her children and of the 
possible activities that they might be engaged in, at that time of the day. As in 
Julie’s case, the connection between upstairs/ individuality and downstairs/ 
commonality is realized virtually – or aurally, through the medium of Cynthia’s voice. 
However, the employment of digital media is seen, here, as special, as it is 
happening just in 10% of the cases; this ‘out of ordinary’ characteristic, together 
with the quality of digital communication of potentially being less intrusive, might 
produce a better response.  
In other situations, the choice of using digital media, instead of having face-to-face 
interactions inside the home, is explained as being more convenient, in terms of 
effort, for the sender of the message. Iris and Steve recall a situation when Iris sent 
a text message to their teenage son, who was in his bedroom, to remind him to 
have a shower. 
Steve: Iris was texting Alan the other night, to tell him to get in the shower. 
Iris [laughing]: I texted him from the sitting room, because I couldn’t be bothered to 
get up! I forgot about it. It’s ten o’clock at night, I can’t be bothered to get up! 
(interview Iris and Steve) 
Here, the possibility of sending the text gives Iris the chance to keep being 
responsible of her children’s evening baths, while responding to her own needs as 
well, like the need to sit down and relax in the evenings. Iris suggests that ‘mother 
time’ should finish before ten o’clock in the evening, when the children would have 
already gone to bed, and her choice of sending a text rather than getting up and 
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climbing the stairs to her son’s bedroom shows her drawing of a boundary between 
being ‘totally available’, and ‘partially available’ for her children. 
These examples show that a specific form of domestic sociality emerges when 
family members share the overall environment of the house, while not being in the 
same room. This form of sociality, which I called elusive togetherness, is uni-
sensorial: it is enough for the existence of the others to be signalled through only 
one impression – be it aural, olfactive, or visual – in order to be recognized as 
sociality by both the producer of the signal, and by the recipient. A uni-sensorial 
signal is enough to trigger one’s imagination of what the other is doing, and of 
where, in the house, they are located, as we have seen in the example of Sam, who 
imagines her son playing the Wii when hearing his footsteps and his jumps coming 
from the upstairs. The imagination of the other, who is located in a different room of 
the house, changes the way in which one experiences one’s home. 
The way in which I understand the concept of sociality follows the approach 
proposed by Long and Moore (2013), who regard sociality as ‘a dynamic relational 
matrix within which subjects are constantly interacting in ways that are co-
productive, and continually plastic and malleable’ (2013: 4). Long and Moore (2013) 
argue that human sociality should not be reduced to affectivity, or relationality, and 
that it should be situated by attending to what is specific about human beings in 
employing ‘an explicit theory of human subjects’ (idem p. 3). Some of the human 
specificities that they identify are the imaginative, motivational, ethical, and 
representative – attaching meaning and significance to things – capacities that 
people can enact. In creating the elusive togetherness form of sociality that I 
discussed in this chapter, my participants made use of representation, when 
sounds signified footsteps; of imagination, like in the example of Julie imagining her 
mother downstairs getting to the computer to pick up the Skype call; and they made 
appeal to various motivations, such as the wish to have a nice dinner time that all 
family members would enjoy, in performing intentional actions, such as using 
Facebook to tell one’s teenage children that the dinner is ready. 
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5. Evening time routines: physical togetherness and digital 
independence 
 
Evening times, the times when all the family members are around, and when the 
home feels most ‘homely’, are described as established segments of leisure and 
relaxation. Often abundant, in terms of the frequency of food and beverage items 
that are consumed, they mark a conspicuous break from the non-memorable 
character of daytime work tasks and household chores. They are little celebrations 
of family, individuality, and, generally, of life. In this section, following the Tactile 
Time collages made by my research participants, I define ‘evening time’ as starting 
after dinner, when the main family TV is switched on and people gather around it; 
and finishing when the TV is switched off and the last family members to watch it 
head upstairs to their bedrooms. 
In the collages that represent my participants’ usages of the living room TV, felt is a 
fabric that was chosen in all the cases to illustrate the feeling of evening times. Part 
of the collage-kit that I provided there were three different types of felt of various 
degrees of softness, the softer – as agreed by participants and by me – being a 
pink one. Pieces of pink felt appear in all the representations of evenings – and, for 
some people, at other moments of the day, as well – of four families that do not 
know each other. This choice is explained as expressing feelings of warmth, 
cosiness, relaxation and ‘being settled down’. In Cynthia’s words: 
I’ve got felt because I’m fed, relaxed, ready for a nice evening. It’s softer than this; 
this is rough, but warm. This is the softest: it’s a relaxed fabric. (transcript from 
video of Tactile Time collage making with Cynthia’s family) 
Evening times imply the imperative of ‘indulgence’. I situate the idea of indulgence 
by using the dichotomy of thrift and treat developed by Miller (1998). In his 
ethnography of ordinary shopping in North London, Miller identifies that the most 
important element in buying provisions for the household – which is understood as 
an entity in itself that transcends the individual – is thrift, or the experience of saving 
money. He describes in detail his participants’ strategies for finding savers in the 
shop, or by choosing different shops for specific categories of products, and he 
outlines that, for the activity of shopping, thrift can be seen as an end in itself. In this 
context, the treat is ‘a slightly transgressive purchase’, an ‘extra extravagance that 
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lies outside the constraints of necessity’ (Miller 1998: 40-1), and that is directed to a 
particular individual, usually the shopper. The treat, that sometimes can mean just 
eating a grape or two from the fruit stalls in the supermarket, can be seen as a 
reward to the shopper for carrying out the act of shopping. Miller argues that the 
treat is ‘an action which specifically reaffirms the self’ (Miller 1998: 47), by 
individualizing the recipient of the treat. In Miller’s ethnography, thrift and treat 
appear as a pair: treat is seen as a (instant) reward for the success of achieving 
thrift.  
However, ‘indulgence’ at evening time is a prolonged state of treat that does not 
necessarily follow the successful accomplishment of a task, or ‘duty’, but is enacted 
as a way of expressing agency. If daytimes are organized following the thrift and 
treat logic, where people give themselves treats for carrying out tedious or non-
inspiring tasks, evenings follow a totally different order. At evenings, indulgence is 
an imperative, the forms of indulgence express individual identity, and the 
enactment of indulgence shows agency. In my research, indulgence involved food 
and beverages, digital media and other technologies that were used simultaneously, 
and a general mood of total relaxation and ‘carelessness’ in relation to one’s ‘duties’, 
which can be described through the expression ‘I can’t be bothered’ (which is used 
by Iris in the quote from the previous section). 
What I have found out to be a general imperative for evening time indulgence, is 
similar to the Swedish phenomenon of Cosy Friday (Brembeck 2012), an 
established ritual for families with children, consisting in gathering together on the 
sofa, in front of the TV, and defined though an abundance of food – usually fast 
food and snacks – and beverages. Brembeck (2012) outlines the importance of the 
Cosy Friday feeling as providing ‘a special experience of freedom, relaxation, and 
togetherness’ (2012: 137), in opposition to everyday experiences of work and order. 
Unlike the general evening time indulgence that I encountered in my fieldwork, the 
Swedish phenomenon is child-centred (ibid. p.139), as it represents a time when no 
alimentary treats are to be refused to the children, and when the family TV choices 
are, generally, children programmes and films. 
Below, the difference between what can be called the thrift-and-treat logic, and 
evening indulgence, can be visually depicted from two Tactile Time collages made 
by Lara, Dominic, and their twelve year old son, Ewan. The first collage shows the 
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usage of computers during the day, and the second one shows TV usage. Lara and 
Dominic, whom I introduced in a previous chapter, live with their son, Ewan, and 
with their two dogs and one cat. During university school holidays, Justine, Lara’s 
daughter from her previous relationship, comes to live with them; and they are also 
visited, sometimes, by Mick, Dominic’s son, who is 22, and who moved out of home. 
At the time of the collage-making research encounter, Dominic was working from 
home for small projects, while looking for a full-time job, and Lara was working full-
time outside the home.  
The first collage (Figure 5) shows the family’s usage of computer – together with 
other technologies and food and drinks – during the day. Lara uses her laptop in the 
morning to check her email before she goes to work; Ewan uses it together with a 
drink, in the afternoon, when he comes back from school; and Dominic, who is at 
home, uses it all day. At 11 am and at 3.30 pm he has a break, with a cup of tea 
and a snack, such as a chocolate bar, and, at 1 pm, he has lunch. In this collage, 
the drinks and the snacks placed around the computer are visually proportionally 
distributed during the day, between 7.30 am and 7.30 pm, with a one hour dinner 
break. They mark, and break, the time that Dominic spends on his own and the 
series of work tasks he performs, which might also involve the landline phone, the 
mobile phone and the printer, as shown. In the second collage (Figure 6), the right 
half of the picture shows only Ewan’s TV usage during two time slots – at 7:30-8:10 
am and 4:30-6:00 pm – while the left half, which represents the family’s evening 
time, shows an abundance of digital devices, food and beverage, and other media, 
such as books. 
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Figure 5 Tactile Time collage made by Lara, Dominic and Ewan, and showing their laptop usage. 
 
 
Figure 6 Tactile Time collage made by Lara, Dominic and Ewan, and showing their TV usage. 
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The living room is dark. The only light that is on is a lamp behind the TV. The 
camera, held by Dominic, looks at Ewan: he sits on the sofa, wearing his pyjamas, 
with a laptop in his lap, and wearing big headphones; he says ‘hello’ in a small 
voice. Lara sits on the other sofa, her feet under her, using her iPhone. Their two 
dogs keep on moving in, and out of, the frame. The TV screen shows a 
programme about relocating to the countryside. Dominic follows the dogs to the 
kitchen. In the sink, one can see a baking tray sitting vertically. Dominic stops by 
the side table, where two full cups, one of purple, and one of brown hot contents, 
wait to be picked and transported. The recording stops. 
Next, it is a Saturday afternoon, and the living room looks bright. On the sofa: dog 
toys, big black headphones, cables, one laptop. Lara sits at the living room table, 
checking her phone. In the kitchen, on the wooden table, Dominic’s laptop shows 
a black screen with white code language, rebooting. Something went wrong with 
his laptop and he is filming while waiting for the computer to start working? The 
ginger cat sits in the door, and the dogs approach him with an inquiring glance.  
 
As a time for celebration, abundance and indulgence, my research participants 
would very often like to be able to extend evening time, to make it feel longer. In 
Sam’s collage (Figure 7), bellow, evening time, which lasts between 7 and 10 pm, is 
represented through a longer piece of fabric, which shows this time as continuous.  
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Figure 7 Tactile Time collage made by Sam, and showing her family’s TV usage 
.  
 
A 29 minutes-long static clip shows Sam, Peter and their children, Julie and Alex, 
sitting on the living room sofa and watching The Voice. The video camera is 
placed on the top of the TV, and the programme can only be guessed from the 
sound. However, the sound is what Peter mainly experiences from the programme, 
as he is reading a magazine – and, later, the printed newsletter of the school, or a 
piece of homework that Alex shows to him – and he very seldom lifts his head to 
watch the screen for more than a second. At the beginning, Alex can only be 
heard: he cries ‘not again!’, or ‘oh, yeah!’ from time to time. Suddenly, he appears 
holding a miniature pool cue stick. Later, Sam leaves the frame, and the others 
start chatting about Alex’s game of soccer; he brings a card box lid that says ’10 
sport games in one’ to his sister on the sofa. We then hear him asking Sam to 
play a game with him, and her playing the game (she is losing, he is winning). 
Sam returns with a plate containing a crumpet with chocolate spread for Julie. 
Then, Alex appears holding a similar plate, and he comes to the camera, saying 
‘hi, we are watching The Voice’, and happily showing us the content of his plate. 
154 
 
He goes to the sofa, and sits down on his mum’s lap. The next fifteen minutes 
pass in this way: Sam sitting between her children, embracing them, and Peter 
sitting beside them, near Julie, switching between his reading material, the TV 
screen, and responding to what the others say. They all keep their feet on a 
footstool, and they look very comfortable. The children eat their crumpets and they 
are all chatting about the choice of songs, and about the contestants’ 
performances. 
Other participants mentioned their strategies of extending evening time. While she 
and her family were making the collage below (Figure 8), Cynthia explained her 
entry for 21:30 pm that is illustrated by a photo of toast, and a dark red taffeta 
choice of fabric:  
I start to feel a bit rough, so I try to make myself better by having some toast. 
Probably I’m ready for bed, to be honest, but I make myself stay up. (transcript 
from video of Tactile Time collage making with Cynthia’s family) 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Tactile Time collage made by Cynthia and her family, and showing their TV usage. 
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‘I thought I’ll do my filming in the last few minutes before I go to bed’. This is how 
Cynthia’s first recording starts. While she is filming, Cynthia is talking with the 
camera, explaining the situation, like a reporter. She is in the living room, together 
with Jeff, and she explains that he is researching ‘family tree stuff’ on his laptop. 
‘The TV is off, but, as soon as I sit down, it will go on, because we can’t both look 
at family trees at the same time’, she continues. She heads towards the window 
and she closes the curtains. Next, she visits the kitchen, where her son, Lee, is 
doing the washing up, while listening to music from his iPod that is plugged in a 
docking station, on top of the fridge. She is amused by the name of the song and 
by the fact that her son is multitasking: he is preparing a snack for himself – 
toasted crumpets – while finishing tidying up the kitchen. Later, she goes back to 
the living room and sits on the sofa by her husband, asking about the new family 
tree discoveries, and watching the weather forecast on TV. The camera moves 
between the TV and the laptop screen, as they chat about tomorrow’s weather 
and about Jeff’s great-grand-uncle.     
However, the extension of evening family time can happen properly only at the 
weekends. During an interview, Marilyn mentions some of the ways in which she 
and her family make ‘family time’ feel longer and more special during the weekends: 
At weekends it’s much more relaxing, so, we might put on music, we might close 
the curtains a bit early, maybe have some candles; we might eat in there. 
(interview Marilyn) 
In his work on ICT use with families in London in the early nineties, Hirsch (1998) 
finds that his research participants were often preoccupied with creating a sort of 
alternative time of unity, or uninterrupted togetherness, at the weekends. One 
family created this alternative time through a set of strategies that involved doing 
the shopping and the housework before the start of the weekend, and a set of 
visible changes in everyday routines, such as, for the male adult, not shaving and 
removing his wristwatch at the weekend.  
In a context of evening indulgence, that feels cosy and that people would like to 
extend, the pursued activities generally follow individual interests, and involve the 
use of individual digital media. The TV is on, providing a common focal point, and 
creating a soundscape and a ‘lightscape’ that is shared, but the people around it 
constantly switch their attention from the TV content, to their personal 
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preoccupations. These preoccupations vary with the digital devices available to 
them. Dominic describes in detail the ‘technological abundance’ of their evenings, 
which was visually depicted in the collage made by him and his family: 
Dominic: Last night, we had Ewan using the laptop with headphones on, sitting on 
one of the sofas; and, then, Justine and myself were playing games on the 
iPhones; Lara was watching the TV, and, then, she switched on to using the 
laptop. I suppose Justine and I were watching the TV at the same time, but we 
were playing on the iPhones as well, so yeah… 
Roxana: Does this normally happen in the evenings then? 
Dominic: Yeah, normally that’s an arrangement. Ewan does normally play - if he 
can’t be on the Xbox ‘cause the TV is on, then he would quite often go to the 
laptop, and look at YouTube, and stuff like that with headphones on. And Lara and 
I would probably watch the TV, or one of us might be using the iPhone to do his 
stuff. And, when Justine is here, she’s on the iPhone nonstop, she’s continually 
using it: texting, skyping, all sorts of things. 
Roxana: She only chats on Skype? 
Dominic: Sometimes she speaks with people as well, and it’s quite annoying. (…) 
So, the habit would tend to be that Justine would probably be using either her 
iPhone, or her laptop, and the TV would be on – ‘cause she’s the one doing it the 
most. She might put a film on TV, and have the laptop in front of her, and she 
would be facebooking or skyping, while the film is running in the back. 
  Roxana: And she’s watching the film? 
Dominic: She says she is, she says she is, yeah. And Ewan, probably, he focuses 
a little bit more on one activity, I think. So, the TV might be on, but if he’s on the 
laptop with the headphones, he’s generally looking at what he’s doing on the 
laptop. But, if he sees something on TV, he might take his headphones off, and 
then tune into the TV.  
Ewan [from the sofa, while playing a video game]: If there’s something interesting. 
Dominic: Something interesting grabs his attention. Or, if something happens on 
his phone, he might pick his phone up. [to Ewan] You would usually phone less, 
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don’t you, then perhaps laptop? [Ewan doesn’t reply] Lara would watch the TV, 
she might have her laptop open, but that’s generally because she’s doing some 
work, as well. But she quite often does stuff on her iPhone while the TV’s running. 
So, she’s watching something, a TV programme, but she’s also communicating 
with her mum, or a friend, or Justine, or something like that, on the iPhone. And I 
would generally watch the TV, or read the newspaper; or if the TV wasn’t very 
interesting, and nobody’s using their iPhone, I might borrow an iPhone and play a 
game on it. That’s generally how it happens, you know. (interview Dominic) 
The diversity of technology permits flexibility and creativity in the activities pursued, 
and in the media of the pursuance: Dominic, who does not have his own iPhone, is 
happy to spend his evening time switching between watching TV and reading the 
newspaper or a book, and, sometimes he would borrow an iPhone – if available – 
to play a game. Lara might work on her laptop while watching TV, or she might use 
her iPhone to communicate with her mother, who lives in Spain, or with her 
daughter, during term times when she is away. The possibilities are rich: people do 
not need to stick to the same activity, and to the same device, every evening.  
This picture looks different from the situation described by Morley (1986) in his 
study of family TV watching in Britain in the mid-eighties. In Morley’s study, the 
living room TV was the main source of media content, and the remote control 
device was, generally, used as an instrument of male dominance, which triggered 
conflicts over the choice of the programme and over the viewing style; Morley (1986) 
outlines that his male participants preferred attentive silent viewing, while the 
female participants liked to chat and to multitask during TV programmes. This was 
not the case for my participants, as I have found out from my research that I 
conducted more than 25 years later than Morley’s (1986). Dominic does not try to 
assert control over the environment of the living room, by choosing what his family 
is going to watch. Chatting and partial attention to the TV screen are described as 
part of the ordinary viewing style. This change is also supported by the multitude, 
and the availability, of media content: one could re-watch a programme anytime 
through the ‘Catch up’ function of TV boxes, or on the internet, so there’s no need 
to pay total attention at the moment of the first watching. The quantity of media 
content might also make it hard to decide to watch a single programme, if one’s 
interests were diverse. Another difference to Morley’s (1986) study is that my 
participants’ emphasis is on spending time together in the same room, rather than 
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on having a family favourite programme that they would all watch attentively. As Vic 
puts it: 
Generally, we do all sit together, and watch whatever’s on, and chat at the same 
time, and play on iPads, and talk, and read. So, we do like to be in the same room. 
(interview Vic and Gail) 
At the same time, even if the use of multiple new digital media might paint a picture 
of ‘technologically-saturated’ homes, people sometimes describe their media use in 
terms of continuities, rather than changes. Vic says that using the iPad is ‘almost 
like browsing an electronic magazine’, and his wife, Gail, agrees that there is 
nothing special in using the iPad while watching TV; it is just like ‘reading the 
newspaper while watching TV’.  
Going back to Dominic’s description of their family evenings, there is a sense of 
flexibility and lack of normative expectations from the other family members. 
Everybody is left to pursue their own interests, even if they might, sometimes, 
produce irritation, such as in the example of loud chatting with friends while the 
other family members are watching the TV: Ewan plays games on his laptop, 
aurally isolated through his headphones; Justine texts and talks with her friends on 
Skype; Lara and Dominic do ‘their stuff’ on the iPhone or laptop. Diversity and 
individuality are encouraged. What was surprising for me was Justine’s choice to 
virtually bring her social circle into the living room, instead of looking for privacy in 
order to chat with her friends. At the same time, the other family members’ 
acceptance of this activity – although Dominic finds her loud talking annoying – 
makes togetherness in the evenings possible. During university holidays, when she 
is at home, Justine does not need to choose whether to actively spend her time with 
her family, or to spend it by chatting with her friends. She can do both activities, 
simultaneously. 
In a publication drawn from their research with children in the North of England 
about experiences of time at school and in family life, Christensen, James and 
Jenks (2000) mention a preoccupation with keeping both family togetherness and 
individual independence at home. They outline that, in order to manage disputes 
between family members over time and space in the home, families carry out a 
process of ‘constant balancing of the concerns for independence, and that of 
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togetherness, a process articulated in and around particular spaces in the home’ 
(Christensen, James, and Jenks 2000: 128).  
From this perspective, evening times in the living room can be seen as daily 
opportunities for exercising this act of balancing togetherness and independence. 
Thus, ‘family time’ in the evenings can be defined as a situation of physical 
togetherness and digital independence.  
During the collage-making task, my participants often asserted individuality through 
their choice of the fabric that was used to express how time felt for them at different 
moments. Very often, for communal evening times they chose different fabrics, 
revealing that even if they were physically together and sharing the same room, and 
the same time slot, their experiences of this shared event were different. For 
example, in the collage represented in Figure 8 (p. 154), Jeff identifies three distinct 
moments during his evening times: (1.) 19:00 is illustrated by pink felt; (2.) 22:00 by 
white and cream patterned cotton; and (3.) 23:00 is illustrated, again, by pink felt, 
together with a cup of tea and snacks. This is how Jeff explains his choices and 
describes these moments: 
(1.) Properly relaxed, switched off, just chilled out. I tend to have a bit of a dip, 
quiet time, and wake up again later. This one is the softest – the pink one is softer. 
(2.) A little bit more awake, but still a soft, nice material. Probably I would do a bit 
of work, something more active – on occasion, probably, I would do a bit of email, 
hobby related. (3.) So, my final one is a sleepy one – might fall asleep on the 
settee, and then wake up and go to bed. (transcript from video of Tactile Time 
collage making with Cynthia and Rob’s family) 
In his description, Jeff’s evening is experienced individually, even if, at the same 
time, it is part of a shared time and space. During the collage making, his daughter, 
Emma, reacts to his last entry (3.), and to his choice of adding snacks and a cup of 
tea to illustrate it, by saying: ‘What’s that: eat because we’ve gone away?’ For 
Emma, Jeff’s choice of snacks and tea expresses a celebration of the fact that he 
would spend some time alone, ‘unsupervised’, in the living room, which can be 
seen as a small ‘betrayal’ to the ethics of togetherness in favour of individuality.  
At her turn, Emma portrays her evening by identifying three different moments: (1.) 
19:00 is illustrated by blue tulle netting fabric; (2.) 20:00 by white soft muslin, 
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together with a snack of toast and honey; (3.) 20.30 by dark red thick felt, which 
other participants described as the least soft of all three types of felt provided. This 
is how Emma describes these three moments, and explains her choice of fabrics: 
(1.) I think I get quite excited around the nice programmes in the evening. (2.) This 
felt really soft. I’m calming down a bit more, but I’m still watching the TV, and I still 
like it. So, I’m still awake. (3.) Quite soft, like the bed duvet; still happy, because 
I’m going to read my book. (transcript from video of Tactile Time collage making 
with Cynthia’s family) 
For Emma, the evening is about pursuing her interests: the evening TV 
programmes that she likes, and her book that she reads in bed. Her choice of 
fabrics is related to the surfaces of the home – the dark red felt is soft like the bed 
duvet – or to other textile tactile experiences. Her mum, Cynthia, suggested during 
the collage-making that Emma’s choice of tulle to express excitement can be 
related to what tutus mean for her: Emma attends a dancing club at the weekends, 
regularly taking part in shows that her group creates and performs for an audience 
of family and friends (one of which I, too, attended, together with Cynthia). Thus, 
through her choices of fabrics, as well as through her evening activities, Emma 
expresses her individuality. 
In the examples of Jeff and Emma, as well as in the previous example of Dominic, 
the family appears as a context for individual pursuits. It can be a context that 
actually encourages individual interests and experiences, or, at least, it does not 
conflict with them. I suggest that even if ‘family time’ and the idea that the home is 
most homely when all family members are around were initially emphasized by all 
my participants, a closer look at what people do during ‘family time’ shows a focus 
on individual pursuits. My ethnography shows that, in everyday life, ‘family’ is not so 
much a normative social construction, but is rather a context that lets, or even 
encourages, its members to find and express their individualities.  
In a publication about changes and continuities in contemporary family, cited by 
Simpson (1998), Elliot (1986) identifies ‘a tragic paradox’, in which ‘security in 
personal relationships implies commitment and loss of freedom’ (Elliot 1986: 133). 
The materials that I discussed in this chapter show that there are ways to dissolve 
this tragic paradox, and that contemporary families are able to keep security and 
commitment, as well as a sense of freedom, at the same time. In this section, I 
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showed some of the ways in which my participants attempt, on an everyday basis, 
to dissolve this paradox, by using a variety of digital media at evening times.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter discussed the time-mode of ‘family time’, the form of agency that this 
time-mode engenders, and its role in the ways in which two forms of domestic 
sociality are articulated: elusive togetherness and physical togetherness and digital 
independence.  
I have grounded my theoretical approach in anthropological discussions of English 
middle-class kinship (Strathern 1992) and I have shown that making ‘family time’ 
can be regarded as an everyday practice of ‘creating relatedness’ (Carsten 2000a). 
In my discussion of approaches to the concepts of ‘family’ and ‘family time’, I 
acknowledged both a social constructivist perspective (Gillis 1996), and a focus on 
people’s agency in ‘doing family’ (Morgan 1996), and I approached the tensions 
between these two types of approaches through the lens provided by Strathern 
(1992) in her discussion of the relationships between convention and choice in 
English middle-class kinship. I argued that by keeping ‘family time’ and by 
emphasizing its importance over other dimensions and qualities of the home, 
people ‘do’ convention and show their capacity for morality. However, what people 
do during ‘family time’ is a matter of choice that reflects individuality and diversity. 
Having, and talking about having, ‘family time’ showed my participants’ ‘normality’ – 
their following of a social norm; talking about the creativity and eccentricity of the 
assemblages that they developed during this time, showed their difference, and 
their capacity to transgress this social norm while keeping it. 
While there are other bodies of literature looking at family life in relation to (digital) 
media practices, or, generally, to everydayness, such as media anthropology 
(Madianou and Miller 2011, 2013), cultural studies (Moran 2007), and media 
studies (Moores 1993, Morley 1986), my theoretical approach, as I mentioned, is 
grounded in the anthropology of Britain field. Moreover, even if I described domestic 
actions that involved the use of digital media, my focus was not upon digital media 
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per se, but on the ways in which people use digital devices in making ‘family time’, 
and on the forms of sociality that emerge in these processes.    
However, this chapter can also be regarded as an ethnographic illustration and 
discussion of what has been recently identified as an important change in ICT 
domestic consumption. The latest Ofcom Communications Market Report (2013) 
shows that ‘media multi-tasking’ – the usage of several communication devices, 
such as smartphones, tablets and laptops, while watching TV – is an important 
rising trend, defining the ICT-usage style of 53% of all UK adults. While the report 
only identifies this trend by drawing upon a survey, my ethnographic description of, 
and theoretical framework for situating the ways in which people multi-task with 
media, could provide more insight and understanding of this trend for scholars and 
policy makers interested in this phenomenon. 
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Chapter 6: Thoughts on applications 
 
1. Chapter outline 
 
In this chapter I define my position in relation to the interdisciplinary applied context 
that framed my doctoral research, in order to show how my ethnographic findings, 
which were influenced by this context, could be applied in order to change the type 
of questions that projects focused on energy reduction address. 
In the next section, I discuss approaches to interdisciplinary work and to applied 
anthropology, and I situate myself in relation to the context of the LEEDR project 
that my doctoral research was part of. Following Strathern’s (2006) approach to 
interdisciplinarity, I ground my research in – following the methods and responding 
to the concerns of – one discipline, the discipline of social anthropology, while 
regarding the potential of interdisciplinary work to appear a posteriori the 
completion of the disciplinary research, when one might let oneself ‘be captured’ by 
the concerns of another discipline, while, and through, maintaining a critical stance. 
This position is visible in the structure of my doctoral dissertation and in the way I 
have analysed my findings. I see the main scope of my thesis to respond to current 
debates in anthropological theory and to contribute to the advancement of new 
perspectives on human agency. The empirical chapters of my thesis – chapters 
three to five – analyse and present ethnographic data in relation to existent 
anthropological topics and bodies of theory on human agency, time, kinship, 
domesticity, and imagination. After addressing this scope, in the current chapter I 
let myself captured by the environmental concerns of the domestic sustainability 
agenda.  
In the third part, I discuss the way in which research questions were formulated in 
previous applied studies of domestic energy consumption research and, following 
the work of Hobson (2011), I argue for a change of perspective from a ‘homes as 
places where people consume energy’ premise to a ‘homes as sites of action’ 
approach. 
In the fourth and fifth sections I discuss possible applications of the research 
findings that I presented in the empirical chapters. In the fourth part I discuss the 
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ways in which the idea of opting for a family-style lifestyle in English middle-class 
kinship (Strathern 1992) organizes ideas of morality, and I ask whether, and how, 
everyday actions oriented towards the preservation of the environment can fit into 
this system of thought. In the fifth section, I compare the folk models of time and of 
agency employed by my participants in their everyday domestic lives with the 
temporality expressed by the Climate Change Act, and I propose some ways to 
reconcile these distinct approaches to, and enactments of, time. I conclude in the 
sixth section. 
 
2. Applied interdisciplinary research and anthropology 
 
In this section, I situate my doctoral research in relation to the interdisciplinary 
applied project that framed it, and that, to an extent, made it possible. I focus on two 
elements of the context of my research that were essential in influencing the 
research design, the completion of my ethnographic fieldwork, and the analysis of 
my findings: interdisciplinary discussions and the expectation of applications.  
Interdisciplinarity, in its contemporary understanding as a way of conducting 
research and of producing knowledge that crosses the boundaries between 
physical sciences and humanities and social sciences (Barry et al. 2008), has 
recently ‘come to be seen as a solution to a series of contemporary problems, in 
particular the relations between science and society, the development of 
accountability and the need to foster innovation in the knowledge economy’ (Barry, 
Born, and Weszkalnys 2008: 21). When it does not happen ‘naturally’, the creation 
of interdisciplinary endeavours is encouraged by funding bodies; in funding calls, 
and in subsequent findings reports, the evocation of the ‘degree’ of 
interdisciplinarity achieved could often be regarded as representing an index of 
accountability, and of innovation, in itself (Strathern 2004b).  
Marilyn Strathern (2004b, 2006) questions the assumptions that this new form of 
knowledge production is based upon. She distinguishes between a managerial 
model of knowledge creation and a research model, and she discusses their 
characteristics in relation to the contemporary context where ‘evidence-based 
policy-making goes hand in hand with a Euro-American understanding of the world 
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as full of uncertainties (…) [that] are not just political or economic but 
epistemological: we do not know enough – more research is needed’ (Strathern 
2006: 193). While a research model is concerned with understanding actions and 
processes for their own sake, in a managerial model research is employed in order 
to seek ‘normative precepts by which to act or give advice’ (idem). The 
anthropologist outlines that she does not oppose the two models in a totalizing way 
and she admits that they are often employed in combination in today’s academic 
context. She suggests that each of the two models should be seen as representing 
a specific point in ‘a particular Euro-American oscillation between the condition of 
knowing through investigation (research) and the condition of asking what is to be 
done with that knowledge (management)’ (ibid p. 195). From this perspective, the 
project that framed my doctoral research can be seen as rather expressing a 
managerial model of knowledge creation, where knowledge is produced with the 
scope of informing future technological, or policy-based, interventions in relation to 
domestic energy demand reduction. These possible future applications of the 
knowledge that the LEEDR project is expected to deliver are part of the wider 
management process of reducing the UK’s carbon emissions by the year 2050, 
legislated in the Climate Change Act.  
When the research carried out by following a managerial model is also defined as 
interdisciplinary, a main problem that can arise, as outlined by Strathern (2006), is 
the criteria for evaluating it. Interdisciplinarity is something else than a discipline; it 
is a dialogue between disciplines. For Strathern (2006), a discipline ‘is a body of 
data, a set of methods, a field of problematics; it is also a bundle of yardsticks, that 
is, criteria for evaluating products and maintaining standards’ (ibid p. 199). An 
important framework for evaluation offered by a discipline is, in Strathern’s (2006) 
view, criticism. In contrast, interdisciplinary endeavours cannot be evaluated inside 
similar frameworks: ‘the single outcome, the integrated collaboration, is impossible 
to measure against its own diverse origins’ (ibid p. 201). In this situation, Strathern 
sees the scope of interdisciplinarity to be in the possibility of initiating criticism as a 
way of letting oneself to be captured by the concerns of a different discipline. Thus, 
the potential of interdisciplinary work appears after the completion of the disciplinary 
research, at the point when one asks what is to be done with the knowledge that 
was gained: ‘interdisciplinary collaborations work best not as tools (means) in 
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research, but as representations (signs) of desired ends in knowledge management’ 
(ibid p. 200).  
The second characteristic of the LEEDR context that was instrumental in the 
development of my research was the applied dimension. The position of working as 
part of an applied project as an anthropologist brings up discussions about taken for 
granted distinctions between ‘applied anthropology’ and ‘academic anthropology’, 
as I discussed in more detail in the methodological chapter. As several 
anthropologists conducting applied research have argued, from the standpoint of 
the academia, applied work may still be viewed as ‘impure’ and compromised 
(Roberts 2006, Wright 2006, Sunderland and Denny 2007). Sillitoe (2007) argues 
that these two forms of anthropological research should not be regarded in 
opposition, and he suggests that ‘academic research is often a prerequisite for 
flourishing applied work’ (Sillitoe 2007: 161). In order to move forward the 
discussion from a dichotomous conflict to a form of reconciliation that would 
contribute to the advancement of both types of endeavours, he asks how the 
discipline of anthropology can be applied. He suggests that there are two ways in 
which the idea of applying anthropology can be understood: applying the methods 
of anthropology; and investigating the applicability of the knowledge that 
anthropologists have learned through their fieldwork and that they have 
‘systematized in various ways using the theories of the moment’ (Sillitoe 2007: 155). 
Both approaches could be equally fruitful, even if they are based upon different sets 
of findings. Applying anthropological methods to the study of contemporary 
questions can bring a fresh perspective on a set of research interests that have 
previously been conscientiously delimited and defined, such as the concern with the 
ways in which people interact with energy meters (Hargreaves et al. 2010). This 
type of problem-solving approach is often what it is expected from anthropologists 
working as part of interdisciplinary energy research projects, where they are often 
regarded as ‘people experts’ (Henning 2005). Applying the knowledge that the 
anthropologists have gained through long-term ethnographic fieldwork is a process 
that necessitates a wider time-frame (Rabinow et al. 2008). It requires the 
opportunities of engaging in long-term fieldwork and of having an open and flexible 
research agenda that would allow one to change focus by following serendipitous 
findings and relationships; and of having the readiness, after analysing this 
knowledge in relation to a corpus of anthropological theory, to look back at it, again, 
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from the standpoint of an applied agenda. In this more ‘traditional’ anthropological 
approach to fieldwork, one is required to momentarily suspend any concerns 
towards applications, and to engage in a learning process that would unfold what 
are the important ideas, meanings and processes in relation to which one’s 
research participants organize and make sense of their lives. This knowledge 
corresponds to a research model, in Strathern’s (2006) conceptualization, and it is 
legitimate in itself. The reinterpretation of this knowledge from the standpoint of an 
applied agenda would be a whole different process, and which would produce a 
new corpus of knowledge. In my thesis, it is this form of applied anthropology that I 
seek. After having interpreted my findings in relation to existent anthropological 
theory, in the previous three empirical chapters, this last chapter represents the 
beginning of a process of secondary analysis, which follows concerns with possible 
applications in relation to the domestic sustainability agenda, which is discussed in 
the next section.   
 
3. Questioning the positioning of domestic energy consumption 
research 
 
In the introduction to their collective volume on anthropological perspectives on the 
study of cultural ideas about energy in various societies around the world, Strauss, 
Rupp and Love (2013) outline that ‘because of the necessity of institutions to 
manage energy flows, and because of the necessity of energy flows to individual 
agency, an anthropology of energy is necessarily political’ (2013: 12). Institutions 
that regulate energy markets and that create systems of transaction for energy 
resources and for carbon emissions are, arguably, the main actors in changing 
‘energyscapes’ (ibid p. 11), at national and transnational levels. However, in public-
funded research projects focused on reducing energy demand these institutions are, 
sometimes, taken for granted: they represent the context that made the research 
possible, and the results of the research need to be ‘delivered’ to them in order to 
inform further forms of planning and regulation.  
As a consequence, researchers working in what could be defined as one-sided 
projects oriented only towards the laypeople-end can be regarded by research 
participants as representatives and ‘translators’ of the national environmental 
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agenda to local communities and to domestic consumers, in a ‘top-down’ 
perspective. As Hobson (2003, 2011) identified, and as it was also the case in my 
research, this agenda of domestic sustainable consumption is often considered 
unjust by laypeople: they express the feeling that, by changing their domestic 
practices and by ‘doing their bit’, they are not making any real difference, if the 
forms of action that the government takes are inefficient. Thus, if publicly-funded 
researchers can sometimes be oblivious of the political entanglements that frame 
the domestic sustainability agenda, everyday people are not. I argue that when 
working as part of a project that promotes domestic sustainability, critical 
awareness of the context that frames the research needs to be part of the process 
of interpretation of one’s findings. This does not necessarily require a change of 
perspective from everyday people’s actions to the processes through which the 
environment was formulated as a political project (Macnaghten 2003, Urry 2011). 
But it requires questioning one’s assumptions in designing, and in carrying out, a 
research project that responds to the domestic sustainability agenda. I follow this 
argument by focusing on two strands in the formulation of the domestic 
sustainability agenda in research and in policy. In this section, I will look at how 
domestic space has been conceptualised in literature that reports on findings of 
applied projects that investigate domestic energy demand. In the fifth section, I will 
address the temporal feature of the environmental policy agenda in the UK, as 
expressed in the Climate Change Act, in relation to the temporalities employed by 
my participants in their everyday lives. 
Discussing social sciences scholarly approaches to domestic sustainability, the 
geographer Guy Hawkins observes that ‘the household invoked in environmental 
policy is highly normalised and constituted through specific empirical processes. In 
contrast to this, “home” emerges as a complex spatial and temporal field where 
everyday life unfolds’ (Hawkins 2011: 69). In other words, the ‘domestic’ in the 
‘domestic energy demand reduction’ agenda, and what different people refer to as 
‘home’, are not the same entity. The first one represents the level of residential 
consumption, which, in addition to the energy consumption of the commercial, 
public, and industrial sectors, gives the equation of the national amounts of energy 
consumption, and of carbon emissions. The second one is a site of dwelling, where 
people carry on their lives and attribute meaning to their experiences, sometimes in 
the company of others. In order to link the abstract notion of the household that has 
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‘appropriate’ levels of energy consumption attributed to, to the idea (Douglas 1991), 
and to the experience, of home, an approach to homes ‘as places where people 
consume energy’ has been often adopted in interdisciplinary research on energy 
consumption, as a premise to build further investigations upon.  
While providing a good-enough framework for linking physical and social sciences 
approaches in order to obtain research funding, this premise could limit 
considerably the interpretation of one’s findings to an area of applications that 
assume the household as a site for government intervention and regulation. This 
perspective expresses a vision of social change as a unidirectional process that 
starts in institutions and that is subsequently adopted by individuals, who adapt 
their habits and behaviour in the face of societal ‘external’ transformations. In this 
vision, the cultural domains of private-domestic and public-‘politico-jural’ (Fraser 
1990, Yanagisako 1979, Yanagisako & Delaney 1995) appear as essentially 
divided in relation to potential enactments and expressions of political power. 
As Hobson (2011) argued, scholars adopting Foucault’s ideas on governmentality 
have criticized the discourses and the intentions of governmental interventions 
related to the domestic sustainability agenda for trying to impose a vision of ‘a self-
reflexive individual taking responsibility for knowing and reducing his or her 
emissions’ (Rutland and Aylett 2008: 642) and for aiming to create a ‘responsible, 
carbon-calculating individual’ (Slocum 2004: 765). A research focus on domestic 
energy demand reduction was also challenged, Hobson (2011) shows, by scholars 
who chose, instead, to look at community energy projects which, they argued, can 
be seen as sites of agency, as ‘a means for political activity on the part of the broad 
mass of citizens who join not just for social interaction but also to be actively 
involved in the making of public policy’ (Hoffman and High-Pippert 2005: 399). 
The geographer Kersty Hobson (2011) suggests that there are ways of looking at 
domestic life that do not abandon the possibility of a form of personal environmental 
politics in favour of green governance techniques. She proposes an approach 
based on the work of Foucault (1990, 2000) on ethical practices, suggesting that 
‘one could develop one’s own ethics as a way of resisting governmental imperatives’ 
(Hobson 2011: 204), through forms of self-reflection and by constantly asking ‘What 
do I aspire to be?’ (Cordner 2008). Her argument, which I discussed in more detail 
in the theoretical chapter, represents an essential point of reference for the way in 
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which I situate my work in relation to the domestic sustainability research agenda. 
In the perspective advocated by Hobson (2011), the domestic becomes a site of 
political power, being no longer the counterpart of the public-‘politico-jural’ domain 
(Fraser 1990), but its continuation. Following Hobson’s (2011) argument, one can 
replace the ‘homes as places where people consume energy’ premise with a 
‘homes as sites of action’ approach. In my dissertation I follow this latter approach. 
One way in which this approach can be employed in interdisciplinary research of 
domestic energy consumption is by provisionally suspending a direct concern with 
energy demand in order to look at the forms of actions that people do inside their 
homes and that make them feel empowered – actions that are, in Foucault’s (1990, 
2000) terms, ‘practices of freedom’. During my fieldwork, I found out that it is these 
actions that people value the most; and this discovery enabled me to develop the 
concept of ‘ordinary agency’. The anthropologists Strauss, Rupp and Love (2013) 
argue that ‘how people use energy is related to how people value it; and how 
people value energy is related to what it enables them to accomplish not only 
materially but also socially and culturally’ (2013: 15). By looking at the forms of 
‘ordinary agency’ that are articulated and enacted inside the home, one 
momentarily loses a focus on domestic energy demand, only to recover it later, 
enriched and able to respond to questions that are not merely following a problem-
solving approach – as, for example, a focus on the accommodation of a specific 
new technology, like the energy meter, might be argued to do, if separated from 
other issues that were of importance for the research participants.  
By adopting the premise of ‘homes as sites of action’ and, most importantly, by 
proposing it at an institutional level, in policy formulations, a ‘constructive and 
positive slippage’ (Hobson 2011: 205) can begin to happen, with individuals and 
societal institutions overcoming a crisis of trust (Beck & Beck-Gernstein 2002, 
Giddens 1994), in order to engage together towards enacting a more sustainable 
future. In the fifth section, I suggest some ways in which this collaborative approach 
can be expressed by mediating between the temporalities of institutions and the 
temporalities of everyday domestic life. 
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4. Family-style living and energy consumption 
 
When the LEEDR project advertised for participants, they called for ‘home-owner 
families’. In this description, neither a suggestion of class, nor of demographic 
characteristics – such as the size and the ‘type’ of the family (nuclear, extended, or 
single-parent), the civil status of the couple, or their sexual orientation – was 
present. Still, the families who volunteered – the families who defined themselves 
as ‘home-owner families’, and who were interested to take part in the project – were 
all families where the adults were heterosexual and married, and who had children. 
With the exception of a single-parent family, and of an extended family comprising 
the maternal grandmother living in, all families were two-parent nuclear families. 
From the twenty family-participants, eighteen could be described, in terms of 
income and education, as ‘middle-class’, while the other two could be described – 
and they defined themselves during interviews – as being ‘working-class’. While this 
might represent, largely, a characteristic of the provincial locality where the 
research was set, it also shows that, no matter how diverse contemporary forms of 
cohabiting might be, when it comes to represent one’s cohabiting group as a family 
to a team of public-funded researchers – who, by addressing the questions 
formulated by a public funding body, might be seen as representing the national 
government, the ‘traditional’ representation of family takes precedence in front of 
other, alternative, representations. 
What is it that makes the construct of family in the UK to appear and to be 
expressed as ‘enduring’, as a ‘pillar of supposed stability’ (Silva and Smart 1999: 2-
3), in the face of various other social changes? As discussed in greater detail in the 
previous chapter, for looking at English middle-class kinship in my thesis, I follow 
the theoretical apparatus developed by Strathern (1992). According to her, the ‘first 
fact’ of English kinship is ‘the individuality of persons’ (Strathern 1992: 14). The 
articulation of the concept of family, can, thus, be regarded as following what 
Macfarlane (1978) calls English individualism, and that he describes as being an 
important cultural trait, dating centuries before the beginnings of industrialization. 
English individualistic ideas suggest that, through domesticity, one is entitled to lead 
a form of self-supporting and self-sufficient lifestyle that limits the amount of close 
relationships with non-kin. Strathern (1992) suggests that later, in Victorian England, 
with the appearance and development of the middle classes, the domestic space 
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came to stand for personal cultivation and individual improvement: ‘The internal 
(what is within persons) has been literalised as an interior (residential) space’ (1992: 
103). Furthermore, in post-Thatcherite Britain, individualism, as both self-
improvement, and self-sufficiency and privacy, is achieved through family-style 
living as an experience, and as a display of right choosing and acting. The ideas 
that ‘the quality of home life has an independent measure’ (ibid p. 149), and that 
opting for a family-style lifestyle shows one’s capacity for morality, together with the 
assumption that people naturally know what is right by having had internalized 
convention as personal style, reveal families as distinct universes following internal 
self-designed and self-imposed norms. 
During my fieldwork, my research participants used the concept of ‘family’ in both 
descriptive, and explanatory, ways. They used it to describe the form of social 
organization that organized their experience of domesticity – a family-style lifestyle, 
in Strathern’s words –; and they used it to explain the reasons why they did specific 
things in their house – such as leaving on the landing light overnight – or the 
reasons why they did things in specific ways. For example, several families 
explained that for drying their laundry they would normally use the tumble dryer 
because they are a family (of four or more) and they have a lot of laundry. Thus, 
‘family’ was understood to be a self-sufficient entity that had both agency of its own 
– family as a domestic ‘reality’ that asked for specific goods and practices, such as 
a tumble dryer, in order to continue to exist – and that collected the agency of 
individual family members in a concentrated form, as people would engage in 
‘family time’ routines, or create an ‘elusive presences’ form of sociality, in order to 
‘do’ (Morgan 1996) family. But, if a lifestyle can have agency in itself, then, who, or 
what, is responsible for (the consequences of) the practices and the commodities 
this lifestyle entails? It is neither the lifestyle, nor the individual persons who choose 
it, and who, by choosing it, have already shown their capacity for morality, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter. This is, then, a complex societal problem that 
needs to be addressed in much broader ways, than just by asking families to 
reduce their energy consumption, and still stay families. 
In his study of British green communes founded in the 1970s, the geographer David 
Pepper shows that communal living appeared and developed as an alternative to 
the nuclear family, which was considered a form of social organisation that was 
‘unnaturally exclusive’ (1991: 10), and which represented a terrain for gender 
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inequalities and for exploitation. As an individualistic unit, oriented towards itself, 
the nuclear family was seen as incapable of generating, and promoting, an altruistic 
way of living that would account for the needs of the environment, and that would 
let all its members to feel equally empowered. Concerning the first issue, there still 
seems to be an irreconcilable everyday dilemma between the ideas of caring for 
one’s family, and caring for the environment. During the first LEEDR interview with 
Cynthia’s and Jeff’s family, conducted by a researcher from the discipline of design 
that I accompanied, Jeff mentioned that his brother used to live off the land, in a 
commune, until his first baby was born. After this event, he and his partner moved 
back to a town where he got a job, and, thus, constant income, which allowed him 
to look after the baby’s material needs much better than he could have done by 
only counting upon cultivating the land, as part of a commune. The conclusion of 
this story, which linked this narrative with other similar stories that I came across 
during my fieldwork, was the unquestionable fact that, once one has a baby, going 
back to live as part of the established social order was the best choice. Cynthia 
expressed this dilemma in relation to their use of the tumble dryer. She said that 
they would like to be able to use the machine much less frequently than they do at 
the moment, but, when school uniforms, or work clothes, or other frequently used 
items need to be washed and dried by the next morning, they do not have a choice, 
but to use the tumble dryer. Self-sufficiency in doing the laundry, as opposed to the 
situation when one needs to rely upon the weather in order to get the laundry dried, 
was, here, linked to normative expectations related to living as part of the 
established social order, and to opting for convention as a way of expressing right 
acting and one’s capacity for morality. When faced with an ambiguous action, which 
did not represent the ‘greenest’ or the ‘lowest-carbon’ choice, people emphasized 
the positive role this action had in their family life, where keeping up the routine was 
seen as positive, in comparison to a potential disruption that a demand to account 
for the needs of other entities besides their kin could have brought. 
In her book based on ethnographic research of a small Norwegian town, Norgaard 
(2011) looks at what she calls the socially organized denial of climate change in 
everyday life, which she defines ‘as the process by which individuals collectively 
distance themselves from information because of norms of emotion, conversation, 
and attention and by which they use an existing cultural repertoire of strategies in 
the process’ (Norgaard 2011: 9). An important such cultural strategy that she 
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identifies is based on local cultural homogeneity, and on a strong emphasis placed 
upon tradition, which provides a normative definition for the concept of being a 
‘good person’, as well as a set of ‘proper’ ways to do any type of everyday activity. 
The way denial is organized, Norgaard (2011) argues, can differ with the cultural 
context. 
In my research, it was not a process of denial as such that I learnt to be 
instrumental for people’s responses to the idea of climate change. My research 
participants were sensible to environmental concerns, and many of them engaged 
in a variety of sustainable actions, such as growing their own food, cycling to work, 
or using green energy produced by the solar panels that they had installed on their 
roof. But, when everyday choices had to be made between an action with good 
(long-term) consequences for the environment, and an action whose (immediate) 
consequences would suit one’s family, the family was considered more important 
than the environment – or, in Strathern’s (1992) conceptualization, ‘culture’ was 
considered more important than, or ‘superior’ to, ‘nature’. In other words, the 
normativity carried by the concept of middle-class family appeared to be much 
stronger, and much wider adopted, and enacted, than possible norms of caring for 
the environment, in the provincial context where I carried out my fieldwork. 
Concerning the second problem of the nuclear family identified by Pepper’s (1991) 
informants, that of being a form of social organisation based on inequality and on 
everyday forms of domination and oppression, my fieldwork showed a different 
story. As discussed in the previous chapter, my research participants were 
concerned with creating forms of sociality that involved both togetherness and 
independence, thus contributing to ‘doing’ family (Morgan 1996), and encouraging 
individual interests and preoccupations, at the same time. These concerns showed 
‘ethical imagination’ (Moore 2011) in developing relationships of mutual 
empowerment. The results of Pepper’s (1991) study show that life in a commune 
does not eliminate relationship problems and the unequal distribution of power. He 
suggests that, by living in communes, people ‘merely swap one set of family 
problems (nuclear) for another (extended)’ (Pepper 1991: 151). The potential 
change of focus that might have happened in the last two decades, between 
Pepper’s research and mine, from a perspective on commonality and individualism 
as mutually exclusive, to a concern with achieving and experiencing togetherness 
and independence simultaneously, shows that the nuclear family is not a form of 
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social organisation that is oppressive in itself, but, rather, that people are able to 
make this form of co-habiting into what they wish it to be.      
Therefore, the problem is not that the nuclear family is the dominant form of social 
organisation in the English context, but that the middle-class family is equated to a 
dominant form of morality that is contained in its very articulation: the morality of 
having a family-style lifestyle and of bringing up children is seen as sufficient in 
itself and it does not leave room, and time, for other ethical concerns oriented 
towards other entities than kin. By drawing upon Strathern’s (1992) work on English 
middle-class kinship, which I discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, I 
suggested that, if having a family-style lifestyle embeds convention, and if 
convention is seen to express morality, then opting for a family-style lifestyle shows 
one’s capacity for morality and for right acting. The fact that concerns with the 
environment, and concerns with one’s kin, were often articulated in mutual 
opposition, should not be seen as expressing a fundamental conflict, but only as 
illustrating one way in which these ideas were connected in the domain of everyday 
life, at one particular point in time. In making and explaining various everyday 
choices, such as those discussed earlier, my participants made appeal to the 
morality embedded in having a family-style lifestyle, as it represented the principal 
moral system that they could communicate to a team of researchers interested in 
reducing domestic energy demand, in a secular middle-class provincial context. 
Making a set of everyday choices that would favour the environment to one’s kin 
immediate comfort might be regarded as actions associated with alternative 
lifestyles that promote communal living and a return to the land. But, as these 
alternative lifestyles do not embed convention, they do not have the capacity to 
express morality in the same measure as the idea of family-style living does. 
This shows that, probably, it would be difficult to reach a growing concern with the 
environment, if a set of normative ideas about family-style living as inherently moral 
is being maintained, and promoted, at the same time. Thus, when communicating 
research findings, it is not just that wide audiences would need to be given more 
information about the environmental impact of their everyday choices, but that the 
assumption that a family-style lifestyle embeds morality by default, in front of any 
other possible lifestyle, should be publicly and openly questioned. 
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5. Domestic time and the Climate Change Act 
 
I will now discuss the possible applications that the work developed in the third and 
fourth chapters, on the time modes of spontaneity and anticipation, could have. 
My theoretical framework for approaching the topic of time follows the work of the 
anthropologist Carol Greenhouse (1996), as I discussed in more detail in the first 
chapter. In her book about time, politics and culture, Greenhouse (1996) argues 
that cultural models of time are inextricably linked to cultural understandings of 
agency, as ‘time articulates people’s understandings of agency: literally, what 
makes things happen and what makes acts relevant in relation to social experience, 
however conceived’ (1996: 1). By carrying out a detailed analysis of previous 
anthropological approaches to the topic of time, she suggests that there are mainly 
two forms of time, both geometric, that are employed in ethnographic writing: the 
cyclical – that is identified in ideas about nature, rituals and the sacred – and the 
linear, which is used to understand progress and sequence. Greenhouse shows 
that the universalisation of linear time as ‘the more mundane, profane, practical, or 
objectively “true” construction of time’ (1996: 34) served at naturalising particular 
forms of social order. In assuming linear time to be real or ‘true’ time, there is an 
inherent legitimation of the dominant institutional forms. However, one should not 
assume that this temporal shape organizes all forms of human experience – such 
as, I argue, imagination, taking action on impulse, or forms of domestic sociality – in 
all cultures: ‘Linear time, which is the cultural preserve of national histories and the 
public institutions comprised in them, dominates those institutional settings only to 
the extent that the people who inhabit them (whether managers or employees, 
presidents or citizens) believe that linear time has a transcendent reality that allows 
it to absorb all the other, potentially rival temporal idioms that also suffuse daily life’ 
(Greenhouse 1996: 209). An important role of the ethnographic endeavour would 
be, in such contexts, to describe, and to conceptualize, some of the multiple 
formulations of time and of agency that are not necessarily recognized as such by 
dominant institutional forms. 
In my research, I have identified and described spontaneity and anticipation as 
cultural models of time and as forms of agency that are enacted as part of the 
routines and of the contingencies of everyday life. I have called these forms of 
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agency ‘ordinary agencies’ that are related to ‘non-conscious’ (unconscious, tacit, 
and non-intentional) acts of creating meaning, such as imagination and taking 
action on impulse. Moreover, I showed that the value of these forms of ‘ordinary 
agency’ does not stand in producing conspicuous and immediate effects on society. 
The ordinary agency engendered by spontaneity consists in generating feelings of 
empowerment over the people who enact it; these feelings of empowerment could 
subsequently be conditions for social change, as they extend one’s ‘ethical 
imagination’ (Moore 2011) regarding one’s relationships with oneself and with 
others. Similarly, anticipation can be seen as triggering the agency of the possible. 
The imagination of one’s future agentic engagement with the world is, in itself, a 
form of agency. This form of ‘ordinary agency’, expressed also in actions of hope 
(Miyazaki 2004), refers to the ‘meanings people attach to questions of possibility’ 
(Greenhouse 1996: 183), rather than to individual self-directed actions. 
As models of time, spontaneity and anticipation show different ways in which one 
could play with, blend, and knead the present and the future together. Spontaneity 
is an event in which a present want and a future fulfilment are uniquely overlapped 
in the performance of a ‘happy action’ (Taylor 1979). Anticipation is the act of 
making the future present by imagining a possibility, and it can be employed for an 
unlimited number of times during a period of waiting for a future event. Here, the 
direction of the time can be reversed, so that, in moments of anticipation, the future 
travels back to the present; then it travels forward to its former place; then it travels 
back to the present once more whenever anticipation is employed again. Below, by 
following the conventional geometrical model expressed in the conceptualization of 
the linear and of the cyclical time, I propose a visual representation for spontaneity 
(Figure 11) and one for anticipation (Figure 12). 
The way in which I drew spontaneity represents the basic movement that is used in 
sewing and in waving; this also looks like the first half of the action of making a knot. 
Spontaneity happens as fast as all these three types of actions, and its results can 
be seen immediately, as the result of only one stich is immediately visible in the 
layout of an embroidery canvas. Spontaneity is, thus, an effortless and organic way 
of modifying the reality, of changing the world. 
Anticipation is a back and forth movement between present and future, which can 
also involve the past: for example, in anticipating the next Christmas one could 
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remember other past Christmases that one experienced. In contrast to spontaneity 
– which depicts a moment – the back and forth movement that is anticipation can 
be the underlying temporal pattern of a whole day, or of longer periods of time, such 
as a year or more in the case of writing a doctoral thesis, when one anticipates the 
end of this process in the shape of a ‘finite’ material object. Anticipation is a means 
of living not ‘only’ in the present and it expresses the complexity of the domain of 
everyday life by emphasizing ‘temporal diversity’ (Albert 2002, Geissler 2002), or 
the multiplicity of ‘times’ (Adam 1995).  
 
Figure 9 Linear time (my drawing) 
          
Figure 10 Cyclical time (my drawing)                                  Figure 11 Spontaneity (my drawing) 
 
 
Figure 12 Anticipation (my drawing) 
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Both spontaneity and anticipation can be employed as temporal modes in 
themselves, or in combination with other temporalities, such as linear or cyclical, 
which are used and expressed by other individual agents and institutions. 
Separately, or in diverse combinations, they are all part of the multiplicity of 
temporalities that exist, concomitantly, in one’s life. Some of these, such as linear 
time, can be seen as the dominant temporality of the social structure in the Western 
world (Greenhouse 1996). Having been institutionalized as the time of public life, 
linear time is also the model invoked in some capitalist societies in relation to 
planning, ideas of efficiency and specific systems of mass production, such as the 
‘on-time’ model (Hochschild 1997). A ‘well-planned time-saver schedule’ attitude 
towards time, related to the world of work in the USA, was identified, by Hochschild 
(1997), to be spreading inside the domain of home, in the way her participants tried 
to efficiently organize their family time. However, she suggests that her participants 
wished for ‘not simply more time, but a less alienating sense of time’ (Hochschild 
1997: 52): they wanted to approach time at home differently than at work. As I have 
shown in the third chapter, spontaneity expresses a different attitude to time: as the 
ability to do something unexpected, it liberates people from the constraints of 
efficiency related to a neoliberal context and to actions of ‘making’, expressing, 
instead, ‘ordinary agency’ and actions of ‘doing’. When enacted in a linear time-
frame – the time of public life that organizes experiences of work and general 
activities of scheduling in relation to wider social systems and institutions – 
spontaneous actions can be regarded as directed towards interrupting the uniform 
temporal linearity in order to create wished for future moments and to make them 
happen. Applying spontaneity to linear time would generate a new geometrical 
shape, represented below in Figure 13. I propose to regard this drawing as an 
advancement to existent understandings and representations of linear time, which 
will show that people can act upon linear time in order to make it complex and 
eventful. 
Similarly, when anticipation is used in a cyclical temporal framework, such as when 
one anticipates the Monday pub quiz, or the French dancing that takes place every 
second Wednesday of the month, the form of temporality generated could take the 
shape of a spiral (Figure 14). The drawings below should be seen as a creative 
exercise meant to open up anthropological imaginations towards other forms of 
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temporality beyond the linear and the cyclical, rather than as a ‘scientific’ 
representation.  
 
Figure 13 Spontaneity and linear time (my drawing) 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Anticipation and cyclical time (my drawing) 
 
 
While I describe spontaneity and anticipation as cultural models of time that 
emerged from my fieldwork with English families in domestic settings located in a 
small provincial town, my research and my identity as a researcher that the 
relationships with my participants have been built upon, can be regarded as 
situated within a different temporal framework, set by the national environmental 
policy. Linear time is the temporal form that underlies the environmental concerns in 
the UK that the LEEDR project, which frames the context of my research, responds 
to. These concerns are expressed in the Climate Change Act, a document set by 
the UK’s Parliament in 2008. This document legally binds the Parliament to reduce 
the country’s carbon emissions with 80% by the year 2050, in relation to the 1990 
baseline. By setting this target, the Climate Change Act creates a linear time-frame 
where the solution to a present problem is left to a distant future moment of hopeful 
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revelation. Both the numbers used in the act, a reduction of 80%, and the year 2050 
are high, and they seem unrealistic, and as part of a Sci-Fi domain, rather than an 
everyday achievable possibility, such as a target of a 15% reduction by the year 
2015, for example, would be. At a summer school organized by the UK’s Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC), and at other interdisciplinary events on energy 
research that I attended during my PhD, directors and managers working for 
UKERC and for other institutions concerned with energy research approached, in 
public presentations, the 2050 targets as unachievable, adding, with an ironic smile 
– or manic grin – that ‘fortunately I won’t be here by then’. As they estimated their 
biological disappearance to occur before 2050, the speakers did not consider 
themselves responsible for achieving the targets; rather, the ‘future’ in itself was 
expected to provide some fortuitous solutions. If this is how ‘people in charge’, who 
make a living by formulating funding calls for energy research projects, see their 
role in reducing energy demand, then how could one translate this environmental 
concern to everyday people? While the 2050 targets are accompanied by an interim 
target to reduce emissions by 34%in 2020 and by ‘carbon budgets’ covering 
periods of four years, these intermediate targets are not widely and publically 
discussed, as the general debate is framed by the 2050 targets. The statement of 
emissions for the first ‘carbon budget’ period – that was between 2008 and 2012 – 
is expected to be published this year. Meanwhile, the statement of emissions for the 
year 2011shows a net carbon decrease by 4% between 2010 and 2011, and it 
explains that this reduction was due to the warmer weather conditions in 2011 that 
resulted in a decrease of residential gas use (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2013). This formulation leaves the responsibility to achieve the 2050 
targets to the ‘future’ and to ‘nature’ – here, the weather. One could argue that a 
linear time-frame, whose end point is beyond the biological mortality of most of the 
members of the actual government and parliament, and whose segments – the 
‘carbon budgets’ – are made by set numbers, rather than by types of proposed 
actions, might not be the best form of temporality for laypeople to act within. This is 
not a critique directed towards the original proponents and signatories of the 
Climate Change Act, but just an observation about the incommensurability of the 
targets and of the time-frame proposed by this document, in relation to the 
everyday domestic temporalities and understandings of agency that laypeople 
enact. 
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In this context, I see my position as a researcher working for an applied 
interdisciplinary project concerned with reducing energy demand in a given 
temporal-frame, as responding to a double bind. First, in my relationships with my 
participants, by being part of the LEEDR project, I am regarded as a representative 
of the linear temporality of environmental concerns that is set by the Climate 
Change Act. Second, as an anthropologist who completed long-term ethnographic 
fieldwork, I wish to ‘give voice’ to my participants, and to describe, conceptualize, 
and express the models of time and the forms of ‘ordinary agency’ that they employ 
in their everyday lives, to wider institutions and structures. This conflict of 
temporalities might be what made my findings possible in the first place, as my 
participants welcomed me in the nitty-gritty of their ordinary lives, talked about and 
enacted ‘ordinary agencies’ in front of me, while I was, arguably, a representative of 
the ‘neoliberal agency’ model (Gershon 2011) assumed by the linear time-frame of 
the 2050 targets. The fact that they let me discover the time modes of spontaneity 
and anticipation could, thus, be seen as a response to the linear time-frame that I 
was representing. I see the act of accommodating their folk models of time and 
agency in my research not as a question of translation – to ‘higher’ institutions and 
structures – but rather as a question of mediation.  
Thus, to reconcile the linear time-frame expressed by the Climate Change Act and 
by the existence of the applied project that my doctoral research is part of, and the 
temporalities of everyday life employed by my participants, I suggest that a greater 
effort can be made in the way in which the goals of reducing the country’s carbon 
emissions are formulated. Actions of spontaneity and of anticipation can be argued 
to involve energy consumption: for example, by using digital media to find out the 
answer to a question of momentous concern and by leaving a light on for a family 
member that is expected to return home. But what they also do is to generate 
agency: they make people feel that they can contribute to changing the world; they 
are, in Foucault’s (1990, 2000) terms, ‘practices of freedom’. Thus, it is exactly 
these everyday actions that should be encouraged, and not supressed, by 
‘behaviour-change’ interventions and strategies developed in relation to the 
domestic sustainability agenda. By starting from a ‘homes as sites for action’ 
premise, and by acknowledging everyday domestic moments of interruption as 
political action (Hobson 2011), a collaborative approach to sustainability could 
emerge. The recognition, and the adoption, of a more complex model of time and of 
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agency in the formulation of the carbon emission reduction goals could be 
translated into a variety of propositions that would encourage public debate and 
collective action.  
Building upon the time mode of anticipation, schedules and slots for energy saving 
could be proposed as cyclical occurrences, or in relation to events that are 
recognized and celebrated widely, such as Christmas. For example, December 
could be proposed as a month when people should switch off all their energy-
consuming appliances ten minutes earlier than normally, every evening, in 
preparation for the higher energy consumption that might occur during the 
Christmas day. Committing to this proposition would be a form of marking time itself, 
by counting down the days before Christmas with an action that would be as visible 
as using an advent calendar. Besides celebratory events, anticipation in relation to 
a cyclical time model could be engaged by creating low-profile events related to 
domestic everyday preoccupations, such as the challenge of not using the tumble 
dryer every second weekend of the month, no matter how the weather is; or of 
switching the heating off earlier on Mondays, as a post-weekend action aimed at 
making up for the potentially higher levels of energy consumption that were reached 
on Saturday and Sunday.   
Addressing the time mode of spontaneity, a competition to save energy through 
hacking could be proposed. This would involve building low energy-consuming 
devices from scratch, or combining various devices in a creative way that would 
lead to saving energy. As I described in the previous chapters, my participants are 
already used to finding out ways of combining the technologies they own in new 
assemblages that show their creativity and individuality. A good example of 
everyday creativity is in Iris and Steve’s recounting of a Christmas holiday, when 
they accessed YouTube through the Wii on their TV in the kitchen to play a video of 
a crackling fire, while broadcasting a Christmas jukebox radio station by attaching 
an iPad to speakers. This form of creativity that involves spontaneous actions could 
be encouraged and directed towards the goal of energy saving. 
I have given a few examples of calls to collective action that would fit into existent 
domestic temporalities. These types of programs could provide the opportunity for 
the people who would respond and take action to feel empowered and responsible, 
and to take further actions in relation to environmental, or other types of social, 
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concerns.  With these ideas, I want to show that the incongruity between the 
models of time assumed in environmental policy, and the ones that people enact in 
their everyday lives, is not unresolvable; but it is an issue that just needs to be 
observed and tackled, rather than ignored. By developing, in environmental policy, 
a more elaborate approach to time that takes into consideration ‘ordinary agencies’ 
and the forms of temporality of the everyday, this incongruity could be transformed 
into complexity, and the conflict experienced by a double-bind researcher could 
reach a creative resolution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I situated my approach to interdisciplinary work and to applied 
anthropology, and I discussed some possible applications of my ethnographic 
findings. The reasons why I defined my position in relation the context of my 
research only in the last chapter is in the scope of my thesis to advance existent 
anthropological conceptualizations of agency, scope that I was able to realize by 
momentarily suspending my concerns with possible applications of my findings in 
relation to energy demand reduction. I theoretically legitimise this process of 
suspension by employing Strathern’s (2006) approach to interdisciplinarity, and 
Sillitoe’s (2007) perspective on applied anthropology.  
While being the last chapter of my doctoral thesis, this chapter also represents the 
beginning of a new process of reinterpreting my anthropological analysis in relation 
to environmental concerns. Here, I argued for a ‘homes as sites of action’ approach 
for future research projects addressing domestic sustainability, and I introduced 
new ways of conceptualizing the possible difficulties that hinder a straightforward 
achievement of sustainability. Some of these difficulties, I found, are in the powerful 
constellations of normativity and morality attributed to having a family-style lifestyle 
in English middle-class contexts; and in the incongruity between the temporality 
expressed by the climate Change Act and the temporalities that laypeople enact in 
their everyday domestic lives. I hope that the propositions that I sketched out in this 
chapter could be further developed, in order to improve future research formulations 
in the areas of domestic energy consumption and domestic sustainability. 
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Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of my dissertation start by discussing the advancements brought 
by the theoretical work that I developed, in two strands: focusing on human agency 
and on time; they continue by summing up the contributions developed in the 
empirical chapters of my thesis, on spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family time’, as 
well as my methodological contributions; next, I discuss the limitations of my study; 
and I end up by looking at possible future directions and applications of my 
research.  
 
Human agency 
 
Focusing on domestic everyday life of middle-class English families, in the context 
provided by a medium-sized provincial town situated in the Midlands area, this 
dissertation proposed a lens for looking at everyday actions as meaningful for social 
transformation, and as expressive of human agency, by developing the concept of 
‘ordinary agency’. Situated within a theoretical framework that brought together 
recent developments in anthropological theory on surpassing, firstly, the tensions 
between social constructivist and vitalist approaches (Moore 2011) and, secondly, 
the influence that neoliberal contexts have upon the ways in which social sciences 
scholars look at human agency (Gershon 2011), the concept of ‘ordinary agency’ 
refers to ‘non-conscious’ – unconscious, tacit, and non-intentional – acts of creating 
meaning, such as imagination and taking action on impulse. These types of actions 
can be regarded, by following the Aristotelian distinction between ‘doing’ and 
‘making’, as activities of ‘doing’: actions where means and ends coincide, as the 
end is the act itself – the scope is no other than just doing. In this respect, the 
approach to the domain of the practical followed by this thesis is congruent to the 
regard on praxis that Foucault (1990; 2000) fosters in his conceptualization of 
‘ethical practices’, and that is further advanced by Moore (2011) through the 
concept of ‘ethical imagination’. The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation, 
therefore, can be regarded to be the building up of a theoretical framework, and the 
development of a working concept, that supports the opening-up of what is 
considered to be human agency. This development could be further employed and 
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advanced in research looking at various aspects of life and at various forms of 
activity that might represent ‘doing’ rather than ‘making’, such as sports activities, 
performing arts, hacking (Coleman 2013), flash mobs and other various forms of 
protest, human-animal relationships, countryside walking, play.     
  
Time 
 
The forms of ‘ordinary agency’ discussed in this thesis, I argued, were articulated in 
relation to alternative understandings of, and engagements with, time, such as 
spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family time’. I approached the relationship between 
time and agency by following the work of Greenhouse (1996) on this topic. She 
argues that the models of time that are developed and followed by various social 
groups articulate the understandings of agency of the people who are part of these 
groups. In my dissertation, I proposed to regard spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family 
time’ as time modes developed in domestic middle-class English contexts, and that 
express counterdiscourses to the dominance of a linear form of temporality. These 
time modes, which co-exist with linear time, bring out the creativity and the 
eventfulness that can rest within the domain of the everyday, and they work by 
blending and kneading the present and the future together in various ways. 
Spontaneity and anticipation make the future present, by creating wished-for future 
moments and by making them happen; and, respectively, by coating the present 
with the imagination of the future. ‘Family time’ aims at making the present future by 
prolonging it, by operating into the present continuous mode. My contribution to the 
anthropological corpus of literature on time stands in identifying and conceptualizing 
a set of time modes, or approaches to time, that I situated in the domain of 
domesticity and of everyday life. Spontaneity, anticipation and ‘family time’ can, 
arguably, be regarded as cultural and as specifically related to the types of social 
groups that I conducted research with – middle-class English families. By 
describing, conceptualizing, and developing theoretical frameworks to situate these 
time modes, I created a precedent for future research interested in folk models of 
time beyond linear and cyclical temporalities. While Greenhouse (1996) mentions 
some examples of possible and critical counterdiscourses of time, such as 
creationism, laziness, superstition and witchcraft, she does not focus upon 
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explaining and theorising them, as the scope of her publication is a different one. 
My work provides an example of the ways in which one could ethnographically 
access, identify, and theoretically situate, understandings, engagements with, and 
enactments of, time. My approach could be inspiring of, and further advanced by, 
research on the relationships with time developed and expressed by other groups 
of people, of different ages and at different life stages than my participants, and 
living in various cultural contexts. I believe that a focus on time can contribute to 
developing new knowledge on the ways in which people approach, experience and 
convey meaning to everyday life, and that pursuing this focus would be a positive 
research endeavour that could complement what is already ‘known’ about specific 
groups from research focusing on ‘problems’ associated with class, income, health, 
or education. 
 
Spontaneity 
 
In order to situate spontaneity I proposed a theoretical framework based upon the 
work of the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe (2000[1957]; 1981) on 
intentionality and on her reconceptualization of the Aristotelian concept of ‘practical 
truth’. I showed that, as a time-mode that articulates a counterdiscourse to linear 
time by making the future present, spontaneity expresses forms of ‘ordinary agency’ 
engendered by emotions associated with self-confidence and empowerment. At the 
same time, as a means of engagement with the world, spontaneity is characterized 
by ‘sincerity in the way of doing’ a task (Slade 1968). In the chapter dedicated to 
spontaneity, I discussed examples of spontaneous actions related to the use of 
digital devices, arguing that my participants used digital media in order to make a 
wider variety of wants attainable. Furthermore, I showed that the broadening of the 
category of immediately attainable wants can contribute to the development of new 
forms of sociality and to extending people’s ‘ethical imaginations’ (Moore 2011). I 
believe that the conceptualization of spontaneity developed here, and based upon 
the philosophical idea drawn from Anscombe, that, in ‘trying to get’ what they want, 
people are ‘doing the truth’, can be further employed and advanced in research 
looking at other forms of spontaneous action, such as those related to protest and 
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to new forms of social movements that employ forms of communication based on 
new digital technologies that can provide immediacy.   
 
Anticipation and the Mother-Multiple ontology 
 
The time mode of anticipation was discussed in my thesis in relation to the concept 
of Mother-Multiple ontology. I identified two forms of anticipation – looking forward 
to and short-term anticipation – and I situated them in relation to a series of 
techniques of imagination, such as visual rehearsal and non-guided imagery. I 
discussed the forms of agency that can come from imagining possibilities, such as 
one’s anticipated future agentic engagement with the world, as being the main 
expressions of ‘ordinary agency’ that anticipation engendered for my participants. In 
the chapter dedicated to anticipation, I also developed the concept of the Mother-
Multiple ontological position, as describing a mode of being that any individual can 
access when acting as the caregiver of family members, pets, and the home itself 
as an entity – collection of elements which I called ‘the domestic others’. Situated in 
relation to recent debates in anthropological theory about what was called the 
‘ontological turn’ (Henare et al 2007; Viveiros de Castro et al 2014), and in relation 
to the analytical framework developed by Strathern (1988) for regarding persons as 
being conceived both individually and dividually – made of parts that correspond to 
relationships –, I  conceptualized the ontology of the Mother-Multiple as a state of 
being that lets the individuals who access it to move from an individual to a dividual 
perspective. When occupying the position of the Mother-Multiple, one lets oneself 
be embodied by one’s domestic others, accessing and enacting knowledge related 
to the character, habits, needs, preferences and dislikes of the others. My 
conceptualization of this analytic lever, together with my discussion of the ways in 
which people enact the Mother-Multiple through actions of anticipation and care 
shows a new way of looking at practices related to mothering, and opens up the 
domain of ‘doing mothering’ to people who are not necessarily biological mothers, 
females, or adults. I believe that my contribution could be further advanced both in 
research on motherhood and mothering practices, and in studies looking at 
practices of care in kinship groups. My conceptualization of the time mode of 
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anticipation could be employed in research on time, and on people’s relationships 
with the future. 
 
Family time 
 
In looking at ‘family time’, I identified two forms of time – spontaneous ‘quality 
moments’ (Kremer-Sadlik and Paugh 2007) and evening times ‘family time’ – which 
are articulated together with two types of domestic sociality, both of which involve 
the use of digital devices, and which I called ‘elusive togetherness’ and ‘physical 
togetherness and digital independence’. I situated the concept of ‘family time’ in 
relation to the (normative) notion of ‘family’ in Euro-American contexts and I 
approached the tensions between a social constructivist perspective that argues 
that ‘family time’ is ‘an ideologically constituted form of prescription’ (Gillis 1996: 17), 
and a focus on people’s agency in developing a process of relationality (Gabb 2010) 
as a way of ‘doing’ family (Morgan 1996), through the lens provided by Strathern 
(1992). Following her discussion of the relationships between convention and 
choice in English middle-class kinship, I argued that by keeping ‘family time’ people 
‘do’ convention and show their capacity for morality; while what they do during 
‘family time’ is a matter of choice that reflects individuality and diversity. The form of 
‘ordinary agency’ that ‘family time’ engages is, thus, related to challenging the 
uniformity of a dominant social ideology of (middle-class) family, through the 
enactment of everyday ‘unconventional’ practices, habits and actions. By following 
existent literature in English kinship, I suggested that ‘family time’ can be regarded 
as a concept that is used in order to ‘measure’ the quality of home life in ‘family-
style lifestyle’ (Strathern 1992) settings; while making ‘family time’ can be seen as 
an everyday practice of ‘creating relatedness’ (Carsten 2000a). I believe that the 
work developed in this chapter contributes to, and advances existent literature on 
English kinship, through the description and conceptualization of a specific practice 
of creating relatedness, the practice of making ‘family time’, associated with the 
articulation of particular forms of domestic sociality. Further research on English 
(middle-class) kinship, as well as research on ‘family time’ and domestic sociality in 
other cultural contexts, could benefit from my findings, and, also, advance the 
theoretical perspective employed here. 
190 
 
 
Methods for the study of time 
 
The methodological contribution of my dissertation stands in advancing existent 
methodological approaches to the topic of time, through the development of a 
series of new methods for looking at the ways in which people understand, engage 
with, and make time. The Tactile Time collage provided the participants with multi-
sensory tools for expressing the ways in which they experienced time at different 
moments of the day; the Evening Time self-video recording activity focused 
specifically on evening ‘family time’ as a time of togetherness; and the Five Cups of 
Tea self-interviewing with video activity focused on moments of solitude and self-
reflection, and on the type of time that the action of having a cup of tea, as a break 
or interruption in the flow of everyday activities, can articulate. I believe these 
methods could be employed in future research on time and they can be further 
adapted and advanced in order to suit different groups of participants, in different 
contexts.  
 
Limitations 
 
The main limitation of my thesis might be the fact that it lacks a firm grounding in 
one particular field of study. Rather than situating my work within one field, and as 
following a particular direction in that field, I developed my theoretical framework by 
bringing together publications of different foci, united only by a similar concern. This 
endeavour felt rather risky at times, as I was worried that my thesis would lack the 
theoretical depth that comes from studying methodically the affordances and the 
limitations of a particular direction, in a specific field. With this risk in mind, I still 
hope that the effort of bringing together recent discussions, from various contexts, 
upon the importance of human agency (Gershon 2011; Hobson 2011; Moore 2011), 
and upon the scholarly tools that can be developed for addressing this topic in new 
ways (Das 2007; Gershon 2011; Greenhouse 1996; Moore 2011), did not seem 
superficial, and that the results of this approach have proved to be fruitful. 
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Future directions and applications 
 
The future directions that my research can be developed towards relate to the 
concerns expressed within the domestic sustainability research agenda. I believe 
that the possible applications of my findings, which I describe in the last chapter of 
the thesis, have the potential to influence the questions addressed in research 
projects following this agenda. My identification of the tensions between the 
morality associated with having a family-style lifestyle, and the notions of morality 
that can be related to low-carbon living, could open up the questions that are being 
addressed in research following the domestic sustainability agenda to approaches 
that are not merely problem-solving, but which could bring complexity into the 
discussion, by taking into consideration existent cultural values, meanings and 
understandings. An acknowledgment of the tensions between the temporal 
framework expressed by the Climate Change Act and the time modes developed 
and enacted by people in everyday domestic life could be translated into an 
approach, both in research and in policy-making, focused upon integrating these 
temporalities together in the process of planning, setting targets, and 
communicating these targets to the wider public.  
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Appendix: Mum’s Cup 
 
The video which accompanies this dissertation, titled Mum’s Cup, is to be regarded 
both, generally, as an independent ethnographic video project, and, specifically, as 
a visual ethnographic component that supports the theoretical and conceptual work 
developed in the fourth chapter, on anticipation and the Mother-Multiple ontology. 
This video project is based on material filmed in solitude by the participants for the 
Five Cups of Tea self-interviewing activity; and it also contains short extracts from 
participant-made recordings of Evening Times activities, as well as short extracts of 
filming that I made with the participants for the LEEDR research of laundry 
practices.  
Mum's Cup is a portrayal of four women’s practices of self-reflection and ethical 
work (Foucault 1990, 2000), in relation to the expectations, contradictions, and their 
everyday experiences of being mothers in contemporary Britain. In this respect, the 
video addresses the topic of mothering, providing a commentary, from four 
perspectives, on the ways in which gender differences are being articulated inside 
the home, in the context provided by middle-class English kinship as a system of 
thought (Strathern 1992) and by a medium-sized provincial town, in the year 2012. 
At the same time, the video reveals a form of epistolary intimacy in the relationship 
between the ethnographer and the participants, manifested when the physically 
absent researcher is addressed through the object that she has handed on, the 
video camera. From this perspective, Mum’s Cup reflects on the nature of 
ethnographic relationships between women, on empathy, and on friendship.     
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